In early April 1975 a Rockefeller Commission investigator interviewed CIA Staff member William C. Sturbitts. His notes read: "HUNT - on sick leave November 22, 1963, (per. Fin. Ofc.) On duty status November 21, 1963." During his Rockefeller Commission testimony, William C. Sturbitts was asked:

Q. Do you know what HUNT was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me, he was here at Headquarters in 1963, and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection?

A. Yes.

Q. --at the moment. It is possible he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of (Deleted) engaged--

A. I guess you are right, I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know HOWARD HUNT?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then, is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I have just asked you if your acquaintance with HUNT was such that you would have known his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing but -- bump into him perhaps downtown the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one day to the next.

A. No

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes. I have done it twice that I recall, and the most recent one was I guess -- I am trying to think. Well it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that HOWARD HUNT was on sick leave that day.

Q. Was this fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand from the files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had nine hours of sick leave during the two week pay period ending November 23, 1963, but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well--

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day, and a sick leave status the next day, and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. This is much more detailed information than I have been previously aware is available in the files of the agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But I can find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt, who is now retired, and at that time was Chief of the European Division. That was about a year ago I guess.

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated. About the bums in Dallas.

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was (deleted) for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something relating to Der Stern Magazine.

A. That is right.

Q. And I did understand you to say that in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that HUNT was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it, but I did get this through our Budget people who have contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before.

A. No, he was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. HUNT'S previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say the record reveals he was on duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

(Off the record discussion).

[NARA SSCIA 157-10011-1083 4.16.75]

Sturbitt's testimony was disturbing to the Rockefeller Commission because it was far more detailed than the information it had previously received. The outcome of this was unclear.

In late 1975 HOWARD HUNT was asked to supply the Rockefeller Commission with an affidavit regarding his whereabouts on November 22, 1963. HUNT filed this affidavit dated March 10, 1975, for the Rockefeller Commission:

I, E. HOWARD HUNT affirm the following to be my recollection of my whereabouts on November 22, 1963.

1. On that date I was an employee of the CIA assigned to the DOD located in a commercial building in Washington, D.C.

2. I was driving with my late wife on H Street near 8th or 9th Street when we first heard of the Kennedy shooting on the car radio. We had been purchasing Chinese groceries in a store named, as best as I can recall it, "Wah Ling." I do not know how long after the first radio reports were made that my wife and I first heard the news. Brinkley was the commentator I remember because of his having theorized a "right wing plot" i.e. Dallas citizens had abused Adlai Stevenson and the climate of Dallas extremism had caused Kennedy's shooting.

3. From the Chinese grocery store we drove out to Wisconsin Avenue to pick up our daughter Kevan, from Sidwell Friends School. On joining us my daughter told us what we already knew: that President Kennedy had been shot. She had learned this because two of Robert Kennedy's children had been taken from Sidwell Friends School presumably by Secret Service Agents.

4. From Kevan's school we drove directly to our home on Baltan Road in Sumner, Maryland (off Massachusetts Avenue extended.) At home was my newly born son David, (DOB September 1, 1963) a maid, Mary Trayner, and my wife's aunt, the late Leona Drexler of Chicago. Our elder son, St. John, a student at nearby Brookmont Elementary School, was probably already home. As I recall, our eldest child, Lisa, arrived soon afterward by bus from Ursuline Academy and joined us at the television set in our basement recreation room where we stayed long hours watching the unfolding events.

5. As to why I was not at my office that entire afternoon, I can only presume that I left early to help my wife shop for a planned Chinese dinner, in preparation of which I normally assisted.

6. I was never in Dallas, Texas, until late 1971, when, at the request of Charles Colson, I flew there to interview General Paul Harkins, former U.S. military commander in Vietnam.

7. I did not meet FRANK STURGIS until the spring of 1972, the introduction being performed by and at the office of BERNARD L. BARKER.

8. I never at anytime met or knew LEE HARVEY OSWALD, JACK RUBY or any other person involved in the Dallas slayings.

9. I was not in Mexico in 1963. In fact, I was not in Mexico between the years 1961 and 1970, and I have not been there since a weekend pleasure trip to Acapulco in July 1970.

10. I have no diaries or other memorabilia prior to 1969, having destroyed as many outdated files and records as possible to save weight in the move to my Florida home in July 1974. I retained only such records, bank statements, etc. as are required by the five year IRS for income tax purposes.

[NARA SSCIA 157-10011-10090]

HOWARD HUNT did not mention having had lunch with his wife at home as he did in his first interview with the FBI.

Kevan Hunt, who was 13-years-old in 1963, stated: "On November 22, 1963, I was a fifth grade student at the Sidwell Friends School in Washington, D.C. My father was not usually at breakfast with his children, so I do not recall seeing him in the morning before I went to school. To my knowledge, however, he was indeed home. He had not been traveling in the previous months.

"I remember that day more clearly than most children my age at the time, because two of Robert Kennedy's sons attended Sidwell Friends School. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. was in my class, and Joseph was a year ahead of me.

"It was rumored that afternoon that both Bobby and Joe had to be taken out of school. Later an announcement was made that the President had been shot in Dallas.

"At 3:30 p.m. both my mother and my father picked me up at school and took me home. I believe that they had been shopping earlier because grocery bags were in the car. I told them about the announcement that had been made at school, and my parents said they had just heard about it over the car radio. My father's reaction was shock and disbelief.

"My father was at home that weekend as well, and the family watched all of the television coverage related to the Presidential plane's arrival in Washington, and funeral proceedings.

"To my knowledge, my father had not left on any trips the months preceding the President's assassination, he was at home the day of the assassination, and he did not leave home that weekend. Kevan Hunt, March 12, 1975."

HUNT'S maid, Mary Trayner (born in England on November 11, 1918 - never married) sent HUNT this letter on February 6, 1975:

4806 DeRussey Parkway

Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Mr. HUNT:

I'm so glad that you thought of writing to me. I remember the day President Kennedy was shot very well, and I certainly remember you were there.

If you recall, Mrs. HUNT'S Aunt Leonie (I am sorry I can't remember her last name) from Chicago was staying with you for a few days and on the Friday Mrs. HUNT, her Aunt, and three children were going downtown to a movie matinee when Veronica Moppet called from the Spanish Embassy to tell Mrs. HUNT that the President had been shot. I remember we all stood around and stared at each other, than you put the television on, and the first thing we heard was the newsman saying that it was now 45 minutes since the shot had been fired, and that they still did not know how badly he had been injured.

I know that Mrs. Hunt's aunt is now dead, but it is possible that when she went back to Chicago she may have mentioned that you were there when the news came through to her daughter, Mrs. Hunt's cousin, Phyllis, although she might not remember it. She just may be able to corroborate your story too.

I can of course remember lots more details. It was the kind of day that stays in your mind. Mary Trayner gave this affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission:

2. On November 22, 1963, I was employed as a housekeeper by Mr. and Mrs. E. HOWARD HUNT who then lived on Baltan Road in Sumner, Maryland with their four children.

3. On that date Mrs. HUNT'S now deceased Aunt Leonie (whose last name I cannot recall) was visiting the HUNT'S house as a guest for a few days. She lived in Chicago. It may have been because of the Aunt's visit or a "Teachers Day" holiday that the children were all home from school in the early afternoon of that Friday.

4. Mr. HUNT was home as well. He was writing a book and spent a good deal of his time in the house. Mrs. HUNT was home too, and planned, with her aunt, to treat the three older children to a movie matinee.

5. Mrs. HUNT worked part-time at the Spanish Embassy where one of her close associates was Veronica Moppet, who has since married and departed the Embassy.

6. At about 2:15 p.m., as the two women and three children were preparing to go downtown to the matinee, Moppet telephoned Mrs. HUNT to report that President Kennedy had been shot. I remember that all of us, including Mr. and Mrs. HUNT, stood and stared at each other. I ran next door to the neighbors and asked what had happened. A neighbor suggested I turn on the radio. When I went back in the HUNT'S house, Mr. HUNT was turning on the T.V. set.

7. The first thing we heard on the T.V. was a newsman saying it was now 15 minutes since the shot had been fired and they still did not know how badly the President had been injured.

8. Mr. and Mrs. HUNT, Aunt Leonie, the three older Hunt children and I spent the rest of the day and that evening in the house watching T.V. reports.

Rockefeller Commission handwritten notes revealed "Mary Trayner 652-2939 Matinee? Went next door over radio HUNT around all day, I think. Children home. May have been excused for matinee since aunt visiting. 45 minutes after assassination. Watched in evening too with HUNT."

During a telephone call with HUNT on March 7, 1975, Robert Olsen, an investigator for the Rockefeller Commission, was told by HUNT: "Mary Trayner seems to be in error if she means that Mrs. HUNT learned of assassination for first time from Veronica Moppett. He has no recollection of Moppett call, but it certainly could have happened." This was extracted from Olsen's handwritten notes. In his report on this telephone conversation he wrote, "I asked Mr. HUNT about the apparent inconsistency between his description to us of the circumstances under which he heard about President Kennedy's assassination and the letter from a former family maid, Mary Trayner. In particular I called his attention to the fact that Mrs. Trayner, in her letter, advises that Mr. and Mrs. HUNT were at home when word of the assassination came in a telephone call from Veronica Moppett. This is inconsistent with Mr. HUNT'S statements that he and Mrs. HUNT heard about the assassination on the car radio while they were in downtown Washington, D.C. Mr. HUNT stated that Mary Trayner seems to be in error. He says it is entirely possible that there was such a call from Veronica Moppett, although he does not remember it. He said a lot of people were calling each other with news about the shooting of the President. He says it is possible this was the manner in which Mary Trayner heard about the shooting, and that she is simply in error in her recollection that the HUNTS were then at home."

No effort was made by Olsen to contact Virginia Moppett. Research indicated Mary Trayner died on September 17, 1980, of generalized carcinomatosis, cachexia and carcinoma of the pancreas. [D.C. Cert. of Death 80-006220] During the second HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial HUNT was asked why he did not depose witnesses to his whereabouts on November 22, 1963, during HUNT v. ajweberman. He stated: "The one who was alive and might have been deposed during another deposition exercise in Washington was Mary Trayner. She was alive at the time I filed the lawsuit. She was alive at the time Messrs. Helms and ANGLETON were deposed by ajweberman in Washington. She was not deposed. She was noticed, but I guess it got late in the day and they decided not to. Subsequently she died."

The Rockefeller Commission questioned Howard St John Hunt:

1. When, where and how you first learned of the shooting in Dallas.

- I was only nine years old at the time and to the best of my recollection I was in school, in class, and I believe the announcement was made over the school P.A. system.

2. What did you do during the remainder of the day after learning of the shooting?

- I went about my usual school routine and went home.

3. Who was with you when you learned of the assassination and later that day?

- To the best of my memory I can't recall anyone in particular that was with me.

4. The whereabouts of your father as best you can recollect from your own observation on November 22, 1963.

- To the best of my recollection I do not recall seeing my father on that day. I might also add that I do not recall him not being there, at our house.

5. The whereabouts of your mother as best as you can recollect from your own observation on that day.

- To the best of my recollection on that day I do not recall seeing my mother. As with the above answer I do not recall her absence.

As I was at a very young age, [9] my recollections of November 22, 1963, are not very vivid in my mind. May 6, 1975.

The Rockefeller Commission: "A son, who was nine-years-old at the time [Howard St. John], could not recall whether his parents were present or absent that day." Notes of a telephone call with St. John revealed his recollection of that day was hazy: "School got out at usual time. Either got picked up by parents or rode bus. Doesn't remember his father or mother not being there."

Lisa Hunt a was 14-year-old at the time. Her affidavit stated: "On that date I was living with my parents in our house in Sumner, Maryland. After returning from school that afternoon and throughout the weekend that followed, I was with my father and my mother at our house spending much of the time watching television. May 16, 1975." An Archivist with the initials KBH withheld a Memo by Robert Olsen to File for National Security reasons. "Interview with HOWARD HUNT and his daughter Lisa Hunt on March 4, 1975, regarding HUNT'S association with CIA and his whereabouts on November 22, 1963. Creation date March 6, 1963, six pages Collection/Series/Folder ID 01800005 Box 1 Folder title O-R (I-AA) HUNT, E. Interviewed March 4, 1975. Date withdrawn March 16, 1992. Withdrawing Archivist KBH. Withdrawal ID 04316." Parts of this document have been subsequently released.

In June 1977 HUNT testified under oath about his whereabouts on November 22, 1963:

Q. Could you specifically give me, to the best of your recollection, your location at the time you heard that President Kennedy was killed?

A. All I can give you is that when I first heard the news, which came over the car radio, I was on 'H' Street about 9th N.W., Washington. I was driving home from a Chinese grocery store.

Q. Do you remember the name of the Chinese grocery store?

A. Wah Ling.

Q. This is near your home?

A. No, it was quite a distance. It was in downtown Washington, and I lived in suburban Maryland at the time.

Q. So in fact on that day you were away from the house for how long a period?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Could it have been six to eight hours, or more, or less? Can you pinpoint it?

A. I would put it about two hours.

Q. Do you recall your telephone number at that time?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall any friends who may have called you by telephone that day?

A. No.

Q. Can you recall any other activities, or contacts, unusual enough to remember, besides the grocery store and the guests at your house?

A. No.

Q. Are there any independent witnesses who would know of your whereabouts since 1963, or connected with the Intelligence Division, to your knowledge, house guests?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge or recollection, no.

Q. At the time of the Rockefeller Commission Report, the report states, and I quote "A son who was nine years old at the time could not recall whether his parents were present or absent that day." Can you explain the problem of the child's failure to remember seeing you for any reason?

A. No.

Q. Are you totally certain of your whereabouts on the day of the assassination?

A. Totally certain.

Q. Were you in good health that day?

A. As far as I know I was.

Q. Did you take any sick leave during that period?

A. I may have. I don't know.

Q. Would sick leave be taken on that particular day?

A. It's entirely possible. I suffer from ulcers.

Q. I am asking whether you took 11 hours of sick leave during that period?

A. I don't recall. If they have that on record they would certainly have a day-by-day rundown of it then.

Q. It does not give a specific day that you took the sick leave. That is why I am asking you if you recall.

A. No, I don't recall.

Q. Perhaps you visited the CIA during the day, as you would during an ordinary business day?

A. I have no idea. Certainly, afterward I did.

Q. But you could have stopped by the office?

A. It's possible I was there in the morning, yes.

HUNT was asked about witnesses to his whereabouts. He replied: "I was with a large number of people. Later on I went home and was with my wife and children, my aunt, and I was with the maid, and neighbors." The deposition continued:

Q. What are the names of the children that saw you on November 22, 1963?

A. My son Howard, my daughter Lisa, and my daughter Kevan.

Q. Are there any problems in the minds of any of your children, in other words, are they clear and accurate in their memories, do they have any problems with remembering things?

A. One daughter was hospitalized in 1966 [Lisa Hunt had received in-patient treatment for a psychiatric disorder in 1966 which HUNT claimed was caused by brain damage after an automobile accident] but as of that time there have been no problems.

Q. All of the children saw you that day?

A. Yes.

Q. The Rockefeller Commission Report states, "A son who was nine-years-old at the time could not recall whether his parents were present or absent that day." Can you explain the problem of the child's failure to remember seeing you for any reason?

A. No.

Q. Did the other two children in fact verify with certainty your whereabouts on that day?

A. I know one did later, my daughter, because she went to the Rockefeller Commission with me and was interrogated several times. The other daughter was not in the Washington vicinity. I don't know when or at what time she was contacted.

Q. But she was there on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes, but as I say I don't know what her contact with the Rockefeller Commission was.

Q. Would her testimony indicate with certainty what the other daughter had given by way of testimony?

A. I would assume so.

Q. But you don't know? Did you ever ask her?

A. Oh, yes. She remembers me picking her up at school. She was with several of Bobby Kennedy's kids. I came by earlier than usual to pick her up after school.

Q. Do you remember the time?

A. No.

Q. Other than your children and your wife, would anybody else be able to verify your whereabouts on that day?

A. Yes. Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Thomas of Pompano Beach, Florida. They are former neighbors, but they moved away, and I've lost track of them.

Q. Anybody else you can recall that might be able to verify your whereabouts on that day?

A. My wife's aunt was staying with us at the time, the late Mrs. Leona Drexler. She had spoken with her daughter that day about the events. So the daughter in Chicago would be able to give you a third party. [The daughter of Leona Drexler was not deposed since her testimony would have been hearsay.]

HUNT'S testimony was self-contradictory. He said he was away from home for two hours that entire day, then said he may have been in the office that morning.

This data base compiler snookered HOWARD HUNT into changing his alibi. In the Spring of 1978 HEMMING telephoned me in Washington, D.C., to offer his services in helping compose the deposition questions in HUNT v. ajweberman. That afternoon, this researcher had discovered that a Wah Ling's grocery store existed in Washington, D.C., during a search of the Washington, D.C., 1963 Coles Crisscross Directory. I told HEMMING: "You ain't gonna believe this my man, but I located Mr. Wah Ling! And he doesn't remember HUNT coming into his store that day." HEMMING said, "I believe it A.J.. 'cause you do your homework." HEMMING recorded this telephone call and gave the tape to HUNT who changed his alibi during his June 1978 deposition:

Q. Did you telephone Wah Ling's grocery store on the morning of November 22, 1963?

A. No.

Q. Where is Wah Ling's located in Washington, D.C.?

A. I don't think that the grocery store existed or ever existed. In fact, in the testimony that I gave to the Church Committee, if you recall I said, to the best of my recollection, the name of the grocery store was Wah Ling (phonetic). Having revisited the site, in fact, by chance having dinner in Chinatown fairly recently, I determined the name of the grocery store was Tuck Cheong, T-u-c-k C-h-e-o-n-g.

Q. So you are now saying that your alibi for the day of the assassination, Wah Ling's grocery, is now changed to a different grocery store?

A. Well, I am saying now that attempting to recollect a couple of years ago, the name of the Chinese grocery store, one of several on 8th Street, that my wife visited on that afternoon, certainly is subject to re-examination and refreshment which I have done.

Q. Now that you have refreshed your memory, where is this Tuck Cheong?

A. It is on H Street between 6th and 7th Northwest, in Washington.

Q. What did you purchase that day?

A. I don't know. My wife made the purchases. She went into the grocery store. I stayed in the car with the children.

Q. If I told you there was a Wah Ling's grocery in Washington, D.C., would that surprise you?

A. I would say simply that it was one, of the probably several, that my wife visited that day.

Q. Do you remember the testimony you gave to the FBI as to when you picked up your children that day?

A. No I have never seen the FBI memorandum.

ajweberman: Here it is.

Rubin: If you have it there may we see it?

Friedman: Yes, sir. We are going to show it to you. (Hands a copy of instrument to counsel.)

Rubin: All right, go ahead and read it.

Friedman: "On October 17, 1974, E. HOWARD HUNT advised [the FBI] that he recalls hearing about the assassination over his car radio immediately after leaving a Chinese grocery store in the area of 9th and H Street N.W. Washington, D.C., on November 22, 1963. He was with his wife Dorothy, who is now deceased. Before returning home, they picked-up their daughter, Kevan, at Sidwell Friends School, Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. He could recall no contact on that date with anyone other than possibly a former neighbor. He advised that his personal records pertaining to November 22, 1963, were destroyed several years ago."

Mr. Rubin: All right. Now how has Mr. HUNT testified any differently than from what you have just said?

Q. (By Mr. Friedman.) Within the context of this particular report, which I will present to you while we make copies of it, it indicates that the grocery store came before picking up the children.

A. Then I would say that I stayed in the car with the dog, rather than with the children.

Q. This would be different from what you testified earlier.

A. Well, we are talking about recollection of a good many years ago. Yes.

Q. So this refreshes your recollection?

A. Yes, as to what I testified to earlier. This is not testified, and it is not a sworn statement in any case.

Thinking Mee Wah Ling was to appear as a witness, HUNT changed his alibi to Tuck Cheong. There was no Tuck Cheong in the 1963 crisscross directory or phone book. Tuck Cheong could never be produced in a court of law, because he did not exist. HUNT stated that he had waited in the car to cover himself in the event Mee Wah Ling was produced at the trial. This would be HUNT'S explanation as to why Mee Wah Ling did not remember him coming into his store that day. Seeking a reason for having waited in the car, instead of accompanying his wife into the store, he had to fabricate someone, or something, in the car that needed supervision. At first it was his children, then his dog. During the 1985 HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial, HUNT stated: "I was at the time of the shooting, I was in Washington, D.C., on H Street between 8th and 9th seated in our car with my two and a half month old son David, while my wife was making purchases at Chinese grocery stores on both sides of the street." When confronted with his change in alibi by Lane he stated:

A. Well, my wife made purchases at several grocery stores. There was another one nearby that she may have gone by, Tuck Cheong, I don't know and subsequently I added that statement. Tuck Cheong.

Q. My question is: Did you in an affidavit state under oath that you had been purchasing groceries? "We had been purchasing groceries in a Chinese grocery store." That you recall at that time to be called Wah Ling?

A. Yes, I so stated.

Q. Was that a mistake, or now you are saying you were in more than one grocery store?

A. I am saying my wife was in more than one grocery store. Chinese names are not terribly easy for me to remember. It seems the one we were parked in front of was Wah Ling.

Q. Then in 1978, when you appeared before the HSCA did you not, in fact, say the Wah Ling reference was wrong?

A. I did.

Q. Now are you saying it's right or wrong?

A. I am saying it could have been either way. Tuck Cheong or Wah Ling.

Q. Now, are you saying that [your HSCA testimony] was wrong, in fact, it was both of them, is that correct?

A. It could easily have been.

HUNT was crossed examined by his attorney, William Sndyer:

Q. Mr. Lane asked you about the name of the Chinese grocery store and said you had testified on a prior occasion that the name was Wah Ling, then you testified it was Tuck Cheong. Now you think it is both. Were you in any way misleading anyone when you gave those prior statements?

A. No, I don't regard it as significant. Anybody who has ever been to Chinatown in Washington, D.C., would know that you have Chinese grocery stores. There are grocery stores on both sides of the street. They line the place. That is the nature of Chinatown. There was no intent to deceive.

During his deposition in June 1978, HUNT offered to settle the lawsuit for $1 and a letter of apology. At a latter deposition Ellis Rubin was asked about this offer: "Who said that?" "I believe you did." "I did?" "Yes." "Where was this?" "During the last depositions here in Miami" "I deny that most emphatically." "Off the record, you did it off the record." "Off the record, or on the record, I never said such a thing, because I am not authorized by HOWARD HUNT to say such a thing."

HEMMING denied having had contact with HUNT in 1978. In 1994 HEMMING stated: "STURGIS lived on 125th Street. I stopped by his house. We went to the Jeb Bush campaign. Two of my guys were working with him at the time, 1977. I had no other dealings with STURGIS in 1978."

In 1981, during a deposition in the first HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT case, HUNT stated: "My wife had...driven downtown with our infant son, who was only about three months old, to pick me up. She wanted to buy ingredients for Chinese dinners, and we proceeded from my office downtown over to 'H' Street where there are several Chinese restaurants and a number of grocery stores. She needed me to sit in the car while she went into the grocery store." HUNT waited in the car with the baby while she bought the groceries. This explained why she did not buy the groceries before picking up her husband, and supported HUNT'S previous testimony.

Why drive around with a three-month-old baby? Why didn't Dorothy Hunt leave the baby with Mary Trayner? HUNT'S claim that he was at his office that morning conformed to the testimony of Walter Kuzmuk.

On February 6, 1979, Walter P. Kuzmuk had signed the following sworn statement that was entered into evidence in HUNT v. ajweberman:

Having become aware through the press of questions raised concerning the whereabouts of E. HOWARD HUNT on November 22, 1963, the day which President Kennedy was assassinated, I wish to make the following voluntary statement:

On November 22, 1963, I was in Washington, D.C. I lunched that day at Duke Zeibert's restaurant on L Street just off Connecticut Avenue. My luncheon companion was Mr. John Sucard.

When we left the restaurant, we walked to Connecticut Avenue, and while waiting at the red light I noticed E. HOWARD HUNT and his wife, Dorothy, driving in their Chevrolet station wagon. It is my recollection that their direction of travel was northward.

I was familiar with the HUNT'S station wagon, having ridden in it from time to time with Mr. HUNT, to and from CIA offices. And as a near neighbor of the HUNTS I knew Mrs. HUNT, having been in their home on several occasions.

Shortly after seeing the HUNTS on Connecticut Avenue I became aware that President Kennedy had been shot in Dallas and most of the government offices were closing for the rest of the day. However I returned to my office before going home.

Walter Kuzmuk

POB 756

Long Key, Florida. 33001

February 6, 1979

Walter Kuzmuk had served in the OSS with HUNT in 1945, and was a 27-year veteran of the CIA who, in 1963, was HUNT'S friend and neighbor. He had visited HUNT'S home on more than several occasions. These men saw each other on a daily basis, and worked in the same office, on the same floor. Walter Kuzmuk: "We lived within four or five houses of one another's homes. My wife was friendly with his wife, and my children were friendly with his children...his children and our children went to school together, and there was always like - they bring them home and things of that nature." [Kuzmuk testimony, 2nd HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial, Kuzmuk deposition in same matter 6.28.84] Walter Kuzmuk did not reveal this information until February 1979, when he decided to mail it to Ellis Rubin. Walter Kuzmuk wrote: "Having become aware through the press of questions raised concerning E. HOWARD HUNT'S whereabouts on November 22, 1963, I wish to make the following voluntary statement."

What took Walter Kuzmuk so long to become aware of the allegations that HUNT was in Dallas? Walter Kuzmuk claimed it was the Dick Gregory press conference that triggered his affidavit. The Dick Gregory press conference took place in 1975, four years before Walter Kuzmuk came forward. Why did he wait until HUNT'S Wah Ling alibi fell apart? The CIA had an interest in clearing HUNT. If HUNT was connected with the Kennedy assassination it would have meant the end of the CIA. The CIA followed the progress of HUNT v. ajweberman. When Attorney Mark Lane questioned Richard Helms about the CIA's interest in Clay Shaw, Richard Helms' CIA Counsel handed him his HUNT v. ajweberman deposition. Did Walter Kuzmuk come forward at the request of the CIA? Or at HUNT'S request?

In the Spring of 1980 a Nazi newspaper called The Spotlight ran a story by Victor Marchetti that placed HUNT in Dallas on November 22, 1963. HUNT sued Spotlight. On December 15, 1981, during the first HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial, the testimony of Walter Kuzmuk was repeated when Ellis Rubin read from his December 7, 1981, deposition. Walter Kuzmuk had testified: "I got into the office in the morning [of November 22, 1963] and then lunch time arrived. As usual, several of us got together and went to lunch at Duke Ziebert's, right around the corner from where the office was located, and I was with several of my colleagues. I guess it was around 1:00 p.m., 1:30 p.m...and I saw a car go by and I noticed HOWARD and Betty - not Betty - Dorothy...and I waved at them."

In his first statement he said he was dining with one man - now he was with several. During the second HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial Kuzmuk said he was with John Sucher and Louis Rucker. Due in part to the testimony of Walter Kuzmuk, Spotlight lost the first HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial and the jury awarded HUNT $100,000 in compensatory damages and $550,000 in punitive damages.

A Federal Court of Appeals Judge reversed the Spotlight conviction on a technicality and ordered a new trial begin. Spotlight hired Mark Lane to represent it. Mark Lane punched holes in Kuzmuk's story. When Mark Lane questioned HUNT about how he traveled to the CIA on the morning of November 22, 1963, HUNT stated: "There was no other way I could have gotten into work that morning. I would have had to have driven in with him [Kuzmuk]." Mark Lane cross-examined Walter Kuzmuk who stated: "Although he had previously testified that he and HUNT drove together to the CIA almost every morning, alternating automobiles, he could not testify that he had seen HUNT on any weekday beginning Monday, November 18, 1963, and ending Friday, November 22, 1963, except for the time HUNT drove past the restaurant that Kuzmuk was leaving after lunch...Furthermore, to the best of his recollection, HUNT had not shown up for regularly scheduled meetings on November 20, 1963, and on November 22, 1963." Walter Kuzmuk repeatedly asserted that he had not driven to work with HUNT on November 22, 1963: "So on that date, I drove, because Mr. HUNT was not with me that day until I met him on the avenue."

This part of Walter Kuzmuk's testimony conflicted with HUNT, who stated: "I probably rode in from Maryland with Mr. Kuzmuk that day."

Mark Lane also pointed to the fact that HUNT had failed to mention Walter Kuzmuk in his first deposition in HUNT v. ajweberman. HUNT: "I omitted Mr. Kuzmuk's name, and it was not brought to my attention, until a letter arrived a couple of years later from him reminding me we had been together on that particular day." When the FBI questioned HUNT on October 17, 1974, he said, "He could recall no contact on that date with anyone other than possibly a former neighbor [Raymond Thomas]."

In June 1977, HUNT stated: "I would put [the time I was away from the house on November 22, 1963] at about two hours."

Only in later depositions had HUNT left open the possibility of his being at the CIA that morning.

The Rockefeller Commission: "HUNT could not recall whether he was on duty with the CIA on the morning of that day." When HUNT was deposed in June 1977, HUNT was again uncertain whether he had gone to the office that morning. He was asked: "But could you have stopped by your office?" He answered: "It is possible I was there in the morning, yes."

Mark Lane also pointed out that Walter Kuzmuk could not place HUNT at the Agency that day. Walter Kuzmuk: "I am not sure whether he was in the office that day. I mean it's easy to be that you are on sick leave, or whatever." Walter Kuzmuk could not cite other witnesses' testimony to corroborate his testimony. No impartial agency employee could be questioned. Mark Lane asked Walter Kuzmuk if he saw HUNT later that day. He answered: "Well, I would say sure, why not? Probably on his front lawn or maybe on my front lawn. So in all probability I did." HUNT testified: "I have no reason to believe I saw Mr. Kuzmuk for the balance of that day..."

When HUNT heard the news of the assassination, why didn't he go to his office at the CIA where he could be most useful to his country? Mark Lane asked HUNT if he had learned about the assassination prior to encountering Walter Kuzmuk. HUNT: "Yes, indeed. I had learned about it when we were parked in front of a Chinese grocery store between 8th and 9th Street." Walter Kuzmuk testified that he was not aware of the assassination when he encountered HUNT. Why didn't HUNT pull over and give them the news?

HUNT testified he got the news after he reached the Chinese grocery store, not after they left the Domestic Operations Division building. Walter Kuzmuk would have had to have seen the HUNTS as they drove to Sidwell Friends School. If the HUNTS drove from Chinatown to Sidwell Friends School did the HUNTS have to have passed the Domestic Operations Division building?

HUNT'S fifth alibi accommodated the testimony of his secretary at the Domestic Operations Division, Connie Hicks Mazerov. In May 1978, during the period when HUNT was erroneously under the impression that Mee Wah Ling had been located, Connie Mazerov composed the following sworn statement:

The following statement represents the factual events of November 22, 1963.

I was employed by the CIA from April 1961 through August 1964 as a clerk typist. On November 22, 1963, I was working for the Domestic Operations Division whose offices were located at 1717 H Street in Washington, D.C. My superior was E. HOWARD HUNT. On the morning of Friday, November 22, 1963, I was at my desk doing routine work. Mr. HUNT was in his office until lunch time, at which time he left. His secretary, Ms. Margaret Amesbury and I were in the office after lunch, when a co-worker informed us John F. Kennedy had been shot. Ms. Amesbury and I discussed whether we should leave as Mr. HUNT had not yet returned from lunch. We decided that as soon as he heard the news he would realize that most government workers had been dismissed, and we both left our office. (Signed)

Connie Joy Hicks Mazerov.

May 16, 1978.

Connie Mazerov had revealed the address of a former CIA installation, and the name of a CIA employee - Margaret Amesbury. Had she obtained the permission of the CIA to do this?

Connie Mazerov was contacted in February 1994: "No, I never at any time talked to anyone from the CIA. They did not ask me to come forward with this. What happened is I am close friends with Elizabeth McIntosh. We have remained in contact with each other for many years. She called me. She was retired. She said, 'Do you remember seeing HOWARD that day?' I talked to her for awhile. That was the only contact. She did not have any contact, nor had I. She knew where I was. I had not heard about the HUNT/tramp allegations prior to this. I followed HOWARD'S role in Watergate. I had no idea the rest of that was going on. I assume HOWARD may have called her and asked her to call. She was in contact with him at that point. I assume he called her, and asked her what her schedule was that day, and if she remembered seeing him at the office. Because, at the point in time, when all of this was going on, HOWARD'S wife was already dead. His children were fairly young."

Elizabeth "Betty" McIntosh was in the OSS during World War II. McIntosh first met HUNT when she was serving "in the OSS in Chicago, behind the lines with HOWARD in 1944." On December 13, 1977, McInosh attended a luncheon sponsored by David Atlee Philips where she told The New York Times: "'That's what hurts, you've lived so long, you thought you were doing it the right way, and people now say you were doing something terrible and dishonorable.' Mrs. McIntosh, who was at Pearl Harbor on the day it was bombed, spoke for many when she said 'There was a real reason for what we were doing in those days. A lot of things we tried didn't work, but it was war, and it was important. Today we seem to be swimming around in a bowl of warm mush.' Mrs. McIntosh recalled the time when she was serving with a psychological warfare unit in China in World War II. Since surrender was anathema to Japanese culture, Mrs. McIntosh and her comrades covertly placed on a dead courier false documents that purported to be a message from the Prime Minister. The documents, written by prisoners of war, said that it was alright to surrender under certain circumstances, and Mrs. McIntosh believes this helped to weaken the Japanese resistance." [NYT 12.13.77]

McIntosh was the female counterpart to HOWARD HUNT. She was the author of a article entitled The Role of Women in Intelligence [published by Association of Former Intelligence Officers] and a book entitled Undercover Girl.

Connie Mazerov was more than HUNT'S secretary, she was his operative. When HUNT ran an operation against Senator Barry Goldwater, he had Connie Mazerov pick up the campaign speeches of Senator Barry Goldwater. Connie Mazerov told The Washington Post that she did perform courier work when she worked for the CIA. [Wash. Post 12.21.73] Connie Mazerov: "I worked for Amesbury and HOWARD. In the course of my duties as a clerk/typist I picked-up information, and I didn't know what it was. I picked up envelopes at one location and took them to another location."

On September 15, 1971, "(Deleted) HUNT asked CIA to detail a certain secretary to the White House to work for him. (Deleted) General Robert Cushman (deleted)." [CIA Memo for Rec. 6.19.73 Meeting with (deleted) Chief EEAB/Pers.]Connie Mazerov submitted her statement during the HUNT v. ajweberman proceedings, however, she testified for the first time at the second HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial. Connie Mazerov said she had seen HUNT at work early that morning. Mark Lane wrote: "As to the meetings he was supposed to have attended later that morning [according to one of HUNT'S versions of events] she couldn't recall seeing him there. She never saw anyone else that morning who could have seen him." Connie Mazerov: "I would have never been in a meeting. I was a GS-5." Like Walter Kuzmuk, Connie Mazerov was unable to name other witnesses who saw HUNT at the CIA that day, however, Connie Mazerov unequivocally stated that she had seen HUNT at the CIA that morning. There were two possibilities: Either Connie Mazerov was mistaken or she surfaced at the CIA's or at HUNT'S behest. The possibility exists the CIA activated Connie Mazerov (and Walter Kuzmuk) when it saw that HUNT'S defense was floundering, although no sources in the CIA or CIA documents have confirmed this to date. Mark Lane pointed to the fact that HUNT failed to mention Connie Mazerov as a witness to his whereabouts on November 22, 1963, in his first deposition in HUNT v. ajweberman, in order to cast doubt on her testimony.

Connie Mazerov: "I saw HUNT at the CIA that day. What time? I'm really digging here. As close as I can recall - its been a lot of years since I testified too." Connie Mazerov's testimony was read to her: "I knew I'd seen him in the morning, and that he had left for lunch. It could have been 11:30 a.m., 12:00 p.m. He generally didn't tell us what he was going to do for lunch. Mrs. Amesbury saw him too. At that time I was in my early 20's, and this woman was in her 50's. There's a very good chance this lady is not alive. When I testified in Florida, I believe at that time they could not locate her. I think the only people they had was Betty McIntosh and myself. She also was my superior, a GS-13. To understand how somebody could be there, and no one could see them, you'd have to understand the way the offices were set up. The building that we were in - everybody had two or three rooms in there - and the doors were closed. So it possible to come in and go into your office and really not see anybody. Each group did their own thing and didn't know what the people next door were doing. There are no traces of him being there that I know of. But you understand it was a lot of years before anyone would have looked for anything like that. I believe Mrs. McIntosh did not see him that day. She was out. She was in the city.

"I did not testify at first Spotlight trial. I testified during the second trial. To my knowledge he was in the office all morning. At least that's what I remembered at the time. There is no way I could be mistaken. I think everyone fairly well remembers what they were doing that day. If you picked another day out of a year, 25 or 30 years ago, I probably wouldn't even remember what state I was living in. He was there. I've seen the tramp shots. Nothing I ever saw would lead me to believe it was him."

HEMMING told this researcher: "People tend to remember the events of an hour preceding the assassination and what went on as they heard more and more news, and what happened that evening. But details of who was supposed to be where, or what, before the event, is not likely. Even a week after the event. Mazerov made the statement out of pure loyalty to HUNT. You probably have a two or three day period there where he ain't around. Or somebody could have put things in her mind, saying 'Don't you remember we did this?' Amesbury called her looking for a witness."

Connie Mazerov had seen HUNT before he went to lunch - this testimony was contradicted by HUNT'S first FBI interview during which he said he had lunch with his wife at home. In addition to these numerous contradictions, during HUNT'S testimony in the second HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial, HUNT said he drove to work on the morning of November 22, 1963, with Walter Cushman.

HUNT maintained that he did not know STURGIS in 1963 so he could not have been involved with him in a plot to kill John Kennedy. HUNT claimed he met STURGIS in the Spring of 1972, through BERNARD BARKER. STURGIS, however, told Andrew St. George: "The Bay of Pigs, hey, there was one sweet mess. I met HOWARD HUNT that year [1961], he was the political officer of the exile brigade. BERNARD BARKER was HUNT'S right hand man, his confidential clerk - his body servant. I wish I'd never met the dumb head. You know, BARKER tells everybody to call him 'Macho.' That's supposed to be his nick name. A man who is macho is supposed to be some kind of virile hard charger. Calling BARKER macho is like call Liberace 'Slugger.' When he is around HUNT, or anybody that's over him, BARKER is like a valet. Servile. You know what I mean? 'Sit here Mr. HUNT so the sun won't bother you.' It's disgusting. 'Yes, sir, Mr. HUNT let me refresh your drink, sir.' And BARKER is the biggest scrooge you ever saw. HUNT gives him $500 saying, 'Round up some men, we have a job to do.' So BARKER comes downtown and he says to me 'Let's have lunch, I need some people for Mr. HUNT.' And you know where we end up having lunch? In the cheapest hamburger joint in Miami." [St. George, Swank, 8.64] In 1961 STURGIS told a CIA source he was a "member of the anti-Castro group Cuban Revolutionary Front." [CIA DBF 75627 4.24.61; DBF 89191 9.22.61]

In 1978 STURGIS was asked:

Q. Did you know HOWARD HUNT in 1963?

A. Let me say this here. I have worked in the intelligence field off and on for years and there is compartmentation with people that you work with directly. I don't recall ever meeting HOWARD HUNT personally. I don't recall meeting HOWARD HUNT. In 1963.

Q. Do you remember speaking to Andrew St. George about the Bay of Pigs?

A. Oh, that was so many years ago, it's possible.

Q. Do you remember telling Andrew St. George that you worked with HOWARD HUNT on the Bay of Pigs invasion?

A. Andrew may get his things a little bit mixed up. Now, understand one thing, before the Bay of Pigs invasion I was working in a different sector because E. HOWARD HUNT was a political officer and I was not associated with the political end of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Q. Did you say that to Andrew St. George?

A. No, and if Andrew said that he is lying.

Q. And if Marita says it, she is lying, too?

A. If she picked up what Andrew says, then it's not so.

MR. RUBIN: They are lying just like they ajweberman did in his book. The whole book is a lie and we will prove it in court.

During his deposition in HUNT v. ajweberman STURGIS stated:

A. Now again I don't believe I ever met E. HOWARD HUNT, but we all knew, many of us knew, "EDUARDO" was the officer of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Q. Did you ever meet EDUARDO?

A. I don't recall. This is the thing. I don't recall.

In 1975 the Rockefeller Commission questioned him about this: "Doesn't recall saying that, or recall meeting him before 1972." Handwritten notes reflected that STURGIS told the Rockefeller Commission: "Met HUNT when: In 1972 personally. Know of him as "EDUARDO" as early as 1960 or 1961. BARKER introduced them in 1972 at BARKER'S office in Miami."

"Quotes regarding HUNT: 'Met him in 1961' - Doesn't recall saying that, or recall meeting him, before 1972.Heard of him in connection with Bay of Pigs, as "EDUARDO" knew of him then, but doesn't think they ever met. HUNT is professional who has affected disposals. Denies ever saying this. HUNT was a political officer and didn't have a hand in killings." STURGIS also told Olsen: "HUNT left Miami one week before Bay of Pigs."

STURGIS was questioned by Robert B. Olsen of the Rockefeller Commission:

STURGIS: I don't know if it was in 1972 or the latter part of 1971 that I met HUNT, and I was introduced. And he said, FRANK, this is HOWARD HUNT.

Olsen: Who introduced you?

STURGIS: BARKER did. And I said 'Oh EDUARDO!'

Olsen: Do we understand then, FRANK, that you had heard of "EDUARDO" during the Bay of Pigs planning and so forth, but you had never met him?

STURGIS: Right, sir. To the best of my knowledge I had never met HOWARD HUNT up until the day in Miami when BARKER introduced me to HOWARD in his office.

HUNT and STURGIS' relationship dated back to World War II. Events indicated they met in Guadalcanal in 1943, when STURGIS was a Marine, and HUNT a war correspondent. When HUNT spoke with Andrew St. George in August 1974 he was unaware of the implications of his remarks regarding his long term relationship with HUNT, however, once the tramp story surfaced STURGIS changed his tune. Now, he said, he could not have been one of the tramps in Dealey Plaza along with HUNT, because he did not know HUNT in 1963, having first been introduced to HUNT by BARKER in 1971. STURGIS claimed to have little respect for BARKER. As this researcher has documented, STURGIS was BARKER'S number one source of information for many years. STURGIS said BARKER, on behalf of HUNT, approached him to do a domestic assassination. This indicated how close the relationship was between the two men and that by denouncing BARKER, STURGIS was trying to hide this relationship.

STURGIS told a Rockefeller Commission investigator that "he started getting involved with Cuban people in Miami in about 1945." In 1949 HUNT wrote Bimini Run, which he prefaced with the disclaimer: "The people in this book are imaginary and are not intended to represent persons living or dead.":

1. The hero of Bimini Run, Hank Sturgis, was an ex-Marine who had been trained at Parris Island. FRANK STURGIS was an ex-Marine who had been trained at Parris Island.

2. Hank Sturgis had seen extensive combat in the Far East including "the Canal."

FRANK STURGIS was in Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Guadalcanal.

3. Hank Sturgis had been wounded in action.

FRANK STURGIS had been wounded in action and had a scar on his right wrist from the wound.

4. Hank Sturgis had been hospitalized after the war.

FRANK STURGIS had been hospitalized after the war.

5. Hank Sturgis worked as a bartender.

FRANK STURGIS worked as a bartender and owned a tavern.

6. Hank Sturgis lived in Miami.

FRANK STURGIS lived in Norfolk, but visited Miami frequently.

7. Hank Sturgis was a gambler.

Juanita Terrell told the FBI that her ex-husband, FRANK STURGIS, was involved in gambling activity.

8. Hank Sturgis frequented the Gulfstream Race Track.

FRANK STURGIS worked at the Gulfstream Race Track.

9. Hank Sturgis was an accomplished marksman.

FRANK STURGIS was an accomplished marksman.

10. Hank Sturgis was familiar with the Andros Islands.

FRANK STURGIS was familiar with the Andros Islands.

STURGIS was asked if he had ever worked as a bartender:

A. I did work as a bartender. As a matter of fact, during the Watergate investigation I was questioned about that book. I have never read that book...

Q. Don't you think the character Hank Sturgis seems to follow your own history to a great extent?

A. Right. My wife thinks that too. She says, 'It could be you.' I don't see how it could be. He didn't know me at that particular time when he wrote the book...I don't know when he wrote it.

Robert B. Olsen of the Rockefeller Commission questioned STURGIS about Bimini Run:

Olsen: Was the any particular reason why you wanted to change your name when you were already an adult, grown up?

STURGIS: The reason for that was that I felt there were too many FIORINIS, FRANK FIORINI'S especially. I don't know. My mother wanted me to change the name really because she had a bad situation with my father and she hated the FIORINI family.

Olsen: I take it from what you say on that score, then, FRANK, that you were not then aware at the time your name was legally changed in Norfolk, Virginia, of the fact that E. HOWARD HUNT had written a novel in the late 1940's in which a character appeared by the name of Hank Sturgis. Is that true?

STURGIS: Would you believe that the Special Committee, they got me on that. And it is a coincidence, because I got the book at home. And my wife read that book and I read that book. And it is just like it would be my type of character.

Pipe smoking Henry Reed Sturgis, a college dropout, was actually a synthesis between FRANK STURGIS and HOWARD HUNT. Evidence suggested FRANK FIORINI used the name FRANK STURGIS before he legally changed it in 1952 -- three years after HUNT wrote about Hank Sturgis in Bimini Run.

In 1975 STURGIS told Michael Canfield how he had used the two names to conceal his identity: "You see where I live at? A lot of people in that area before the Watergate thing, they never knew who I was. I go off two, three weeks at a time. They figured I was a salesman. And here I am, involved in every goddamn thing imaginable. And I've never used STURGIS in any of my activities. I've always used FIORINI...So if any publicity came out, it came out in [FIORINI]. I left STURGIS alone." Conversely, when FRANK'S legal name was FIORINI he might have used STURGIS for "every goddamn thing imaginable." HUNT knew him by his nom-de-guerre, FRANK STURGIS, and used the name in his novel.

A. During the war I met a Captain Sturgis, whom I became very fond of. He contracted tuberculosis in the jungles. He came back home in a ship and went up to Saranac Lake Sanitarium. I heard subsequently he died of the T.B. he incurred in the Far East during the war. I was a great admirer of this individual. His name came to mind when I wrote the book.

Q. What was his first name?

A. My guess is it was Lee.

Q. What is his hometown, how can we get in touch with him?

A. I said he died.

Q. Did you in fact characterize HANK STURGIS in the 1949 book as a bartender as well as a soldier-of-fortune and ex-Marine?

A. Gee, I wouldn't remember. I probably wrote three dozen books since then.

HUNT added that the rest of Hank Sturgis' characteristics were his own invention. There was no similarity to FRANK STURGIS besides the name, although he admitted: "I heard of an adventurer [named] FIORINI, but it wasn't until early 1972 that BERNIE BARKER introduced me to an individual now known as FRANK STURGIS."

THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

The Rockefeller Commission attempted to resolve the Bimini Run question, however, it did not address itself to the real issue, because Dick Gregory's associate, Ralph Schoenman, confused the information that had been given to him by this researcher. Ralph Schoenman testified that FIORINI took the name STURGIS from a character in Bimini Run, rather than testifying that HUNT had patterned a character in Bimini Run after STURGIS: "One witness asserted that STURGIS is a pseudonym; that his name is FRANK FIORINI; and that he took the name STURGIS from a fictional character [Hank Sturgis] in a novel written by HUNT in 1949 [Bimini Run]...A search of the relevant court records disclosed that a petition was filed on September 23, 1952, in the Norfolk [Virginia] City Circuit Court pursuant to which a FRANK ANGELO FIORINO petitioned to change his name to FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS. The petition recited that his mother had divorced his father about 15 years previously, and had married one Ralph Sturgis, that he had been living with his mother all of his life, that his mother was known as Mary Sturgis, and that his stepfather also desired him to change his name to STURGIS. A court order was entered on September 23, 1952, (the same date as the petition) changing his name to FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS...In the petition and the order relating to the change of name, FIORINI was misspelled as Fiorino. In light of this documentary evidence, no weight can be given to the claim that STURGIS took his present name from a character in a HUNT novel - or that the name change was associated in any way with STURGIS' knowing HUNT before 1971 or 1972."

Rockefeller Commission notes dealt with the Fiorino question: "Telephone Conversation with STURGIS May 3, 1975, Called him to ask about spelling of the name 'Fiorino" on petition snf order covering his name change. He joked about the fact Italians can't spell. Said his birth certificate and military records were all FIORINI, but that his grandfather might have spelled the name Fiorino. Confirmed that his mother's maiden name was Mary Vona, and his father was Angelo Anthony Fiorini. For his new middle name, he switched from his father's first name to his father's middle name - Italian custom to carry father's name, he said. Probably just an error on the court papers - both of which were probably prepared by the same attorney. Note. FRANK'S signature on the petition is ambiguous. It could be read as either 'I' or an 'o.'"

HUNT and STURGIS both knew the same people so it was likely that they knew one another. The CIA pointed this out in 1975, in the course of evaluating STURGIS' Agency connections. A CIA document generated by Jerrold Brown pointed out:

(1) HUNT knew Lanz. Lanz knew STURGIS. Therefore HUNT could have known STURGIS through Lanz.

(2) Manuel Artime knew STURGIS.

STURGIS was asked:

Q. Did you know the late Manuel Artime?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you work with him in the MIR?

A. Let me say this here. I had contact with Artime, since Artime came from Cuba. I was part of the original officers that organized the MIR. Manuel Artime was an individual who left Cuba, and came to the United States. I did not know Artime in Cuba, but I was one of the original officers who helped organize the MIR movement in the United States.

Q. Was your friend, Geraldine Shamma, also associated with Dr. Artime.

A. Yes.

HUNT knew Manuel Artime. Therefore HUNT could have known STURGIS through Manuel Artime.

(3) HUNT knew Nino Diaz. Nino Diaz knew STURGIS. Therefore HUNT could have known STURGIS through Diaz.

(4) HUNT knew BARKER. BARKER knew STURGIS. Therefore HUNT could have known STURGIS though BARKER.

(5) HUNT knew BARKER. BARKER knew Alexander Rorke. Alexander Rorke knew STURGIS. Therefore HUNT could have known STURGIS through BARKER/Alexander Rorke.

(6) HUNT knew Manuel Artime. Manuel Artime knew Alexander Rorke. Alexander Rorke knew STURGIS. Therefore HUNT could have known STURGIS through Manuel Artime/Alexander Rorke.

In the course of HUNT v. ajweberman, HUNT was questioned about Pedro Diaz Lanz.

Q. Did you know Pedro Diaz Lanz?

A. I met him on a couple of occasions. BARKER brought him to my home in Coconut Grove probably in January or February 1961.

Q. Did you know that Pedro Diaz Lanz was in fact a close friend of STURGIS?

A. I'm not sure he was a friend. I know he and FIORINI joined him in Havana.

Q. But you never met FRANK STURGIS through Pedro Diaz Lanz?

A. No.

Q. You had no contact with him?

A. I didn't know him in 1972 under that name.

James W. Franklin, Chief, Official Cover Branch, CCS stated: "I reviewed the file of STURGIS which contained no reference to HUNT, although reference was made to some other associates in the Bay of Pigs period." [CIA MFR 11.2.73]

Pedro Diaz Lanz was asked:

Q. When did you first meet FRANK STURGIS?

A. When? 1957.

Q. Where was that?

A. Santiago De Cuba.

Q. When did you first see Mr. STURGIS with Mr. HUNT, what date?

A. Never.

Q. Did STURGIS indicate in 1957, or a time subsequent, that he had knowledge of Mr. HUNT?

A. No.

Q. When did you first meet Mr. HUNT?

A. Never met him.

Q. Did you ever see Mr. HUNT or Mr. STURGIS in November 1963?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you know Mr. HUNT as "EDUARDO" of the Cuban Revolutionary Front?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever see Mr. HUNT, or Mr. STURGIS in November 1963?

A. No, sir.

Q. Either in Miami or in Dallas Texas?

A. I said I never seen them.

Q. You have never seen Mr. HUNT though?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever talked to him on the telephone.

A. (No response).

Q. I again ask the question that was objected to: Did you, Mr. Lanz, become acquainted with Manuel Artime?

MR. DARRACH: Same objection. [Lanz Depo 2.3.78]

In 1977 Pedro Diaz Lanz told Gaeton Fonzi "he was with BARKER many times. He told BARKER that Artime was a Communist...Lanz described Bender (Droller) as an older man over 45 years of age (1960's) curly hair, European accent. He met Bender at safe house in Coconut Grove, and Bender offered him position as Chief of Air Strike Force in Guatemala (Bay of Pigs Operation). Lanz did not accept it because he would not have been in on the planning. It was all very secret and run by the CIA. Lanz was then offered another position in Cuba, but refused and had heated words with Bender because he stated it was just an effort to destroy the Cuban forces in exile. Bender agreed off the record. Lanz was very hot and someone came over and attempted to calm him down. Believes this was HUNT. Shortly thereafter Artime arrived and he and Bender hugged and kissed each other on the mouth. This drew Lanz attention because he knew it wasn't an American or French or Spanish custom for men to kiss each other."

Gaeton Fonzi returned the next day with a photograph of HUNT. "Pedro Diaz Lanz could not ID HUNT...I asked Lanz to explain how HUNT wrote about him in his book, Give Us This Day. Lanz could not explain." [HSCA Gonzales and Fonzi 9.23.77]

"Marcos Diaz Lanz said that he early recognized that Castro was a Communist and that he was using Communism as a vehicle to take over Cuba. He said he reported this to Colonel Nichols, the Air Force Military Attache at the American Embassy, with whom he had been in regular contact..."

Gaeton Fonzi questioned Marcos Diaz Lanz about HUNT: "It was pointed out to Marcos that HOWARD HUNT mentions, in Give Us This Day, the leaflet raid [October 21, 1959] and that HUNT writes of immediately afterwards interviewing Pedro, but not Marcos or STURGIS. Marcos Diaz Lanz responded: 'I wouldn't waste a minute reading his book. I don't know the man. The book to me, I don't think I'm going to learn anything reading the book, because I don't know the man.' He was then asked if he had ever met HUNT. He said he had not. He was then asked if he had ever met "EDUARDO." He said: 'Well, you know, someone will come to you and say they worked for the Company and they will be wearing a bracelet that says 'John' on it and they will tell you another name. You just don't know who you meet.'" [HSCA Memo 3.7.78]

In a deposition in HUNT v. ajweberman, HUNT said he met Pedro Diaz Lanz at least once. In Give Us This Day, HUNT indicated he was well acquainted with Pedro Diaz Lanz.

In (deleted) 1964 an unidentified office of the CIA issued this memo:

MEMORANDUM (Deleted) 1964

SUBJECT: Involved in Arms Smuggling and in a Planned Insurrection of Minutemen in Florida Area.

1. This office is in the process of monitoring a clandestine arms smuggling operation in the Miami area directed against Venezuela. In this connection (deleted), an arms supplier, operating under the alias of Pedro Garcia, who offered to supply arms of any type and any amount within a period of one week. (Deleted) Pedro Garcia, the latter indicated that he was member and associated with an ultra-rightist group called Minutemen, who are training in an area in Florida called Yahagva (phonetic; possibly Yalaha, near Leesburg). Pedro Garcia stated that if Lyndon Johnson were re-elected President this group planned to revolt in an armed insurrection against the U.S. Government. Garcia bragged that he provided the arms for the above revolt.

2. (Deleted) Pedro Garcia remarks were made casually, (deleted). As of the writing of this memorandum this office has not been able to determine whether the above information constitutes a bit of braggadocio on the part of Pedro Garcia (deleted) or whether there is indeed some element of truth in Pedro Garcia's claim.

3. This office has been able to identify Pedro Garcia as Marcos Jose Diaz Lanz A11 811 130.

4. This office will continue to monitor the arms smuggling operation, and particular emphasis will be placed on uncovering Marcos Jose Diaz Lanz' intentions and activities in connection with the above cited insurrection plans. In this context, it is requested that this office be informed if the above information relative to an insurrection coincides with any information available to our office. If so, details are requested. (Deleted).

5. For these reasons, it is requested that the above information be handled on a need-to-know basis and that no action be taken on this information without prior coordination with this office. In this regard, we will be glad to service any requirements (deleted). We will of course keep you informed of any further developments that may occur in this case." [CIA 201-259,716]

MEMORANDUM (Deleted) 1964

SUBJECT: Marcos Diaz Lanz

REFERENCE: Memorandum this office dated (Deleted) 1964 Subject: Planned Insurrection of Minutemen in Florida area.

1. On (deleted) 1964 this office received a report (deleted) pertaining to (deleted) Marcos Diaz Lanz (deleted).

2. (Deleted) Marcos Diaz Lanz talked freely about the election results which by that time indicated President Johnson had been elected for another term. As the margin of votes for Johnson increased, Marcos Diaz Lanz became more and more excited. Marcos Diaz Lanz criticized Johnson very severely and referred to him as an SOB. He said it was becoming obvious that 'they' would have to go and fight in the streets because 'they' were unable to accept the Johnson Government. Marcos Diaz Lanz did not clarify who the 'they' were, but it was understood (deleted) to mean the Minutemen. (Deleted) received a definite impression that Marcos Diaz Lanz himself was deeply involved in any action contemplated.

3. (Deleted). Marcos Diaz Lanz made some reference to the fact that the U.S. would be better off if Johnson were dead, but (Deleted) could not say that Marcos Diaz Lanz had made any direct reference or suggestion that he or the Minutemen intended to do anything beyond going to the streets to fight as indicated in the referenced memorandum.

4. This office will keep you informed of any developments that may occur in this case as they evolve. [CIA 201-259716]

BERNARD BARKER was questioned during HUNT V. ajweberman:

Q. When did you first meet HOWARD HUNT?

A. I'm trying to think right now if that came out in any declarations of mine at Watergate. I think it did. I met HOWARD HUNT in Miami somewhere around the year 1960. He was air commander or chief of the CIA.

Q. How did you become his number one assistant?

A. That is a question only he can answer.

Q. Did you work for him in Cuba, too?

A. No.

Q. Did you work for the Cuban Revolutionary Front, and Cuban Revolutionary Council?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever have any correspondence with the New Orleans Cuban Revolutionary Council.

A. No...I will go further and say I have never been in New Orleans.

BARKER admitted he knew STURGIS, but when asked if he had seen HUNT and STURGIS together prior to the time he allegedly introduced the two men to each other circa 1972, he responded:

A. No, never.

Q. When you introduced HUNT to STURGIS do you remember the conversation?

A. When we went on the, I think it was the second trip, before the - STURGIS had known of the existence of HUNT. From his conversations with me, I knew STURGIS was quite excited at meeting the famous "EDUARDO." On the other hand, HUNT said he was going to have to meet STURGIS now because he is going to be involved in something. So I introduced him to HUNT at that time and from official expressions, the excitement of meeting the great "EDUARDO," meeting somebody removed. This is to the best of my knowledge, under oath I can tell you, they first met, therefore it's...

Tony Varona told the HSCA: "I know the name FIORINI, because I know there was a pilot by that name. I never saw him present. Maybe, I am not sure, he was working with Bender. Possibly with BARKER."

In April 1993 Howard K. Davis was asked: "Did you ever see HOWARD HUNT back in the early 1960's?" Howard K. Davis replied: "Well he was around every place, yeah. But I had no great contact with him." He was asked: "Did you ever see HUNT and STURGIS together?" Howard K. Davis stated: "I can't say that I did, no. But then I'd see STURGIS with a whole bunch of different people. I wouldn't know who they were."

HEMMING told the HSCA "He was aware of HUNT, but never worked with him." In 1994 HEMMING stated, "Who walks in the fucking door but STURGIS, and HUNT and Bill what-the-fuck's his name. We were at Freedom Tower to meet with Cisneros and Veciana and a bunch of other people. Frank Watterson was supposed to be there. This was October 1963."

The Rockefeller Commission tackled the question of whether HUNT knew STURGIS before 1972: "HUNT testified that he had never met FRANK STURGIS before they were introduced by BERNARD BARKER in Miami in 1972. STURGIS testified to the same effect. STURGIS further testified that while he had often heard of "EDUARDO," a CIA political officer who had been active in Cuban Revolutionary Council work in Miami before the April 1961 BAY OF PIGS OPERATION, he had never met him and did not know until 1971 or 1972 that "EDUARDO" was E. HOWARD HUNT. STURGIS had also been active in Miami area anti-Castro groups before, during and after HUNT'S 1960 and early 1961 assignment regarding the political aspects of the Bay of Pigs Project."

A Rockefeller Commission investigator wrote: "Marita Lorenz - mistress of Fidel Castro - said recently to a reporter that when she came to the U.S. in 1960 or so, the first people she met was STURGIS and HUNT. STURGIS denies this, says that the person who was with him was Alex Rorke or Jose Joachim Sanjennes Pardomo - not HUNT."

Undoubtedly STURGIS was curious about "EDUARDO'S" identity back in the early 1960's. He admitted having heard about him. All STURGIS had to do was to ask any number of friends to introduce him to "EDUARDO" and he would have met HUNT. Tad Szulc was asked, in the course of HUNT v. ajweberman, if he had developed any information that linked HUNT to STURGIS prior to 1971. Szulc stated: "And, the answer would be: I believe I did on the basis of conversations with writer people with whom I dealt in it, but again, I would, my memory is not perfect on this point." Szluc said that their relationship involved the United States Government and that it occurred at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The pattern of deliberate disassociation that appeared in the HUNT/STURGIS relationship also appeared in the HUNT/ANGLETON relationship. ANGLETON claimed that he never met HUNT. Scott Malone stated: "ANGLETON, Newton S. Miler and HUNT were thick as thieves at the CIA." Charles Colson "mentioned the fact that ANGLETON had had contact with HUNT while HUNT was in the White House." [Werbell Ex. 4 see Conein in Record Groups] In an interview with Daniel Schorr, ANGLETON denied knowing HUNT. [Wise, Molehunt p246] During his deposition in HUNT V. ajweberman ANGLETON was asked: "During the course of yours and his professional duties on behalf of the Agency, did you ever have an occasion to have a professional relationship with HUNT?" Answer: "No." ANGLETON was asked "And are you friends with him?" He answered: "No." William Hood was questioned about HUNT and ANGLETON by this researcher: "I can't imagine. I would doubt very much if their paths ever crossed." The CIA reported on June 19, 1972: "HUNT'S security file reflects that Subject has, in the past, been of operational interest to Mr. JAMES ANGLETON, Chief, CI Staff/ DDP in connection with an operational matter. One June 19, 1972, Mr. Fred Hubbard, CI Staff, advised that he will provide information as to the nature of Mr. ANGLETON'S utilization of Subject." In January 1974 ANGLETON was questioned about his relationship with HUNT:

ANGLETON: According to Lyle Miller, Deputy Legislative Counsel, he has a paper of Security's on this fellow HUNT. Paragraph 15 [of] Subject's Security file reflects that Subject has in the past been of operational interest to Mr. JAMES ANGLETON, Chief /Counter-Intelligence Staff, DDP, in connection with an OP matter. On June 19, 1972, Fred Hubbard, Counter-Intelligence/Staff, advised that he will provide information as to the nature of Mr. ANGLETON'S utilization of Subject. That's the end of the quote.

SDO: Yes Sir.

ANGLETON: As I told Mr. - when I talked to Mr. Osborn I didn't have this in hand and he didn't recall it - so it throws - the fact that I talked to Fred Hubbard who denies all of this.

SDO: Please hang on. Mr. ANGLETON could you hang on to this - he doesn't remember it?

ANGLETON: No, he doesn't remember making such a statement. According to him, I remember him well - Second, I've never met HUNT in my life, and I'd appreciate it if Mr. Howard Osborne, who's going up with the Director today, finds out who the author is of all of this and brief him on all of this. That's it.

SDO: Thank you. I will.

The operation referred to in this document may have dealt with Counter-Intelligence's subsidy of HUNT'S career as an author of spy novels. This came to light as a result of this chain of events:

In 1968 the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, "discussed with Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, the potential of several books written by David St. John, a former Agency employee. Mr. Helms thought these books gave a favorable impression of the Agency and might be exploitable for the movies."

On or about May 1971, Mr. Martin S. Davis, Chairman of the Gulf and Western subsidiary, Paramount Pictures, met with Mr. Kern, of the New York City Domestic Contacts Office concerning the possibility of Paramount doing a T.V. series on the CIA similar to that presently on T.V. concerning the FBI. "...According to Mr. Davis, the decision had been reached by the Agency that it would be unwise to attempt such a series, but that if and when the Agency felt such a series to be desirable, it would first offer the opportunity to Mr. Davis and Paramount Pictures."

Mr. Helms said that on May 9, 1972, Mr. Valenti introduced him to Mr. Charles Bluhdorn, chairman of the board of Gulf and Western which owns Paramount pictures at a showing of The Godfather at the headquarters of the Motion Picture Association of America."Mr. Helms related that Mr. Bluhdorn did not raise the issue of the books by David St. John nor say anything about a possible T.V. series on the Agency, although he could have easily done so. Mr. Helms said their conversation related principally to wine from grapes grown in the Napa Valley. Mr. Helms said flatly that he made no commitment to anyone regarding the possibility of a T.V. series on the Agency and, as a matter of fact, opposed presentation of a series on the Agency."

Charles Bluhdorn, a World War II Jewish immigrant from Austria who arrived in America with $15, used the money he made from Brazilian coffee to set up Gulf and Western in 1956. Gulf and Western invested heavily in Latin America. Charles Bluhdorn was associated with Vatican banker Michelle Sidona through the Societa Generale Immobiliare, a multinational real estate firm. He was also associated with Ivan Boesky and reputed mafia attorney Sidney Korshak. The largest single beneficiary of the U.S. invasion and subsequent government policies in the Dominican Republic was Gulf and Western. After the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in April 1965, Gulf and Western supported the appointment of Juan Balaguer as president - as did organized crime figure Joe Zicaralli. Many Cuban exiles were involved in Gulf and Western's Dominican operations. In July 1970 top Gulf and Western executives were asked to appear before the Illinois Racing Board, then investigating ties between a Gulf and Western controlled company and organized crime. Mr. Bluhdorn and his associates denied any and all knowledge of organized crime figures connected with Gulf and Western properties, but evidence was presented that indicated Gulf and Western was in partnership with Philip Levin, who was also a Gulf and Western director, in a hotel in Acapulco that was run by Moe Morton as a private club. Guests included Meyer Lansky and Sidney Korshak.[NACLA 4.75] Charles Bluhdorn died circa 1983.

The CIA: "Mr. Davis was upset because Mr. Bludorn, on the morning of May 10, 1972, put a number of St. John's books on Martin S. Davis' desk with a note 'maybe I should deal with Mr. Helms myself.' According to Martin S. Davis, Jack Valenti had given the books to Mr. Bluhdorn after supposedly having received them from Mr. Helms. Mr. Davis assumed that Mr. Bluhdorn had received them from Mr. Valenti the previous evening when Mr. Bluhdorn was present at a showing of The Godfather to which Mr. Helms and number of other White House advisors were also invited. Relating this transmission of the St. John books to Gulf & Western's interest in doing a T.V. series, Mr. Bluhdorn questioned the accuracy of Mr. Davis' information that the Agency did not want to do a T.V. series. Mr. Bluhdorn is apparently interpreting this coincidence to mean that Mr. Helms is now interested in doing the series.

4. Mr. Isenstead, Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff, related the above to Mr. Cord Meyer, Deputy Director, Plans, on May 10, 1972, and was informed that Mr. Davis and the company should exercise their own judgements concerning David St. John's books, and that there is no pressure from the Agency on the matter.

5. Mr. Davis and Mr. Lukoskie met on May 11, 1972, at (deleted). At the meeting, Davis showed Lukoskie several books by David St. John, one of which was a hardcover book and the other paperback copies selling for 50 cents. The cover described David St. John as a former CIA agent. Mr. Davis referred to the books as a 'bunch of crap' and said they 'can't possible do the Agency any good.' He checked with another Gulf and Western vice president, Mr. Levinson, who said that Valenti had informed Mr. Levinson, a couple of weeks ago, that Mr. Helms, a personal friend of David St. John, said he would like to help St. John get the books made into movies of a T.V. series. Mr. Davis stated flatly that he has no interest in the books, but that he is unhappy because he felt he had a commitment from the Agency through Mr. Kerns which would give Mr. Davis and Paramount first opportunity to produce a T.V. series if the Agency is willing. Mr. Davis fears that someone in the Agency is talking to Valenti about the possibility of a T.V. series and the Agency is reneging on it's commitment to him. Mr. Davis wants to know whether he does or does not have a commitment from CIA by way of Mr. Kerns of the DCS office to be given the first opportunity to produce a T.V. series of movie concerning the CIA."

On May 10, 1972, as a result of the controversy with Paramount, the ID/I/F Supervisor received a call from "Martin J. Lukowski, Cover and Commercial Staff/CCB. He asked me to identify for him by true name the Agency employee who had in the past extensively used the pen name David St. John. Martin J. Lukowski believed it was either (Deleted) OS# 37435 or the Subject. Lukowski identified the Subject as HOWARD HUNT. Martin J. Lukowski said he needed the information urgently, but he did not explain the need or identity of his requestor. Initial OS indices search revealed no record of David St. John, and numerous files in the name of (Deleted) and HOWARD HUNT. I consulted privately with Edward F. Sayle, Office of Security, Security Research Staff, in the hope that SRS might have some record of pen names used by Agency employees whose works had been published. Sayle recalled from memory that HUNT had written several books under Agency sponsorship, using the pen-name David St. John. The intent of the novels had been to provide a series similar to the James Bond novels, presenting a favorable image of the Agency. The project had, Edward F. Sayle said, been under the guidance of the Counter-Intelligence Staff. It had not, he noted, proved very successful...In as much as Subject had written under the guidance of the Counter-Intelligence Staff, Edward F. Sayle advised against identifying him by name to Martin J. Lukowski. He suggested instead that Martin J. Lukowski be referred to Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief, Counter-Intelligence Staff, or Mr. ANGLETON, Chief, CI Staff. I called Mr. Lukoskie on Red Line 1978. In his absence I advised Ellen, his secretary, that I did not that the authority to identify David St. John by his true name and suggested that Mr. Lukoskie contact Mr. Rocca or Mr. ANGLETON. At no time did I identify Subject as the user of the pen name David St. John." [CIA File Number 235000 MFR] William Hood commented, "God knows JIM would have never read any of those books, I would think, because they're so bad."

On May 23, 1972, Martin J. Lukoskie, CCS/CCB met with Martin S. Davis in Mr. Davis' office in New York City. Davis was informed that the Agency was against doing a television series on the CIA and Davis readily agreed to drop the matter. Harry Real, a Domestic Contacts Division Agent from New York discussed the possibility of producing a series of movies based on the paperback novels of David St. John (one of HOWARD HUNT'S pen names).

Martin S. Davis succeeded Charles Bluhdorn as Chairman of the Board of Gulf and Western.

February 1974

FROM: Edward F. Sayle

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. KUHN

SUBJECT: General Paul F. Gaynor's Recollections

1. This date, at your instruction, I called General Paul Gaynor to seek his recollections regarding his knowledge of the writings of Mr. HUNT and any official who might be aware of the circumstances of any Agency involvement in that effort.

2. General Gaynor advised that his memory is not all together clear on that matter, and that he was "reaching," but stated that as he reconstructs the matter:

3. He became aware that HUNT, while in WH, was accomplishing a steady flow of spy books, and that security approval was not being requested on the manuscripts before submission to publishers. (He stated that this activity continued later, as he recalls it, in CI Staff, and agreed with the idea that the volume of writings was sufficient to indicate that a great deal of time was involved in HUNT'S writing.) General Gaynor advised that he raised the issue "up front" on several occasions. The reaction he received from raising the issues was that "keep your stinking nose out of this business." He stated that he was led to believe that Mr. Helms desired to improve the image of the intelligence profession, and the Agency, and that HUNT'S books were a part of the program to do so. He stated he was never told outright this was the case, but the responses he received led him to believe this was the case.

4. He suggested that two people might be able to assist in clearing the issue were Ray Rocca and Walter Pforzheimer, both of whom were involved in the "image" materials. He stated that Pforzheimer seemed to be aware of all the details - on an up to date basis - of HUNT'S departure from the Agency to join the public relations firm, to the degree that General Gaynor gained the belief that HUNT was merely moving his desk outside the building, but being paid by the same source as before. He also advised that he kept Mrs. Ethel Mendoza fairly current on what he was learning about HUNT'S activities because she followed the case for him and suggested that her recall about what he had learned, and when and what resulted, might be better than him at this date. (He also mentioned an incident in which Morse Allen while on TDY was told by a COS to ask Headquarters to remove HUNT from the area because of his direct liaison with the President of that country, and other activities which were confounding station operations. Later the COS told Morse to forget about relaying the message, with the implication that HUNT was being directed by higher authority in the Agency and the COS did not (illegible).

4. He also suggested that another person -- definitely no friend of HUNT -- who might have some recall or have picked-up information about the book-writing might be Anita Potocki of CI Staff, formerly of Division D. (I gather that she did not have official knowledge, but because of her dislike for HUNT, she made it somewhat her business to follow his career). Edward Sayle.

February 14, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Raymond A. Rocca on the David St. John Novels.

1. On the morning of February 14, 1974, Messrs. Fredrick Evans and Lawrence Howe interviewed Mr. Raymond A. Rocca, Deputy Chief, Counter-Intelligence Operations. The purpose of the interview was to follow up on information contained in Office of Security files which stated the belief that individuals in the Counter Intelligence Operations Office had knowledge of the writing activities of HUNT. This belief was a matter of record in the files of the former Security Research Staff and was attributed to Mr. Paul Gaynor, now retired, and Mr. Edward Sayle.

2. During this interview Mr. Rocca was specifically asked whether or not he had knowledge of the existence of any form of official sponsorship or encouragement to HUNT to write novels to improve the image of this Agency. Additionally, Mr. Rocca was asked whether or not any assistance was requested of the Counter Intelligence Operations Office to be provided to Mr. HUNT, or whether or not that staff had any relationship with Mr. HUNT whatsoever. In response to these questions, Mr. Rocca responded "on the record" that he has no knowledge of any such arrangements, not at any time was he party to any assistance, or requests for assistance to Mr. HUNT. Mr. Rocca stated that the particular section which had been most actively concerned in the past years was responsible for handling a variety of tasks categorized under the area of "setting the record straight." In this sense the image mission of the office was to counter misinformation currently in the media, or otherwise believed to be part of an effort to discredit the Agency. Mr. Rocca feels that any assumption that Mr. HUNT was engaged in any form of Agency sponsored image activity would have probably lead to the conclusion that it was done under the Counter Intelligence Operations. However, Mr. Rocca emphatically stated that this was not the case.

3. Mr. Rocca was thoroughly candid and cooperative during the course of this interview. He was unable to suggest alternate means of attempting to determine if any official agency sponsorship of Mr. HUNT did, in fact, exist. Mr. Rocca did venture the opinion that he felt that in all probability an official acquiescence on the part of senior officials might have been involved, rather than an official sponsorship. It was agreed by all in this discussion that the nature of any informal support given to Mr. HUNT would be far more difficult to define in the absence of any formalized agreements.

Lawrence J. Howe.

FROM: Lawrence Howe

TO: Mr. Steven L. Kuhn

SUBJECT: The David St. John Novels

1...It had previously been alleged in Office of Security records that Paul Gaynor and Edward Sayle of Security Research Staff, believed that HUNT had written novels at Agency request and that his effort had been known to Mr. JAMES ANGLETON, Chief, Counter-Intelligence Operations.

2. Mr. Pforzheimer provided a verbal summary of his knowledge of Mr. HUNT'S fictional writings under the pen name, David St. John. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that when the first St. John book, On Hazardous Duty, appeared in 1965, he undertook to identify the true name of the author. Mr. Pforzheimer related that he checked with a source in the copyright office, only to find at the time that the true name was not given on the copyright application. The mailing address given for the author was checked against telephone cross reference directory. The address on the copyright application was identified with HUNT. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that after making the identification, he called Mr. Thomas Karamessines and related his discovery. Pforzheimer recalled from the nature of Karamessines' reaction that he had uncovered a sensitive matter of senior officer concern. Pforzheimer then recommended to Mr. Karamessines that 'if the Agency is involved in this thing, why not see to it that HUNT leaves his address of the copyright applications in the future. Mr. Karamessines reportedly accepted the suggestion, and Mr. Pforzheimer recalls that subsequent copyright applications were submitted without the address. Within five minutes of the conversation with Mr. Karamessines, Mr. Pforzheimer recalls being called by Richard Helms, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Pforzheimer recalls the substance of the conversation as being: "For Christ sake Walter, this is the first book to come along and say something good about the Agency. Why not leave the goddamn thing alone?"

3. The undersigned asked Mr. Pforzheimer, who, to his knowledge, would be in a position to confirm or deny whether Mr. HUNT was under any sort of Agency sponsorship in his writing of the David St. John novels. Pforzheimer replied that he was never officially briefed on the matter and that only Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamessines could provide the answer. Pforzheimer was then asked if ANGLETON or Raymond Rocca of Counter Intelligence Operations, would have any knowledge of this activity. Pforzheimer replied that he doubted it seriously.

5. Tracing Mr. HUNT'S career assignments, it is noted that he was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Director of Operations Group, in February 1965. The first David St. John book was published during 1965. From June 1965, through September 1966, Mr. HUNT was assigned (deleted). During 1966 three St. John books appeared in print, the highest output for any year. Mr. HUNT published one book under the St. John pseudonym in 1967 and one each in the years 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1972."

Lawrence Howe also stated: "Subsequent to publishing the last St. John novel, Mr. HUNT published a novel entitled EDUARDO, using his old Agency issued alias, Edward J. Hamilton." [2.6.74]

Walter Pforzhiemer, contacted in 1993, commented: "I don't think he needed an Agency subsidy. His books sold." Walter Pforzhiemer was informed that this author had read all of HUNT'S early paperbacks: "You're a tough man. Now what do you want me tell you, whether he was involved in the Kennedy assassination?" I told him, "I already know he was involved." He responded, "I don't think he was within hundreds of miles of Dealey Plaza."

Another HUNT/ANGLETON link surfaced on August 9, 1973, when Director /Office of Security, Bruce Solie generated this document:

Director of Security August 9, 1973

Bruce L. Solie

NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. (Deleted) Soviet Bloc/Counter-Intelligence has advised of the following information which he noted during a review of a diary kept by David Murphy while he was Chief, Soviet Research.

2. In the above diary is an entry for April 9, 1964, that "called HOWARD HUNT to confirm that he has been told about the doubts regarding AEFOXTROT bona fides by Tracy Barnes and had then passed it on to Virgil Harris. I will discuss this matter with Tracy or Rositzke."

3. (Deleted) was not involved in the Nosenko case and has no other information in regard to the April 9, 1964, entry. In the absence of a specific request (deleted) will make no inquiry concerning why Murphy considered it necessary to make sure HUNT was aware of the doubts concerning AEFOXTROT bona fides.

4. It is presumed that no precautions can or should be taken in regard to the information that HUNT was briefed in April 1964 concerning Nosenko. It is a matter for serious concern if HUNT has testified or does testify concerning his knowledge of CIA activities, or if he is permitted to prepare a manuscript (while in prison) based on his CIA experience.

5. The date of April 9, 1964, should be noted since this is after April 4, 1964, when there was a distinct change in Nosenko's handling.

Bruce L. Solie.

The CIA's Office of the Inspector General generated this index card on August 10, 1973:

Jack Kindschi, Francis Henriguez, Bennett, Mullen, HUNT, Hank Greenspun, Senator Baker, Ervin. Memo for the Record by Jack Kindschi, Subject: Meeting with (Deleted).

The CIA's Office of the Inspector General generated this index card on September 10, 1973:

Mullen Company, Lynne Jones, Scott Armstrong, Robert Bennett, Robert Mullen, Gary Dressler (phon), HOWARD HUNT, Diane Konawalski, Hank Greenspun, Jack Kindschi, (Deleted) Martin Lukoskie, C.D. Flitsch. Memo for the Record by Jack Kindschi. Subject: Meeting with (deleted).

Jack C. Kindschi was in Stockholm, Sweden, from 1962 to 1966, where he worked under the cover of Mullen & Company. Ostensibly, Kindischi handled the General Foods account. Actually, he was engaged in debriefing Soviet and Chinese defectors. [Hougan Secret Agenda p216] Jack Kindischi was in Mexico in 1967. Jack Kindischi was CIA Station Chief, in Honolulu, Hawaii, from 1978 until he retired in 1980. During his term as Chief of Station the CIA established a proprietary in Hawaii known as Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald and Dillingham Investments. Among those who invested in Bishop Baldwin was Jack Kindischi, who later became a $68,000 per year company consultant. Jack Anderson reported: "John (Jack) Kindischi not only gave Rewald and the firm a variety of CIA assignments, but also went to work for Bishop, Baldwin, when he retired from the CIA in 1980. According to Rewald's affidavit, Kindischi also invested $185,000 in the company and his mother put in $112,000. As station chief, Kindischi ordered Rewald's son (also a CIA contract agent) to build a laser gun." Kindischi produced brochures for Bishop, Baldwin that called Bishop, Baldwin one of the oldest and largest private investment firms in Hawaii. [Wash. Post 12.27.84; Kwitney, The Crimes of Patriots] Bishop, Baldwin was a classic Ponzi scheme in which money from new investors was used to pay the 20% interest previous investors expected to receive. (Rewald had a criminal record for having effectuated a similar scheme in Wisconsin). Rewald used the rest of the money to maintain the offices of Bishop, Baldwin and for his own expenses. The IRS became aware of Rewald's lavish lifestyle in 1982. The CIA delayed an IRS audit of Bishop, Baldwin for two weeks. In July 1983 a T.V. reporter in Honolulu drew attention to certain financial irregularities in Bishop, Baldwin. After Rewald saw this exposé, he slashed his wrists. Bishop, Baldwin collapsed, costing investors more than $22 million. Kindischi, who was given back $175,000 of his investment by Rewald just before the bankruptcy, agreed to return that money and stand on line with the other creditors. Rewald was arrested. [Wall Street Journal 4.18.84]

The CIA noted that Herman Greenspun, 201-788,988, was the Subject of CIA documents dated 1950 to 1955 regarding Greenspun's purchase and sale of arms and aircraft, and his participation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948 to 1950.

An Office of the Inspector General of the CIA's Index card stated: "Memorandum for the Record by Scott D. Breckinridge, Subject: E. HOWARD HUNT [regarding HUNT'S activities during the Fall of 1964] Goldwater, Barry." HUNT reportedly told the Watergate committee staff that immediately after Barry Goldwater was nominated in 1964, he was told to pick-up all publicly released information at Goldwater Headquarters, and take it to the White House to Chester Cooper, an aide to President Lyndon Johnson. Elizabeth McIntosh told the Washington Post that the Goldwater speeches were not delivered to the White House, but instead were delivered to CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia: "It was just to keep in touch with what was going on." Mrs. McIntosh said. "If it had anything to do with the White House, I'm sure he (HUNT) would have told us about it. He would have bragged about it...HUNT told the committee staff that the actual pick-up was done by Connie Mazerov [who] said in a telephone interview that she did perform courier work when she worked for the CIA, but that she could not recall picking up any materials from Goldwater Headquarters. She had never taken anything she picked up to the White House Office Building or the Executive Office Building. 'I might have picked it up from someone else, like in a hotel room,' she said. When asked if she recalled a daily pick-up from any person in the same place during the period of the campaign, she said she did not. Referring to HUNT'S reported testimony on her role, Mazerov said, 'I'm sure he wouldn't have said I had done something, if I hadn't...I consider him to be a man of great integrity.'"

HUNT lied about his surveillance of Goldwater on behalf of President Johnson. In December 1964 HUNT suffered from ulcers.

Another card concerned: "HUNT'S travel vouchers during 1964 - Travel to Mexico City." HUNT'S "CIA Fitness Report, March 31, 1963, to March 31, 1964," was ironic: "In the (deleted) project, Subject vindicated his faith in moribund clandestine asset [OSWALD] by demonstrating, after about a year and a half [OSWALD returned in June 1962, and was killed in November 1963] under his personal direction, that it is one of the most effective activities of its kind...HUNT promptly and swiftly terminated a large and effective radio broadcasting project [the assassination of President John F. Kennedy], to establish which he and his subordinates had labored hard, immediately upon belated discovery that insuperable, practical obstacles precluded realization of the project's theoretical potential [the invasion of Cuba]." [HUNT CIA Fitness Report rel. 4.22.83]

In Undercover, HUNT wrote that in 1964, he "resigned from the CIA and was at once rehired as a contract agent, responsible only to Thomas Karamessines." Thomas Karamessines was responsible to Richard Helms. In February 1965 HUNT moved to the office of the DDP/ Operations Group. From June 1965 HUNT served as (Deleted). In 1965 HUNT wrote to BARKER and stated he had retired from the CIA. He said he did this because of "the instruction I received from the Agency." [HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT HUNT test. 1.29.85 p108] On July 20, 1965, the CIA generated a Notification of Establishment or Cancellation of (Deleted) Form which was sent to Chief, Operating Component, DDP Ref: Resignee Backstop Debriefing (Deleted)" signed by James W. Franklin. The CIA: "Subject served in Headquarters assignments until July 1965, when he converted to contract status and was sent to Madrid. He returned to Headquarters in September 1966." HUNT reported he was in Madrid from July 1965 to July 1966. On September 21, 1966, a "Request for (Deleted) or Change" form was sent to the Central Cover Staff through the Office of Security, Subject, E. HOWARD HUNT, that stated: "ENTRY: Inclusion of Subject on the (deleted) is requested as noted below. When notified that (deleted) has been established, Subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to (deleted). CHANGE: Subject is currently included (deleted), For the reason noted below it is requested that: This employee be (deleted). The following change be made: (rest of document deleted)." On September 22, 1966, HUNT was "designated assistant to Chairman, NATO Intelligence Collection Working Group (USIB), and is required to appraise the effect of possible change in the NATO structure on U.S. collection capabilities." The Ervin Committee: "HUNT was in Madrid on unknown business from 1965 to 1966." [SSC on Illegal Election Practices - Book 9 p3726] The CIA released a index card that read "N HUNT, E. HOWARD CR JR216276 /D July 23, 1965. (Deleted) 9022940 /u 65." The Rockefeller Commission commented: "HUNT alias on Madrid assignment - 'Terence S. Crabanac.'" The SSCIA questioned HUNT about Madrid: "I was sent to Madrid in either 1964 or 1965. I can't recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. (Deleted) My communications were handled independently between myself and Thomas Karamessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans. This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms. (Deleted) and I had no Cuban activities of any kind."

On August 14, 1973, Manuel Artime told Martin Dardis, an investigator for the Miami District Attorney's Office: "In reference to the information that Artime had met with HUNT in Spain in 1965 to plot the assassination of Fidel Castro, Artime related that HUNT had, in fact, been in Spain during that period of time, that he, Artime, had been in Spain at that time, and that he, Artime, had participated in and discussed a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro with other individuals in the Cuban underground, but that HOWARD HUNT was not present, nor was he privy to information discussed during these meetings, unless HUNT got the information from a source other than Artime." [Richard E. Gerstein and Martin F. Dardis 8.14.73 Inv. #929] Dardis died in May 2006 at age 83. He was a high school dropout who lied about his age to join the Army at 16, was awarded a Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts and Silver Stars for gallantry after rescuing an American pilot in World War II. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors.

The Office of the Inspector General of the CIA had a blind memo in its files: "Subject: E. HOWARD HUNT - Finances. Regarding: 'Did HUNT receive $30,000 from Helms?' - St. John Royalties, Activities during Madrid Assignment, Baker Investigation (relations with Artime)."

CIA Finance Director Thomas B. Yale could find no record of a $30,000 payment to HUNT until 1965. "We made a specific analysis of HUNT'S advance account for the period he was in (Deleted) (July 1965 to September 1966) and have determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and (deleted) with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their (deleted) visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for a write-off by Desmond FitzGerald on June 1, 1966, without further accounting. Also, we confirmed that no Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. HUNT during this period. At the beginning of his (Deleted) it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. HUNT'S name to receive all non-salary payments. Mr. HUNT had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966. Account opened: July 13, 1965, $10,000, July 22, 1965, $5,000, September 15, 1965, $5,000, October 6, 1965, $5,000 and July 19, 1966, $5,000 for a total of $30,000. All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the (deleted) is that all costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as (deleted) are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without incurring operational expenditures." [CIA Memo for IG 2.27.74 copy to Breckinridge] HUNT was in Madrid for ten months and incurred $63, 500 in transportation expenses. Thomas Karamessines was the Approving Officer.

February 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Finance Records - E. HOWARD HUNT

1. On the instruction of Mr. Steven L. Kuhn, Chief of Operations, PSI, the undersigned made an appointment for the afternoon of February 20, 1974, to interview Mr. (Deleted) Chief, Certification and Liaison Division, Office of Finance, and Mr. Deleted of Finance on the subject of HOWARD HUNT. At the outset of the interview Mr. Deleted advised the undersigned that instruction had been received from the Director of the Office of Finance, Mr. Thomas Yale, that discussion on the subject of Mr. HUNT was to be carried out only with the Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Deleted stated that he had informed Mr. Yale of the requested interview, and had received this instruction with the suggestion that the undersigned contact Mr. Yale directly with any inquiry.

2. Accompanied by Mr. Deleted, the undersigned briefed Mr. Yale on the nature of the request, and identified the "Task Force" effort being undertaken by the Office of Security in concert with the Offices of the Inspector General and Legislative Counsel. Mr. Yale responded that he recognized the legitimacy of the inquiry. Mr. Yale explained that subsequent to initiation of complete audit being undertaken by Mr. Deleted of the Audit Staff, the Deputy Director for Management and Services, Mr. Deleted had requested the Office of Finance to discontinue their investigation of Mr. HUNT to avoid duplication. Mr. Yale added parenthetically that it was the nature of Finance Officers not to leave a job half done, and that an "informal" inquiry into Mr. HUNT'S financial records had nevertheless continued at a more subdued pace.

3. A review of the circumstances surrounding HUNT'S conversion to Contract Type A employment and (deleted) assignment was then undertaken by Messrs. Yale, Finance Director and the undersigned, Lawrence J. Howe. The contract and payroll files of Mr. HUNT were reviewed for possible indications of the nature of the operational activity undertaken in Madrid. A review of travel vouchers indicated that HUNT made accounting indicating departure from Washington, D.C., on August 5, 1965. The costs for this travel were charged to the budget of the Western Hemisphere Division/Deputy Director Plans, Madrid Station, Support account. A subsequent accounting summarized PCS travel expenses and included a payment for apartment rental for August 16, 1965, August 17, 1965, and August 18, 1965, with a payment in the amount of $125 to Mr. Deleted for this purpose.

4. It was determined that an allottee bank account in Mr. HUNT'S name had been established at the Riggs National Bank of Washington. All salary and other non-operational reimbursements were made to Mr. HUNT through a sterile check to this account. An operational account was established for Mr. HUNT with the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City. A review of all payments made to Mr. HUNT through the Chase Bank account through Mr. HUNT'S operational advance subsidiary account, or 1442 account, had been made. There was no record of any operational accounts or advances being processed through this channel. Mr. Yale stated that this fact defined his concern. He felt that it was inconceivable that Mr. HUNT could have undertaken operational activity without some transfer or accounting for funds. To date, no such records have been developed. No reference to a project, or project digraph, or operational FAN number, has been located. All expenses connected with Mr. HUNT identified to date were charged to the (deleted) Support. A review made of (deleted) records has not indicated any "Developmental and Target of Opportunity (D&TO)" funds or "Other Operational Activity (OOA)" funds expended by or on behalf of HUNT. The two accounts would normally be the source of operational funding not charged against a specific project activity.

5. A review of all the travel vouchers on record for HUNT during this period also failed to identify a project. In addition to the PCD and return vouchers, two other accountings are on record. One accounting covered a trip by the entire HUNT family to Paris "for renewal of visas." A second voucher covered a TDY trip from Madrid to Washington, with a return made to Madrid, made by Mr. HUNT from January 5, 1966, to January 8, 1966. The voucher states in the space provided for the citation of the travel order number "no travel order." The accounting was approved and signed by Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director for Plans. No justification statement or purpose for this TDY was given on the accounting.

6. Mr. Yale determined that further review of possible sources for identification of operational funding was in order. Mr. Yale gave instructions that the entire 1442 advance account of Mr. HUNT be reviewed for other possible channels of funding outside of the New York Chase account. After discussion it was agreed that particular attention be taken to any items connected with publishing or book royalties. Mr. Yale noted that the royalty offset waiver provision amended to Mr. HUNT'S contract was, in his experience, somewhat unusual.

7. Mr. Yale was informed by the undersigned of the intention to interview Mr. Edward Ryan, currently Chief, Division D, who was at the time of Mr. HUNT'S Madrid assignment, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Deputy Director for Plans. Mr. Yale suggested that Mr. Davis Powell also be interviewed. The undersigned informed Mr. Yale that this had been done and briefed Mr. Yale on the generally negative results of the interview. Mr. Yale then recommended that Mr. Sam Halpern be interviewed. Mr. Yale noted that Mr. Halpern had been assistant to Desmond FitzGerald when the latter was Chief, Western Hemisphere Division and had accompanied Mr. FitzGerald when he became Deputy Director for Plans. Mr. Yale recalled that subsequent to FitzGerald's passing, that Mr. Halpern remained on the staff and acted as an Executive Office for Mr. Thomas Karamessines. Mr. Yale stated that from his experience, Mr. Karamessines would have delegated all the arranging of 'details' surrounding an assignment such as Mr. HUNT'S to Mr. Halpern. Mr. Yale offered the parenthetical observation of his surprise at what he interpreted to be reticence to date to interview Mr. Halpern.

8. The undersigned assured Mr. Yale that he would be informed of any information identifying any possible project activity developed in subsequent investigation. Mr. Yale stated that any information in this area would greatly facilitate the job of checking computerized financial records. Lawrence J. Howe. [CIA Howe Memo Office of Fin. Rec. E.H.H. 2.21.74]

Sam Halpern said he had no recollection about HUNT'S assignment. In June 1965 he moved from WH Division with Des FitzGerald when he became the DD/P. At about that time Halpern's father died and he was in New York for the funeral and ten days of religious observations following that. He was back in mid-June and in and out from then on as he got ready to attend the National War College which began in August. He did not return to that office until the end of June 1966.

Halpern observed that during this period Karamessines was ADDP with Helms moving up to be DDCI. He thought it entirely possible that Helms and Karamessines could have handled this on their own...He also suggested talking to Georgia. [CIA S.D.B. 2.22.74 MFR EHH IG File 10 Tab 32]

The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Edward Ryan, was interviewed by Lawrence Howe and Fredrick N. Evans. "The purpose of the interview was to determine if Mr. Ryan had any information bearing on the matter of the operational assignment of Mr. HUNT during this period. Mr. Ryan stated that the assignment of Mr. HUNT both to the European Division and (Deleted) was handled without benefit of routine processing procedures through the Western Hemisphere Division. Mr. HUNT'S assignment was coordinated and directed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. With regard to operational duties, Mr. Ryan was unaware of any specific project or target for Mr. HUNT. Edward Ryan made the specific observation that if HUNT produced positive intelligence on the (deleted) target during this period the officials responsible for this effort within the Western European Division were totally unaware of it." [Howe 2.22.74 IG File 11 Tab 38]

"On the morning of February 15, 1974, Lawrence J. Howe interviewed Davis Powell, currently a Budget Officer on the staff of the Deputy Director for Management and Services. During 1965 Mr. Powell was Chief of Support of the the designated Western European Division. In July 1965 a contract was written authorizing salary and benefits to Mr. E. HOWARD HUNT for an assignment (deleted). The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Powell had any information on Mr. HUNT'S activities during this period.

"Mr. Powell responded that from his recollection, it was Mr. HUNT'S habit to deal only with the most senior officer available. In this case HUNT dealt directly with the then Chief of the Western European Division, Rolf Kingsley. Mr. Powell states that in his capacity as Chief of Support, any activity undertaken to support Mr. HUNT'S assignment in Madrid was undertaken second and third hand on receipt or instructions from Mr. Kingsley's office. He further stated that he was never briefed on the nature of his mission and could add little in terms of speculation. Mr. Powell recommended that Mr. Edward Ryan, who was then Deputy Chief of the Western European Division, be contacted. Mr. Powell also suggested that (Deleted) be interviewed. (Deleted) was the executive secretary in the Western European Division during the time that Mr. HUNT'S contract was written and (Deleted) subsequently served in Madrid herself. Mr. Powell understands that (Deleted) is currently assigned to the office of the Chief, European Division." [Howe 2.15.74]

On February 15, 1974, Lawrence Howe interviewed Mr. Deleted, Chief, Contract Personnel Division, Office of Personnel: "The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. (Deleted) had any information not contained in the Contract Personnel file of Mr. HUNT on the latter's activities while (deleted). Mr. Deleted summarized his recollections by saying that although it was not common practice, it was not entirely unusual for highly sensitive contracts to be administered without the contracting officer being made aware of the operational objective involved."

Lawrence J. Howe interviewed Frank A. O'Malley about HUNT. O'Malley had served with the Central Cover Staff in the area dealing with the funding of covert action projects. In this capacity he had become familiar with Mr. HUNT while Mr. HUNT functioned on the Covert Activities Staff primarily in the propaganda field: "Returning to Mr. O'Malley's previous responsibilities in coordinating funding for HUNT'S covert action activities, the issue was raised as to whether or not the funding of HUNT'S projects continued between July 1965 and September 1966, while HUNT was a contract employee (deleted). Mr. Frank O'Malley recalled that at the time of Mr. HUNT'S assignment (deleted) the statement disseminated for consumption within the Agency was that Mr. HUNT was retiring. Frank O'Malley stated that this was not generally believed. Frank O'Malley was quite certain that during this period his office handled no project funding for HUNT. In response to specific question O'Malley stated that on Mr. HUNT'S return to staff employment the projects and funding which stopped in July 1965 were again resumed. Mr. O'Malley was not aware of any project names or funding mechanisms or post assignment accountings in connection with Mr. HUNT'S activities in (Deleted)." [CIA MFR 2.21.74 - Howe] Scott Breckinridge questioned Edward Ryan, Chief, Staff D, DD/P.

December 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: E. HOWARD HUNT

1. I phoned Paul Burns, Special Assistant to the DDO, and said we had some leads that could be followed by whoever has the action in the DDO in tracking down HUNT'S activities during the fall of 1964, when he was alleged to have been engaged in surveillance activities of Barry Goldwater.

2. I said that our files showed HUNT was in DO Division (Burns was not familiar with that title, but recognized it as a predecessor of FR Division) and in August 1964 was assigned to the Washington Field Office. I suggested that Stan Gaines, who was Deputy Division Chief of the DO Division, and DCOS (deleted) might be in a position to give a few groups on what HUNT was supposed to be doing then. I suggested that he be queried by cable. Burns said Gaines is staying on under contract for a while, so would continue to be available.

3. I said that Fig Coleman was on the (deleted) when HUNT'S assignment to Madrid was brought up in 1964 and when HUNT went to the field in 1965. He could give the background on the assignment, which seems to have been through Thomas Karamessines, at Richard Helms' direction. His recollections would give leads. I told him that Coleman became Chief of Station, Madrid, later, after HUNT left Madrid and could provide information on what HUNT did not do for the Agency during that period. I suggested that both Helms and Karamessines should be queried. I gave as a possible press treatment that HUNT was engaged in domestic operations (something Senator Baker is pursuing) and that his assignment to Madrid after the election could be presented as giving him time to cool off. I thought we had to pursue the matter to be sure we know the facts.

4. I asked Burns to be sure that we are on information distribution of cables to the field on this, given our assigned responsibility for keeping files on Watergate. He said we are on the (deleted) for messages to Helms. He would advise the action officer. I said we are available for any help we can give.

[CIA SDB Memo 12.20.73 - Scott Breckinridge]

December 20, 1973.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. HOWARD HUNT

1. I spoke with Fig Coleman about HUNT'S assignment to Madrid. I had spoken with him back in August when we were inquiring into the reported activities of Mrs. Hunt.

2. Coleman said that he got out of the War College in May 1964 (by which he fixed the time) and took over the (Deleted) Desk. (Deleted) was C/EUR (or was it WE Division at the time). In early autumn (deleted) said that he had just been informed by Thomas Karamessines that HUNT was to be assigned to (deleted) as a directed assignment by Richard Helms. A memo was prepared and sent to the Chief of Station (deleted) (now retired). There was nothing further for about a month when (deleted) called Coleman and showed him a RYBAT letter from (deleted) stating that Ambassador Stanley J. Woodward would not have HUNT in the Embassy.

3. Woodward had been the Ambassador to Uruguay when HUNT was Montevideo Chief of Station. He had a low opinion of HUNT, and was counting the days until HUNT left. The (deleted) visited President Eisenhower in the States, at which time he requested a personal favor - that HUNT be reassigned to (deleted). So HUNT took another tour. Woodward was outraged, and had his revenge in 1964 when HUNT was sent as (deleted).

4. After a couple of months - early 1965 (Deleted) called Fig Coleman in and, observing that there was more than one way to skin a cat, told him that HUNT was going (deleted). This didn't require anything special (deleted) saying that he didn't know much about it. It came to him from Thomas Karamessines on Richard Helms' order. HUNT was to have the telephone number of the Chief of Station, but he would do nothing for the Station. HUNT was to submit administrative vouchers for reimbursement of his expenses and they were to be paid. Fig Coleman said he never saw HUNT before he went out. He knows that there was no operational reporting, to indicate that HUNT was doing anything. The vouchers were not large, although the documentation was poor. Fig Coleman raised the question with (deleted) about his signing off, and (Deleted) said he could talk to Karamessines, if he wished. He was told by Karamessines that he didn't know much about it either. Richard Helms said "Send him out." He was instructed to go ahead.

5. In early July 1966 (July 4, 1966) Coleman went (deleted). He had a ten day turnover with (Deleted). HUNT had already gone and he did not see him. (Deleted) said he didn't know what HUNT did, but that Coleman need not worry because he was gone.

6. Several months ago (Deleted) was at a seminar as which Ambassador Woodward was also present. At that time he asked about HUNT. Woodward said it might still be dragged into the press. Tad Szulc had been after Woodward about the HUNT assignment (Deleted). Coleman observed that Szulc did have a long article about HUNT in The New York Times and the Madrid assignment was mentioned but without any conclusions as to it significance.

7. Coleman said the RYBAT file of C/EUR may have something on the event, but not much. A letter out and the reply, but not much more. S.D. Breckinridge.

7. "Offset: Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions. DHL Contracting Officer.

"From: (Deleted) Chief, Covert Claims Branch: "This office acknowledges the OCC opinion, Reference A, which determined HUNT may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer. As Subject's cover activities have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from (Deleted) Supplement."

TO: Compensation and Tax Division Office of Finance

ATTENTION: (Deleted)

FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamesssines, ADDP, there will be no duty status reports (Form 764) submitted on (deleted). This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports. David S. Powell, Chief of Support, WE Division. November 5, 1965.

HUNT was allowed $2,900 per annum quarters allowance. The house he rented in Madrid cost $8, 600 per annum. "Due to the operational sensitivity of (deleted) assignment, his requests for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Karamessines, ADDP. On September 15, 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed 60% above his quarters allowance. Edward Ryan, Acting Chief, Western Europe Division, Charles N. Davis, Deputy Director for Support DDP/WE/SS:Davis B. Powell/aj/6189 (November 8, 1965)."

One answer to the Madrid riddle was found in a CIA Memorandum dated February 15, 1965, for the Record that "recommended the deletions of references to Subject's assignment to (deleted)." [CIA EAB MFR A.E. Shrout.(?)] On September 21, 1966, HUNT filed a "Request For (deleted) or Change" with the Central Cover Staff.

Tad Szulc reported that in 1964 Richard Helms appointed HUNT Deputy Station Chief of Madrid. HUNT coordinated Second Naval Guerrilla, a plan that called for the assassination of Fidel Castro, followed by an amphibious exile assault on Cuba. By early 1965 the first essential element of the plan was in place: Manuel Artime and HUNT had recruited Rolando Cubela Secades (born January 19, 1933; 201-252,234 - code name AMLASH), a high ranking Cuban Army Commander, to assassinate Fidel Castro. HUNT denied working with Manuel Artime and Rolando Cubela when he testified before the SSCIA.

HUNT: I knew that there was such a person [Cubela], but I never had any contact with him and I know nothing about him.

Baron: Do you know anything about the incident that is described in this cable?

HUNT: None at all. I'm sure the reference in paragraph five is not to me.

Baron: The sentence that says "Quite likely, "EDUARDO" will never appear to contact Subject."

HUNT: That can't conceivably have been a reference to me. Because I had not been involved in Cuban activities for more than three years at that time. I was purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay of Pigs...I was sent to Madrid in either 1964, or 1965. I can't recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. (Deleted) My communications were handled independently between myself and Thomas Karamessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans. This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms. (Deleted) and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

FROM: (Deleted)

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO: DDP, VR

SECRET 161228Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE (Deleted) 1705 September 16, 1964

REF (Deleted) 1681 IN 73706

1. CIA officers met with Subject reference September 15. Only "important info he provided was vague reference to Agent-1 plan assassinate Castro attempt would supposedly take place during university ceremony at which Castro would be present. Agent-1 reportedly responsible arranging delivery to Cuba on Belgian FAL equipped with silencer. Agent-1 was to be triggerman supported by unidentified Army officers. Above plan now apparently abandoned.

2. Said Agent-1 anxious to leave Cuba on official visit in order to contact CIA regarding his future role with Cuba. Subject suggested remote possibility arrange visit Prague through Agent-1 friend Jose, delegate to IUS. Our impression is Agent-1 wants to come out for good as probably feels personal situation tenuous.

3. According to Subject following persons or influence or Agent-1 team. Major, Major and ex-Major (FNU).

4. Said Agent-2 had numerous contacts Cuban official circles Madrid, Paris, but working for another government since he is in bad standing with U.S. Government. Hinted CIA should be in touch. Agency, however, (Deleted) has strong reservations against Agent-2 on security grounds and fact he out for gold.

5. (Deleted) who left meeting first, clearly inferred to Subject it had been a great waste of time. Other CIA Officer proceeded politely 'chew out' for getting us to meet on false pretenses. Subject frankly admitted his recruitment by CIS was handled in such a sloppy manner was to be construed a farce. View vagueness his mission and lack secure contacts, reporting channels, it apparent CIS not expecting much results for OP which probably made on hit or miss basis. Quite likely "EDUARDO" will never appear to contact Subject.

6. Seeing his "utility" to us as dubious, Subject began scratching his head for leads and mentioned following friends he might contact. Orlando Blanco (deleted) charge in Bern who is coming to Madrid September 25, 1964. (FNU) Trasanco of Paris Embassy who confidante AMLASH-1 also known AMLASH-(Deleted) and Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, Ambassador to Morocco (Deleted) September 20, 1964.

7. C/O said now up to Subject show bonafides suggesting he would take advantage his "unique status" as Cuban agent to gain entry into official circles. Subject fears we may deny visa and denounce him to (Deleted) Police. Although he promised to make every effort, indications to date are he will have little, if any, OPS utility. In any event, was told examine throughly any leads he might have in next few days. We will decide in next meeting or two whether he does appear to have any utility. If not he will be dropped.

As early as March 1952 Rolando Cubela was working against Batista. That year, with student friends he reinstituted the Student Directorate (DRE). In October 1956 Rolando Cubela assassinated Blanco Rico, Fulgencio Batista's Chief of Military Intelligence. Fleeing to the U.S., he became involved in military planning and purchasing arms until February 1958, when he and 16 other students returned clandestinely to the Escambray. He led a famous military column, and became the overall military leader of the DRE. The DRE refused the military leadership of Ché Guevara, fighting only under Rolando Cubela's orders. They occupied the Presidential Place on January 1, 1959, and initially declined to turn it over to Fidel Castro. BRINGUIER was in Rolando Cubela's group. In March 1959 the CIA received a report that if Rolando Cubela did not get out of the country soon "he was so disgusted with Fidel Castro that he would kill Fidel Castro himself." [CIA CS -3/396,635 4.28.59] In October 1959 Rolando Cubela became president of the government-sponsored FEU, after resuming his medical studies at Havana University. Rolando Cubela contacted the CIA in March 1961 through AMWHIP-1 [CIA 201-0267956] at a Latin American Peace Conference held in Mexico City. The Kubark objective of the meeting was to determine whether Rolando Cubela was anti-Castro. In August 1962 Rolando Cubela went to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki, where he was met by (deleted) who introduced (deleted) under the alias of "Bill Thompson." Rolando Cubela said he was not interested in any small undertaking, and declared the assassination of Fidel Castro and other leaders would be the most effective way to rescue the revolution from the Communists. Later in August 1962 Rolando Cubela "went on vacation" in Paris where he again met with Bill Thompson. In August 1962 Rolando Cubela was taken to an Air Force Base in Southern France where he was given a demonstration in explosives. Rolando Cubela was not given any sabotage equipment but was trained in SW (Secret Writing). A Technical Services Division SW technician accompanied him. In September 1963 he met with Bill Thompson and Nestor Sanchez in Porta Alegre, Brazil.

New Mexico born Nestor D. Sanchez joined the CIA in 1953. From 1953 to 1955, he served as a U.S. Army political officer. Nestor Sanchez helped co-ordinate the Bay of Pigs invasion. Nestor Sanchez worked with Guatemalan death squads from 1967 to 1968 as Chief of Station in Guatemala. From 1976 to 1979, he was in Spain. He served as CIA station chief in Managua. He was rumored to be the Case Officer of former Panamanian President Manuel Noriega. Senator Alphonse D'Amato questioned Sanchez about having leaked information on Noriega's behalf. He also asked Nestor Sanchez if he had any financial relationship with Noriega. Nestor Sanchez returned to Washington where he became Chief of the Latin American Division. [Washington Times 2.10.88] Nestor Sanchez was an associate of John Singlaub. In August 1981 Nestor Sanchez became the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs at the Defense Department. In 1984 he was allegedly involved in a private effort to supply the Contras after Congress cut off military assistance. [Washington Times 12.12.86] In 1988 he was chosen to supervise the United States military involvement with the Contras in Nicaragua. Nestor Sanchez suggested the Government of Maurice Bishop in Grenada be overthrown. He stated: "The Cubans are constructing air and naval facilities there that far exceed the requirements of that tiny island." [Washington Post 2.27.83 A1] Nestor Sanchez was involved with Richard V. Secord in the Iran-Contra flap. He retired 1987. In 1992 Nestor Sanchez was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

From Porta Alegre, Rolando Cubela went to Paris on September 14, 1963, with Nestor Sanchez and Richard Maxwell Long. It was learned that the French were unilaterally surveilling Rolando Cubela, whereupon the CIA advised the French of its contact with him. Rolando Cubela agreed to assassinate Fidel Castro, on the condition that he receive prior authorization from a high official of the United States Government. On October 29, 1963, Cubela met with Desmond FitzGerald, whom HUNT had known since the early 1950's, when Desmond FitzGerald was Chief of Station in Manila. In the early 1960's Desmond FitzGerald replaced William K. Harvey as head of the CIA's assassination section. In 1963 Desmond FitzGerald replaced Colonel J.C. King as Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, after the latter's tenure of a decade. Desmond FitzGerald convinced Rolando Cubela that his activities had U.S. Government approval. Desmond FitzGerald gave Rolando Cubela a pen that was really a vector for a deadly poison he was told to obtain.

On November 22, 1963, Nestor Sanchez and Rolando Cubela met. Rolando Cubela asked for 20 hand grenades, two high powered rifles with scopes, and 20 pounds of C-4 explosives, however, he refused to carry any of it with him on his return to Cuba. When the meeting broke up, Nestor Sanchez and Rolando Cubela were informed about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Rolando Cubela was visibly moved and asked, "Why do such things happen to good people?" Rolando Cubela returned to Cuba, but nothing happened to Fidel Castro. In March 1964, Rolando Cubela was given a weapons cache, and on May 3, 1964, Rolando Cubela asked for a silencer. According to the news reports, the cache was discovered by a young boy. In February 1965 he said "portions of the cache were recovered by a fisherman. He never received any part of the cache." On November 11, 1964, Rolando Cubela went to Prague as a special guest of the International Union of Students.

On November 13, 1964, Manuel Artime agreed to talk to Rolando Cubela. At a meeting with Nestor Sanchez on December 6, 1964, in Paris, Rolando Cubela told him he was going to meet Manuel Artime. Cuban Embassy officials Odon Alvarez de la Campa and Gonzales Garrarreta simultaneously contacted CIA agents in Madrid and were put in touch with Station Chief Jim Noel who offered them $5,000 for a list of Cuban Embassy personnel, as well as information as to who would be susceptible to CIA recruitment. Gonzales Garrarreta was sentenced to 20 years in prison. [Granma 3.13.66]

The meeting with Manuel Artime took place on December 27, 1964, in Madrid. HUNT denied that he was present at these meetings, and claimed that his assignment in Spain "had to do with the upcoming, inevitable transition of power from Franco to the successor government." Manuel Artime provided Rolando Cubela with a silencer for an FAL. On February 1, 1965, Rolando Cubela requested $10,000 from Nestor Sanchez to finance his operations.

Funds were also furnished by former Chief of Station in Havana in 1959, James Noel, who, like HUNT, was an official at the U.S. Embassy, Madrid. James Noel, an associate of HUNT, was mentioned in Give Us This Day. HUNT stated: "I knew Jim only when he was Chief of Station in Havana and chief of station in Spain. Jim supplanted me as the liaison officer during the revolutionary time." HEMMING told this researcher that James Noel "dealt with William Morgan. So did Sam Kail." Rolando Cubela returned to Cuba on February 23, 1965. "On February 23, 1965, CA/PA passed a letter through the (deleted) operation to (deleted) implying that Rolando Cubela has recently received an additional $5000 in his secret bank account."

Manuel Artime agreed to be present in Cuba when the assassination occurred, and to provide Rolando Cubela with an escape route by creating a diversion near the shooting scene. Manuel Artime said: "I had U-2 photographs of the beach. I had 300 men ready to attack when Rolando Cubela gave the word. The call never came..." Rolando Cubela and Roman Guin Diaz (201-142,291) were arrested by the DGI when they returned to Cuba on March 1, 1966, and were sentenced to 25 years in prison. Roman Guin Diaz had been one of Camillo Cienfuegos' officers and a member of the March Directorio Revolucionario. In September 1962, while he was an administrator of The National Institute of Agrarian Reform, Roman Guin Diaz made plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. [CIA CSDB-3/651,487 9.25.62] In May 1964, a staff officer from the CIA's Special Activities Staff/MOB component asked CI to grant (deleted) [Roman Guin Diaz] a POA. It was granted, then extended in July 1964. There was no evidence that Manuel Artime was in Cuba when Rolando Cubela was arrested.

AMWHIP-1 was an important cutout between the CIA and AMLASH. Who was AMWHIPP? In May 1956, Roman Guin Diaz came to the attention of the CIA when he visited his uncle, Juan Soto, in Brooklyn, N.Y. Juan Soto was a businessman engaged in pro-Castro activities.

It has been suggested Rolando Cubela was a Castro double-agent and had reported the CIA's assassination plot to Fidel Castro. Fidel Castro had retaliated by having had OSWALD shoot President Kennedy. According to BRINGUIER: "When he was apprehended in Cuba, Rolando Cubela should have been executed. Castro has killed a lot of his people for lesser crimes than conspire with the CIA to kill him. But he had spared this major in his Army. In my opinion, he was a double-agent working for Castro. Castro commuted his sentence in the 1970's and then he is living in Spain. I saw a picture of Cubela attending a party in Miami. Cubela spent a few years in jail, and it happened that I never hear Radio Havana, Cuba, and one night I say to my wife 'I still like to hear Radio Havana Cuba.' I put the radio on and in that moment they were having a trial in Cuba about the Kennedy assassination and Cubela was testifying in the trial and he was blaming the CIA that minute. If you want to blame the CIA, Cubela is the man for you, sir." Scott Breckinridge reported: "It has been reported that AMLASH is now out of jail and back to his old profession as a medic. He is reported to have been Raoul Castro's lover (!)..." [CIA Memo for Leader 10.7.76] Another CIA document stated: "Rolando Cubela, following his arrest, was given a relatively light sentence, considering the seriousness of the charge. Upon incarceration, he reportedly functioned as a prison physician, and drove around in a jeep unescorted. Such treatment by the Government of Cuba is quite unusual and, if true, is an indication that he was trusted." [NARA # 1993.08.13.13:49:39-370028] Another CIA document reported that during the trial of Rolando Cubela there was "no indication whatsoever that Rolando Cubela revealed anything more than his 'weakness, playboy attitude,' in plotting with a man like Manuel Artime to assassinate Fidel Castro. Under private interrogation to date [CIA MFR April 14, 1964] there is no known possibility that Rolando Cubela has revealed the names of the real military leaders with whom he really was in contact...none of these major individuals, whose names are known to us, have been arrested or detained. (Deleted) of course, does not fall into this category. However, he like (deleted) and (deleted) who are reportedly arrested, falls into the category of known personal friends of Cubela...Several careful readings of the entire proceeding of the trial appears to indicate that as soon as Cubela learned the extent of the regime's knowledge of the plot he adopted as an immediate line of defense his own 'weakness, emotional instability, deterioration, liking for gay parties' as the common denominator to make himself, and the few friends known to be involved through the betrayal by (deleted), as the sole 'responsibles' for the plot."

Rolando Cubela had been married twice, and had two children. He might have been blackmailed by the Cubans, since there was no indication the CIA was aware that he was gay. Was Rolando Cubela a double-agent who attempted to entrap Manuel Artime? Or was the AMLASH plan leaky?

On May 2, 1965, Victor Espinosa told an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer that he was aware of the AMLASH plot. The Immigration and Naturalization Service contacted the FBI and Victor Espinosa was interviewed in June 1965. He said he "had just returned to New York on May 29, 1965, after having spent 26 days in Paris and Spain. He said the following people knew of the plot: "Rolando Cubela, a next door neighbor of Fidel Castro, Alberto Blanco and Major Almeida Bosque." Victor Espinosa said that he had heard from Cuban exiles in Spain that our "(deleted) knew of this plot to some extent, but the anti-Castro Cubans do not trust him, for he was compromised by a Cuban girl known as 'Tata.'" The CIA cabled Paris and Madrid: "For Paris: Victor Espinosa on return PBPRIME told ODURGE and ODENVY of AMLASH conspiracy; Contacts with AMLASH 2 and 3, UNSNAFU 9, MIRRLESS; Criticism of KUBARK staffers at Madrid including GROWERY; Derogatory allegations on QUSPORT, SUSWIFT 1, AMWHIP 1, MIRRLESS scare in accepting as serious joking recruitment by AMLASH 3 for Soviets; Relationship at Paris among Bob, Dick, Maureen, Luis Fernandez, UNSAFU 9...For Director: Tota, girl named by Espinosa, is QUSWIFT 7. She was never employed by QUWEB and was never in contact with KUBARK Staff. Photographs of material which Espinosa called ciphers and microfilm were forwarded to headquarters. Stockwood Langosch meeting to discuss above may be profitable. Langosch will telephone Stockwood from Perpignan to determine if it is feasible for Stockwood to meet him there or nearby place. In view of Stockwood's previous assignment to Barcelona, assume no security problem if he seen by quantum." A CIA Headquarters cable dated June 9, 1965, advised "it is evident that security of our Cuban operations in some cases, and our own compartmentation, not all that we would desire." [CIA Cable 081746Z rec. 6.8.65]

On July 9, 1965, Victor Espinosa appeared in the offices of an unnamed CIA official. He told him he had been trained by the CIA "both in Louisiana and (deleted), and was one of those who was sent into Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs. He explained that earlier in the year he had received a request from one of his reliable Cuban contacts in Europe, asking that he come there quickly. He obtained false papers in Miami and traveled to Paris: There, apparently in the presence of the Cuban Ambassador to France, he met one of the top security men of the Castro regime" and was apprised of Rolando Cubela's plot against Castro. He stated, "The Cubans might have turned to (deleted) the CIA man in (deleted). However they believe (deleted) is completely unreliable. A Cuban girl was sent to Madrid some time ago by the Castro people. (Deleted) was fooled by her, and set her up in an apartment in Madrid. He also arranged for her to work with the International Rescue Committee. When the proper moment came, she fled back to Havana with some very useful files. Espinosa is determined to bring the very dangerous situation of the Cuban plot to the attention of some top level U.S. Government official unless he receives some reply from the CIA." [CIA 4.27.77 SSC Final Rep. Book 5 pgs. 78,79,105; CIA Cable 6.8.65; MFR 6.3.65 WH/C/RR/OS; Memo 7.9.65 ARA/CCA Stevenson ARA George Lister; CIA IG Rep. p105]

Organized crime was aware of AMLASH. The CIA reported: "March 1965. The (deleted) Station cabled that one (deleted) had arrived in (deleted) from Cuba on (deleted) March, and had been introduced to a Station Officer. (Deleted) claimed to be in contact with [AMLASH]. Deleted said that he had always been publicly identified as a close friend of Rolando Cubela whom he saw in Havana on March 9, 1965. (Deleted) said he had been the lawyer for the (deleted) in Havana. (Deleted). Comment: This is another name-link between Cubela and the gambling syndicate plots..." In May 1966 "Immigration and Naturalization Service inquired if Agency had any interest in Subject's [Victor Espinosa] traveling to Spain and Australia on business and on May 16, 1966, the Agency advised Immigration and Naturalization Service in the negative." After AMLASH'S arrest, HUNT requested a transfer to Washington, allegedly because his son needed medical treatment unavailable in Madrid.

In 1964 the CIA funded Manuel Artime's training camp with $7 million. Manuel Artime took a mistress, and he used her apartment for secret meetings. The FBI began investigating his alleged "grand style of living" and his operation of Nicaraguan training camps, where he reportedly had more than $5 million worth of military equipment. It was alleged that Manuel Artime was being officially sponsored and subsidized, and that he made a living out of the counter-revolution. Many exiles came to the conclusion that "Manuel Artime was the only Cuban national authorized by the U.S. Government to go ahead with military plans for future operations against Cuba." By May 1964 the Air Force of Manuel Artime had bombed Cuban sugar mills. [NYT 5.15.64] That month Tad Szulc reported Cuba feared another military invasion was imminent. In September 1964 Victor Panque and Manuel Artime's men took part in an anti-Castro action that caused the death of three Spanish seamen, and alienated anti-Castro Cubans from the Johnson Administration. Manuel Artime planned to intercept and sink the Cuban cargo vessel El Sierra Maestre. In 1978 HEMMING stated: "There was a thick fog that night and we couldn't see shit. We hit the goddamned Sierra Aranzazu, a Spanish ship, by mistake." In 1994 HEMMING denied that he told me this. On September 15, 1964, the Spanish merchant vessel Sierra Aranzazu was attacked by two small boats north of Great Inagua, Bahamas. Earlier that night, a small boat had approached the merchant vessel, shined a spotlight on its stern, noted the name of the vessel, and then left. About 15 minutes later, two attack boats approached the vessel and strafed it with cannons and machine guns. The merchant vessel caught fire and blew up while the crew took to lifeboats. Three crewmen were killed and 17 were injured. On September 16, 1964, the Cuban Government claimed that the CIA had been responsible for the attack. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the Spanish Ambassador that the raiders had not come from United States soil.

On September 16, 1964, The Miami News contained an article that stated Telmo Alvarez had called a news agency and claimed his group, the Secret Organization of Continental Action, was responsible for the attack. Telmo Alvarez, however, claimed the attack had been made with torpedoes. The article noted the survivors of the Spanish ship did not mention torpedoes being used. The FBI reported that the Secret Organization of Continental Action was formed about January 1964, by Mesa Rodriguez: "On July 15, 1964, Mesa Rodriguez discussed plans to torpedo a British vessel transporting oil to Cuba." The FBI conducted an intensive investigation of the Secret Organization of Continental Action. The results of this investigation were withheld. [FBI 91-4133 NR 9.24.64 p2, 9.25.64 enc. p2; 2-1877-26 - 10.1.64, NR 10.14.64 Top Secret; 97-4133 NR 9.17.64, NR 11.23.64]

Manuel Artime was questioned. An FBI Miami teletype reported: "(Deleted) It was alleged that this attack was carried out by representatives of a group receiving U.S. backing, known as MRR, and headed by Manuel Artime. The Secret Organization of Continental Action (OSAC) initially claimed responsibility for the attack. Newspaper accounts indicated that Artime denied responsibility for the raid and in a statement from Panama suggested the Castro Government was responsible in an attempt to discredit MRR. The FBI reported: "On October 5, 1964, Rolando Masferrer, 42-46 81st Street, New York City, advised he had learned that this CIA-sponsored anti-Castro action was led by Cuban exiles who he identified as (Deleted). According to Masferrer (Deleted) now were working with Manuel Artime of the MRR, which was supported by CIA and operated out of Nicaragua." [FBI 2-1877-26; FBI 97-4133-118]

The FBI questioned Pedro Diaz Lanz and Victor Panque. The reports of these interviews were withheld. [FBI 2-1877-26, 97-4133 NR 9.25.64, 9.23.63] In late September 1964 Pedro Diaz Lanz and Nino Diaz had held a press conference during which they announced that Victor Panque was leading 1,000 anti-Castro guerrillas in the Escambrays. In January 1976 there was an assassination attempt against Nino Diaz at his Key Biscayne home.

On October 16, 1964, the CIA's Director of Security received a letter from M.K. Holbrick, IRD, about Manuel Artime. This letter asked, "Wouldn't Senator Goldwater have a ball if he knew about the Spanish ship and about Manuel Artime's wife? This remark caused (Deleted) to do considerable thinking and recall. As you might recall, a Spanish ship was attacked about two weeks ago. My knowledge of the attack is based on comments made to me by a person whom I knew while in Special Activities Staff [Des FitzGerald's component]. The attack was reportedly made by the SS Santa Maria, one of two JMWAVE vessels (converted Navy AKL's). I was with this vessel in Hoboken, New Jersey, for about two weeks during the spring of the year. At the time the vessel was being equipped and manned. As reported to me the Santa Maria was cruising off of Cuba and at a distance noticed the name on the Spanish ship. I believe it was 'Sierra' LNU. The Santa Maria, thinking that this ship was one of those on its 'Watch List' opened fire on the Spanish ship and, according to newspaper publicity, three Spaniards were killed and the Spanish Government was up in arms. As fate would have it, the Santa Maria reportedly attacked the wrong ship. The ship they were interested in was of the same name; however, it in fact was not the Spanish ship. I was further informed that because of this flap, Secretary Rusk and Mr. McCone immediately conferred.

"What is of equal or even greater concern to me relates to (deleted). In late February 1964 (deleted) requested that I check the Office of Security Indices in the name of Adelaida Matilda Padron y Cruz. As a result of this check I made an inquiry of Chief, Domestic Contacts Division, and from that office received a report relating to Padron ...This, to my knowledge, was the first indication that Padron, who was then reportedly Manuel Artime's mistress, was possibly a lesbian. During continued contacts with (deleted), I would discreetly inquire as to whether or not Artime continued to have an interest in Padron. (Deleted- R) is quite shrewd and extremely adept at double talk. In essence, he replied in the affirmative and further said that Artime planned to marry her...the political repercussions could be 'calamitous' if Artime married Padron. During the next couple of months Padron was investigated by Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Agency's request. This was arranged through the Alien Affairs Staff. I am told there is a Security file on her. In addition there is a Subject file on her in Western Hemisphere Security. That investigation indicated that Padron was in all probability bi-sexual, and that she had been the former mistress of Fulgencio Batista."

An investigation conducted by "Cubans used by a Counter-Intelligence shop at JMWAVE" revealed that Adelaida Matilda Padron y Cruz had also been the mistress of Venezuelan Dictator Marcos Jimenez Perez. Further, it stated that Padron and her sister were both homosexual and had posed for pornography for Batista and Marcos Jimenez Perez. In addition, the dispatch noted that informants had said that Adelaida Matilda Padron y Cruz visualized herself as being the next First Lady of Cuba."

WAVE Dispatch 8521 dated February 20, 1965, mentioned that (deleted) source reported FIORINI had mentioned a robbery of Manuel Artime's house and his meetings with Miami Police concerning the robbery.

In February 1965 Manuel Artime announced from Madrid that his commandos had shelled a Cuban oil depot. By September 1966 MRR was launching commando raids against Cuban military targets. Large shipments of whiskey were seized by Costa Rican authorities on the way to the forces of Manuel Artime. After this seizure, a mysterious death occurred at the camp. (Roberto Trujillo Rodriguez). Costa Rican reports indicated that "local rightists had been trained and armed at the MRR camp in preparation for a coup in which government leaders were to be assassinated and replaced by a neo-Nazi dictatorship." [Wash. Post 3.17.65] By end of 1965 the FBI was aware that many of Manuel Artime's soldiers were cocaine and heroin traffickers. The Johnson Administration closed down Manuel Artime's operation.

HUNT returned to Headquarters in September 1966, and served in DDP Staff assignments. HUNT was Chief of European Covert Operations until April 1970, when HUNT retired from DDP (Europe), and became a CIA retiree. That year HUNT was the Subject of a CIA investigation. [CIA FOIA #72-4] Traces on HUNT revealed "July 9 Mont. Texas." [CIA File No. 304292]

Orlando Bosch was arrested in October 1968 for firing a homemade bazooka at The Polciana, a Polish freighter moored in Miami harbor, from the median of a Miami Beach Causeway, using a paper clip as a sight. Richardo Morales supplied the prosecution with tapes of conversations between himself and Orlando Bosch. HUNT'S name came up on one of these tapes:

Morales: Another thing, two months ago, a fellow named HUNT, who is a member of the Republican Party, was here and he gave $15,000 to some representatives of Cuban Power to place bombs.

Bosch: I knew nothing about that.

Morales: Fifteen thousand bucks they gave.

Bosch: You know that makes two people who tell me this...

[USA v Bosch 68-420-Cr-Wm Southern District Florida]

The conversation between Orlando Bosch and Richardo Morales took place in August 1968. In August 1968 HUNT was with the Deputy Directorate/Plans, European Special Action Staff. If the HUNT mentioned by Morales was E. HOWARD HUNT, why had HUNT used his real name? During his bombing trial, Cuban exile Rolando Otero testified that many exiles knew HUNT by his real name rather than "EDUARDO" or a pseudonym. HOWARD HUNT was asked about this: "In 1961 or 1963 how were you addressed by your inferior employees?" He answered: "As Mr. HUNT." HUNT claimed to represent the Republican Party on other occasions: CIA Staffer Charles W. Kane reported that in 1971 Jack (deleted) was contacted by HUNT, "who suggested that he consider an assignment as a Security Officer for the Republican Party. (Deleted) visited Washington in January 1972, to discuss the proposed position with HOWARD HUNT who was apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party." [Memo for Record 7.19.72 Con. with Mr. (deleted) signed by Charles W. Kane CIA FOIA 00158, 00155]

During the Polciana trial, Orlando Bosch pleaded that his activities were sponsored by the CIA. But the judge ruled that this testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible. Orlando Bosch was convicted and sentenced to ten years. While Orlando Bosch was imprisoned, Richardo Morales was almost killed when a bomb exploded in his car. Released in 1972, Orlando Bosch immediately violated parole by attending a meeting at the Novo brothers headquarters in New Jersey. Orlando Bosch went underground, and continued to pursue his campaign of terror against Fidel Castro and those he considered Castro's allies. In May 1974 Orlando Bosch was in the Dominican Republic with Frank Castro. [CIA 201-074,2365] In June 1974 he was in Venezuela, where he bombed the Panamanian Embassy in Caracas. In November 1974 Orlando Bosch was arrested by the Venezuelan national police (DISIP) for bombing the Cuban Embassy. He was not returned to the United States. Instead, he was declared persona non grata and deported. He was escorted to the airport by Richardo Morales, who had emigrated to Venezuela in 1974 and joined DISIP. The CIA reported that Richardo Morales warned Frank Castro of DISIP repression against Cubans in Venezuela. Orlando Bosch flew to Curacao, where he met with Guillermo Novo. In late 1974, the two men flew to Chile where they met with representatives of the Chilean Junta.

The HSCA questioned MIRR leader Orlando Bosch about his alibi for November 22, 1963. Orlando Bosch said he was "at home in Miami" when he heard President Kennedy had been shot.

In early March 1964 the Miami FBI inquired if FBI Headquarters wanted to prosecute Orlando Bosch for violations of the Neutrality Act. The Miami FBI received a letter "denying Miami request for appropriate (deleted) in this case." [FBI 97-4474-102 4.1.64.] The Miami FBI then received another letter which stated: "Due to the over-all needs of the Bureau, authority to place (deleted) is being denied. (Deleted.) Captioned anti-Castro organization [MIRR] is engaged in carrying out raids against Cuban (deleted). In view of foregoing, it is requested that the Bureau reconsider the (deleted) submitted by this office." [FBI Hq. res. 4.6.64] On November 22, 1964, Orlando Bosch was behind an aerial assassination plot against Fidel Castro, who was to be killed in a stadium while he watched a baseball game. The flight, however, was ill-timed - arriving over Havana before Fidel Castro reached the stadium. [Wash. Daily News 11.23.64 p97] By 1966 MIRR claimed 11 aerial attacks against Cuba. Orlando Bosch had been apprehended by the Coast Guard, the Treasury Department and other Federal agencies at least six times. In 1967 Orlando Bosch joined the Novos brothers' Cuban Nationalist Movement. MIRR was dissolved, and Cuban Power was formed. Cuban Power concentrated on attacking Cuban diplomatic installations abroad, along with the embassies and trade centers of countries that had dealings with Cuba. In January 1968 four Cuban exile-owned stores in Little Havana were bombed because their owners were involved in sending relief packages to Cuba. Richardo "The Monkey" Morales was arrested by Miami Police and charged with these bombings. Richardo Morales had arranged to be arrested to enhance his status within Orlando Bosch's organization.

On December 31, 1953, Richardo Morales [201-285,923 born June 14, 1939] killed Matos Boson, the G-2 Chief at Rancho Boyeras Airport. He joined the Rebel Army on that same day. He was arrested in 1954 and 1957 for conspiring against Batista. In 1958 he attended law school in Havana. In 1959 he became a G-3 agent stationed at Rancho Boyeras Airport and was involved in the "counter-revolutionary sentencing of Pablo Ubides Diaz." Richardo Morales was a Special Agent in the G-2 in Cuba in 1960 from October 1959 to August 1960. In July and August 1960, Morales listed his occupation as card dealer in the casino of the Havana Hilton. In 1960 he was arrested for conspiring against Castro, held for four days, then released. He deserted on August 23, 1960, and took asylum in the Brazilian Embassy. He fled to the United States in 1960, where he was recruited into William K. Harvey's operation. The CIA: "Subject was considered suspect G-3 when he arrived in the U.S. because of his past affiliation with the G-3. On his arrival, he did give an interview to Bohemia Libre on his G-2 past." On January 11, 1961, the CIA reported Richardo Morales had recently joined the Cuban Revolutionary Front. The CIA: "It was understood, when he arrived, that he intended to penetrate the recruitment office of the Cuban Revolutionary Front, however, he did not do this." On March 2, 1964, a CIA investigation by the Office of Security on Richardo Morales yielded numerous derogatory traces, nonetheless, he was granted a Provisional Operation Approval. Richardo Morales went to the Republic of the Congo, where he helped put down a revolution led by Katangese secessionists. He worked as a radio operator for a Paramilitary Team. Richardo Morales returned to the United States. Robert Gambino, SOD/SO informed CIA Headquarters that Richardo Morales would be arriving at Andrews Air Force Base in an Agency C-118 "He said that Bob Gambino, (deleted) and Dr. (Deleted) M.D. would also be aboard. He said the plane would also have loose cargo as follows: outboard motors, radio beacons, silence weapons, other weapons, commo gear, medical equipment and parachute drop equipment. He also said Robert Gambino may be carrying some Technical Services Division material [swine flu]. He said that James Fitchett, under (deleted) cover, would be there to transfer Subjects to a C-54 for further travel to (deleted), and that Fitchett would meet the Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service men at Base Operations. On December 2, 1964, I advised Lawrence Fleishmen, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, of the arrival and told him the type of gear aboard. Signed W.M. Knott." [CIA Chief, Alien Affairs Staff W.M. Knott 11.24.64] Richardo Morales began working for the FBI. The CIA reported: "On August 26, 1965, (deleted) advised Alien Affairs Staff the Subject had returned to the U.S. having completed his assigned duties for SOD." [CIA AAS 8.27.65 Laurence G. Parr] Ché left the Congo in 1965.

In another document, Ray Warren, Chief, Latin American Division stated: "Richardo Morales was first spotted and recruited in Miami in January 1964 to be used as a radio operator and member of paramilitary infiltration team. Successfully polygraphed on February 10, 1964. He was paid a salary of (deleted) per month effective May 1, 1964. He was terminated on August 26, 1964, and was never used in a (deleted) sponsored mission. He had received training in Miami and well as (deleted). He volunteered and signed up for paramilitary action in the Congo in September 1964. Although he received training toward the Congo mission he never served. (Deleted)." [CIA 10.23.76]

Richardo Morales married the sister of Hector Cornillot. Hector Cornillot, a Bosch lieutenant, was serving 30 years for a series of Miami bombings. Through his wife, Richardo Morales penetrated Orlando Bosch's organization. On March 31, 1976, Orlando Bosch was deported from Costa Rica. He traveled to the Dominican Republic, where Cuban Power, the Cuban Nationalist Movement, and the Bay of Pigs Brigade Veterans, merged into the Congress of Revolutionary Union (CORU). In the next six months, CORU took credit for 50 anti-Castro bombings.

In the Fall of 1976, Orlando Bosch visited Nicaragua, then returned to Venezuela, where he was met by Richardo Morales at Caracas Airport. Richardo Morales wanted to question him about the Orlando Letelier murder, which occurred September 26, 1976. Orlando Letelier was killed in Washington, D.C., two days before Orlando Bosch arrived in Venezuela. Orlando Bosch implicated the Novo Brothers in the Orlando Letelier assassination. In October 1976, two of Orlando Bosch's soldiers, Freddy Lugo and Hernan Ricardo, planted an explosive device aboard a Cubana Airliner. The bomb exploded while the jet was in flight, killing at least 60 people. When they were questioned by Barbados authorities, they confessed. Hernan Ricardo stated he had worked for the CIA since 1970, and had received a course in explosives handling. Hernan Ricardo said his CIA contact was Joe Leo, the FBI Legal Attache at the American Embassy, Caracas. Before Freddy Lugo and Hernan Ricardo were picked up, they had telephoned Orlando Bosch. On October 15, 1976, the Venezuelan police took Orlando Bosch into custody and charged him with masterminding the Cubana Airlines bombing. The incarceration of Orlando Bosch touched off numerous attacks against Venezuelan diplomatic and trade installations. He was given a military trial and found guilty. While he was in jail, a Federal Grand Jury convened in Washington, D.C., to probe the Orlando Letelier murder. Witnesses included Richardo Morales and the President of the Bay of Pigs Brigade Veterans, Juan Peruyero, who was later murdered. The Novo brothers were indicted for conspiracy. Soon bombs exploded outside the White House. Exiles who collaborated with the Carter Administration were threatened with death. Richardo Morales was number one on Orlando Bosch's hit list. In August 1987 Orlando Bosch was freed from prison in Venezuela after serving nearly 11 years. However, he was reincarcerated one year later in a Florida prison as an undesirable alien. George Bush's son, Jeb Bush, visited the hunger strikers who demanded the release of Orlando Bosch. Orlando Bosch was released on parole on July 17, 1990.

In April 1978 Richardo Morales was charged with possession of 5,000 pounds of marijuana and held on $250,000 bond in Miami. Richardo Morales attorneys said that his arrest was "coercion to break the man," since he had refused to share certain valuable information in his possession. Richardo Morales spoke with HSCA investigators while he was in jail. After three months of confinement, Richardo Morales was released on bond and in late July 1978, was found innocent. (The informant who had provided the Miami Police Department with the information used to obtain a wiretap on the home of one of Richardo Morales' codefendants recanted his testimony.) On August 10, 1978, Richardo Morales testified before HSCA. HEMMING told this researcher: "Richardo Morales was nailed by Martin Dardis of Watergate fame. They'd been running the marijuana for months, but they let him stay in place. Dardis almost got fired for doing this. They were also bringing in goddamn explosives, timer devices."

On March 21, 1969, HUNT filled out a Personal History Statement for the CIA. As stated, HUNT listed his immediate superior as John L. Hart.

On April 23, 1970, a form titled "Notification of Establishment or Cancellation of (Deleted) Retirement Debriefing To Chief, Operating Component EUR" signed by James W. Franklin was generated by the CIA. HUNT retired voluntarily under CIARDS on April 30, 1970. In May 1970, Frank A. O'Malley, an Officer in the External Employment Assistance Branch, Retirement Activities Division of the Office of Personnel, delivered HUNT'S resume to the public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen and Company. Robert R. Mullen and Company, located in the same building as the Domestic Operations Division, was across the street from the Committee to Re-Elect President NIXON. Robert R. Mullen and Company had provided certain sensitive cover support overseas for Agency employees. The book keeper and accountant at Robert R. Mullen and Company was a retired CIA Finance Officer. The USIA was a Robert R. Mullen and Company account. HUNT had known Robert R. Mullen when both were connected with the Economic Cooperation Administration in Paris.

The Free Cuba Committee in Washington, D.C. was established by Robert R. Mullen & Company at the request of the CIA. When Sam Papich wanted a document from the Free Cuba Committee, he contacted Raymond Rocca, who in turn activated Birch O'Neal. [CIA 630-795] The Free Cuba Committee was funded by the Grace Foundation, and its Board of Directors included author and foreign correspondent Dicky Chapelle, Harry Bonaro Overstreet, Leo Cherne, Claire Booth Luce, Ernest Cuneo, and the President of the American Security Council, James Fisher. The Grace Foundation was a supporter of the Free Cuba Committee.

Paul Bethel was President of the Free Cuba Committee. Paul Bethel began his career with the State Department on August 22, 1949. Subsequently, he served as a Foreign Affairs Analyst and Resident Officer for the United States High Commissioner to Germany, John J. McCloy. Paul Bethel later served in other posts in Bavaria, Germany and Japan. Paul Bethel joined the Voice of America in December 1949, and was the Subject of an FBI Special Inquiry that proved favorable. In 1957 he was the Subject of an FBI "AEA-A investigation." From 1958 to 1961 Paul Bethel served as Press Attache at the American Embassy in Havana. When the Embassy closed, Paul Bethel moved to Miami, where he opened an office of the Voice Of America, and met many Cuban exiles, including Orlando Bosch. In 1965 Paul Bethel reported on the revolt in the Dominican Republic for the Mutual Broadcasting Company. Many of his articles appeared in The Reporter magazine. In 1969 Paul Bethel wrote The Losers, in which he suggested President Kennedy might have been an active or tacit Communist agent. On June 29, 1974, the name of Paul Bethel came up on an index card generated by the CIA's Office of the Inspector General: "and details on Radio City allegation; (5) investigate HUNT testimony that CIA did not return Tessina film negatives; (Deleted) retirement date." [IG File #27 Tab #23]

Daniel James was the Executive Secretary of the Free Cuba Committee. In 1954 Daniel James wrote a book on communist infiltration of the Arbenz regime, and another in 1961 exposing Fidel Castro. He wrote two books about Ché Guevara, and was responsible for creating the myth that Ché Guevara was betrayed by a KGB agent named "Tanya." Daniel James was a correspondent for the Voice Of America, an Information-Education Officer at the Pentagon, and a Fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

On February 6, 1964, Paul Bethel appeared on Barry Gray's New York City radio show, along with journalist Stanley Ross, and Daniel James. Despite their impressive credentials and CIA backing, Stanley Ross suggested that a Castro agent, who was a methedrine addict and was confined to the Disturbed Ward of Creedmore Psychiatric Hospital in Queens, New York, helped OSWALD assassinate the President: "Ross stated that he was informed by Mr. Banon [the Spanish Counsel] that during an interview with Pascual Enrique Rudolo Gongora the later stated that he was one of five or six groups sent to the United States to assassinate President Kennedy at the direction of Fidel Castro. Gongora reportedly stated that Castro was fearful that President Kennedy was trying to assassinate him, and further stated that the United States had been involved in previous assassinations, such as the assassination of the husband and brother-in-law of Madame Nhu of Vietnam." Stanley Ross died on September 22, 1992, and Paul Bethel died on May 20, 1979. [WCE 1444; FBI 105-82555-2305; NYT 9.22.92]]

Robert R. Mullen was unsure whether to hire HUNT. Richard Helms wrote a letter on behalf of HUNT. On April 10, 1970, Robert R. Mullen called Frank A. O'Malley to say he was going to offer HUNT a job: "O'Malley reported this to Central Cover where there were 'mixed emotions' but with Cover giving OK." Eight months after HUNT was hired by Mullen, Robert Bennett joined the company. Bennett, the son of Senator Wallace Bennett (Rep.-UTAH), was active in Republican Party affairs. He brought the Hughes Tool Company account with him. Mullen, who was planning to retire, had invited Bennett to purchase the firm and become its President. This was a disappointment to HUNT, who had expected to become president and own the business. Attempts by HUNT to negotiate a joint ownership arrangement with Bennett failed, and HUNT began to talk of leaving the firm. On October 14, 1970, DDP Thomas Karamessines stated: "Mr. HUNT has been employed by Robert R. Mullen and Company since his April 30, 1970, retirement from the Agency, and CCS understands that Mr. HUNT is going to succeed Mr. Mullen as principal officer of the company. Mr. HUNT contacted CCS on July 7, 1970, to report his belief the company could provide cover as a result of it's connections with the Brussels Times. In discussions of this matter with Mr. Mullen and Mr. HUNT, it developed that Mr. Mullen, who as a long time friend of Mr. HUNT, was cognizant of his Agency background had informed Mr. HUNT of the existing [deleted] without authorization from CCS...In as much as Mr. HUNT is already witting of the current (deleted) with the company which he reportedly will soon head, and because the use of the company in other locations where it has (deleted) would require his knowledge and assistance, CCS requests that you approve the issuance by the Office of Security of a clearance on Mr. HUNT to the Central Cover Staff."

"On November 6, 1970, Subject was granted a (deleted) for use (deleted) with Robert R. Mullen." The reason the (Deleted) was not granted immediately "stemmed from SRS regarding a manuscript written by Subject about CIA Operations and authored by (Deleted). SRS advised matter was under discussion with Deputy Director of Plans. Later SRS advised they interposed no objection, but suggested CCS be requested to obtain concurrence from Deputy Director of Plans. CCS has furnished OS with that approval."

In July 19, 1971, HUNT joined the White House Staff as a consultant to NIXON preparatory to his trip to China. In 1971 HUNT served as an advisor to President NIXON in relation to his trip to China. In July 1971 Charles Colson hired HUNT for the White House/Special Operations Group. HUNT contacted BARKER and STURGIS in Miami. A CIA memorandum, "Potential Flap Activities: CIA Contact With Watergate Figures" stated: "The Office of Logistics reports that safehouse (deleted) was made available to (deleted) on July 23, 1971. This safehouse is (deleted). It was used for meetings between HUNT and Technical Services Division representatives." [Broe to Colby 5.21.73 p8] HUNT responded: "Plaintiff [HUNT] swears that his appointment calendars and diary and all other written memoranda which would specify his daily whereabouts in the year 1971 have been destroyed and are no longer in his possession; consequently, Plaintiff has no way of determining whom he might have been in contact on July 23, 1971." [USDC SDF Miami Civ-76-1252-CIV-SMA Answers To Req. For Admissions 1.22.79]

HUNT claimed to have met John F. Kennedy "socially in Boston." Tad Szulc reported that when HUNT first went to work for the White House, he attempted to discredit Senator Edward Kennedy with new information about the Chappaquidick scandal. [Comp. Spy p253] In FRANK STURGIS' book proposal he claimed that he had inside knowledge as to "what deadly threat caused Senator Ted Kennedy to make that fateful hard right turn at Chappaquidick that killed young Mary Joe Kopechne." HUNT cultivated informers within the Kennedy clan. During the Watergate Hearings, NIXON aide John Dean testified that in November 1971, H.R. Haldeman had a standing order pending with John Dean for 24-hour surveillance on Senator Edward Kennedy. [McCORD Piece of Tape p10] It was revealed during Jack Caulfield’s testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee that Tony Ulasewicz was ordered to set up a round-the-clock surveillance of Edward Kennedy. Ulasewicz admits that he was at Chappaquiddick before any journalists arrived. He also seems to have been there before the police detectives assigned to the case. This is confirmed by Sylvia Malm who was staying in Dike House at the time. Dike House was only 150 yards from the scene of the accident. Malm was interviewed by Ulasewicz before the police got to her. The same is true of Ulasewicz’s interviews with John Farrar, the scuba diver who pulled out Mary Jo’s body from the car. These were only two of many who were interviewed by Ulasewicz just a few hours after the accident had taken place. [John Simpkin JFK Forum 7.23.05]

Shortly after HUNT started work for the White House/Special Operations Group, Robert Bennett told him that Clifford de Mott claimed to have derogatory information on the Kennedys. HUNT went to the Technical Services Division and obtained disguise material using the name "Mr. Edward." He was given a wig, a pair of glasses, a speech-altering device, a drivers license, a tape recorder, business cards, miscellaneous identification cards, and a backstopped telephone number. HUNT used the disguise to interview de Clifford Mott in Rhode Island.

The FBI: "De Motte stated that on July 26, 1971, he met with an individual who introduced himself as Ed Warren. He had received telephone calls from this individual who claimed that he was contacting De Motte on the recommendation of Robert Bennett of the Robert R. Mullen and Company. He met this individual in a motel immediately adjacent to the airport at Warwick, Rhode Island. They spent several hours in a motel room and WARREN taped most of the conversation. At this time Warren gave to him a business card of Robert Bennett with handwriting on the back which he recognized as that of Robert Bennett. The man said he was working for a group which was doing research on the Kennedy family and the Chappaquidick Island incident. He said that he was working for a group of people whom he described only as investment and industrial people. HUNT had a very anti-Kennedy attitude and asked specific questions as to whether or not De Motte knew anything about pornographic movies being shown at the Kennedy home. He also inquired as to any incidents which might have occurred at parties which he described as drunken orgies. The only information provided to him by De Motte was the fact that (deleted). De Motte explained that WARREN had been referred to him by Bennett because in 1960 he had worked as public relations man for the Yachtsman Hotel which was used to house press people and staff people of the Kennedy campaign group." [FBI `39-4089-1314] De Motte later "furnished instant enclosure which he had found among his papers which he had been currently reviewing. He speculated possibly that Albert S. Paterson may in fact be HUNT who, according to information resulting from Watergate, had allegedly falsified documents in an effort to defame John and Robert Kennedy. De Motte has no reason, other than pure speculation, to identify Patterson as HUNT. The material which De Motte furnished the FBI was received by (Deleted) from (Deleted) and (Deleted) became friends during the Summer of 1969 when both were working for the (Deleted) as Washington, D.C. (Deleted) subsequently transferred to (Deleted)'s Office where he is now an Administrative Assistant. De Motte and (Deleted) have remained close friends and (deleted) note transmitting the enclosures to De Motte included the statement it was being sent for your amusement and amazement.'" [FBI 139-4089-2224 5.23.73] During HUNT V ajweberman HUNT was asked:

Q. Did you ever follow the Chappaquidick incident involving Ted Kennedy.

A. To some extent.

Q. Do you know a White House librarian named Schleicher?

A. No.

Q. Did you borrow books from her pertaining to the Chappaquidick incident.

A. No.

Q. Did you ever maintain a file of information about the Kennedy clan, specifically the Chappaquidick incident?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Where did you keep that file?

A. The few gleanings that came from DeMott, I think I turned the originals over to Chuck Colson and I kept a skeleton file in my own office in the White House safe, in my then White House office.

Q. Did any members of the White House plumbers spy on Ted Kennedy, to your knowledge?

A. To my knowledge, no.

In August 1971 HUNT and G. Gordon Liddy, another member of the White House/Special Operations Group, were involved in burglarizing the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Daniel Ellsberg had leaked the classified Pentagon Papers to The New York Times. The Technical Service Division supplied HUNT with support for this and other entries. HUNT was provided with alias documents, disguise material including wig, glasses, and speech alteration device; a Uher stereo tape recorder with Sony microphones, a camera, film and film processing. He also requested a device to record incoming phone calls. The official of the Technical Services Division who provided HUNT with this material knew him only as "Mr. Edward," a staff officer investigating drugs, assigned to the Domestic Contacts Division. The CIA: "Deleted advised that in the summer of 1971 he and his section chief were called into the office of (Deleted) who briefed them to the effect that a disguise, documentation, and other support were to be provided to an individual identified as 'EDWARD.' (Deleted) met with 'EDWARD' the following day and made all the necessary arrangements to immediately provide him with a disguise and alias documentation. 'EDWARD' was observed signing his name to three items which required a signature, and he tried a mouth device that was utilized in connection with the operation. Approximately two weeks later 'EDWARD' called to indicate that he needed some help with the disguise glasses...The latter individual made some adjustment to the glasses, and it was probably at this meeting that EDWARD inquired about a backstopped telephone number and address in New York. [These were not provided] (Deleted) indicated that he would have to check with his superiors. (Deleted) is not absolutely certain, but it is his best recollection that EDWARD also requested a disguise and alias documentation for an associate." [CIA FOIA #23 2146-4: Alias GEORGE F. LEONARD, EDWARD JOSEPH WARREN] The CIA reported: "Mr. HUNT was issued the alias (deleted). This name was erroneously recorded at that time on a (deleted). Mr. HUNT was supposed to use the (deleted) for only one week. On or about (deleted) Mr. HUNT was issued various unspecified organizational cards in (deleted's) name...With respect to the overall question of pocket litter during that period, Agency records have been destroyed, and there is no specific information in our files relating to the issue." [RR p32; CIA FOIA 2146-2, 5; Unmarked CIA doc; CIA FOIA 2146-20] On August 30, 1971, Fredrick N. Evans / PES circulated a memo about HUNT to AC/CB, C/PSD, DDS/PS, AD/S, C/PSD.

During the Summer of 1971 evidence suggested HUNT and McCORD were involved in a plan to provoke a state of National Emergency in the United States. The possibility existed that one of the provocateurs contacted by them or by an intermediary, was Louis Elbert Tackwood (born February 20, 1943).

Louis Tackwood was born in February 1943, an illegitimate child, in New Orleans.

In 1950 Louis Tackwood moved from New Orleans to Los Angeles where he joined his father, a dope dealer, who was shot and killed by a rival dealer four years later. Tackwood became involved in street crime in L.A. In 1958 Louis Tackwood was committed to a state mental hospital and diagnosed as psychopathic. In 1962 he was arrested for car theft, but was offered immunity from prosecution in return for his cooperation in apprehending other car thieves. Tackwood was arrested at least a dozen times in the next nine years but spent little time in jail. A note on Tackwood's rap sheet stated "defendant worked...as reliable informant." "I had a free hand to do what I wanted," Tackwood told investigative reporters, "Anything I did was okay. Like saying go out an' commit all the crimes you want to an' if you get busted they'll pull you out." Around 1965 he became involved in political surveillance, working for Sgts. Edward Watkins and Lawrence Brown of SIS. All names used by Tackwood were confirmed to be officers in the specified departments, in fact he provided reporters with correct phone numbers directly into SIS and CCS, as well as a taped telephone conversation with Lawrence Brown. In 1965, just after the Watts riot, Tackwood said the police department came to the conclusion that the Black Muslims were getting "too big, too powerful." He was instructed to make a phone call on August 18, 1965, to the police precinct saying there were guns going in and out of the Muslim mosque. Tackwood said he did so, and immediately "all kinds of police came in and shot the place up." Around 1966 he recalled, he began working with Ron Karenga, at the time when the Black Panthers were beginning to gain strength in Los Angeles. On orders of SIS, Tackwood said, he frequently brought money to Karenga and told him to "off" (kill) Panthers. A main target, he said, was Ellmore (Geronimo) Pratt, the Panther's Southern Chairman. Pratt, however, was never killed. Two Black Panthers, Alprentice Bunchy Carter and John Huggins were slain at UCLA in late 1968, and two members of US, the organization headed by Ron Karenga, were convicted. Louis Tackwood: "My first C.C.S. assignment was when I was liaison between C.S.S. and Ron Karenga's organization US." In 1966 a probation officer wrote: "Los Angeles Police Department officers report that Tackwood in the past worked for them as a reliable informant." Louis Tackwood claimed that in 1969 he was recruited for Criminal Conspiracy Section, Los Angeles Police Department, which was an outgrowth of a special unit to investigate the Robert F. Kennedy assassination, by Ronald G. Farwell, a black member of CCS in charge of monitoring black militant activity. The L.A. Panthers continued to thrive until their headquarters was raided on December 8, 1969. Thirteen of their members were arrested for assault. Tackwood charged that police had planned the raid long in advance with Panther Melvin "Cotton" Smith. Tackwood said he learned from Sgt. Ronald G. Farwell that Smith had been a police informant since 1967. In early 1970 Tackwood said he killed a man who was getting wise to his informing activities. He fled to New Orleans, assured by his police friends, no action would be taken. Louis Tackwood moved to New Orleans in the early 1970's, then returned to Los Angeles in July 1970, after his New Orleans cover had been blown. In 1970 he testified at a murder trial. The prosecutor conceded that his testimony "put the defendant on death row."

By 1971 Louis Tackwood believed he could get rich if he told all he knew about government misconduct to the media. According to Bob Duggan, "Tackwood was a psychopathic liar and a mercenary. The LA Free Press thought it was too hot to handle, so they turned him over to me. And the first thing he did was, in my presence, he called a couple of the agents there. He played the game on both sides for several months." (While Louis Tackwood was in contact with Duggan, he was feeding the Los Angeles Police Department information on him.) Bob Duggan and Marilyn Katz debriefed Tackwood. They arranged for a press conference in mid-September 1971, during which time Tackwood said he had been contacted by two CIA agents when he worked with the FBI on Squad 19 - a special group that was set up to plan disruptions at the Republican Convention, then slated for San Diego. Louis Tackwood stated: "There is a plan right now that is so monstrous that it is pathetic. It entails a detailed plan to blow up the Republican Convention. It has been worked out by the super-agencies...The blame will fall on militant organizations demonstrating at the convention. The President will then be asked to declare a state of national emergency and martial law. Within 48 hours, they will arrest all known militants on the left, and a police state will then exist...I am only giving up two names. There's 'Martin' and there's 'White.' Alright now, 'Martin' was the code name for my contact, and I'm going to tell you he's CIA all the way. Are you ready for this? He was in Dallas when they got Kennedy; he left out of there for the Caribbean. And 'Martin' is in on the cancellation of elections, and some way in on the concentration camp thing. Do you see what I'm saying? Now the control, the man over 'Martin' is 'White.' I only heard a little about him, but they say he is the money man, nobody's over him but the top dogs. 'Martin' and 'White' that's all I'm going to give you now. This is my life insurance."

Tackwood told The Washington Post he "sat in on meetings where plans were made by federal and local agents to disrupt the 1972 San Diego Republican convention and blame it on the leftists. The object: To create a situation which would permit the President to invoke special emergency powers leading to the arrest and detention of political activists throughout the country; that the C.C.S. had prior knowledge of last years Marin County Courthouse shootout and George Jackson's fatal escape attempt from San Quentin - and allowed both to proceed despite certainty that lives would be lost." On November 22, 1971, Louis Tackwood testified in the Los Angeles Panther 13 trial. He said that Melvin Cotton Smith, the principal witness, was a police informant and had not turned State's evidence as the police suggested. His testimony was preceded by that of Ronald Farwell who said that he first met Louis Tackwood in early 1970, and had used him as an informer against the Black Panthers.

In June 1972, eight months after Louis Tackwood went public, it was revealed that HUNT had used the name "White" during Watergate. Watergate burglar Rolando Martinez' personal telephone directory listed HOWARD HUNT. Next to the phone number it noted: "W. House." HUNT'S name was listed under the letters "W.H." in BERNARD BARKER'S address book. HUNT was asked what would lead Mr. BARKER to use the initials W.H.? HUNT: "I assume that WH was for White House." The initials "WH" appeared on the flyleaf of OSWALD'S address book. Page 43 of the address book contained the letters "WH get Peg 6X10," disguised as the Russian word "Inderedko." The Warren Commission was not sure what this word meant, and translated it as an abbreviation for "International Rescue Committee." OSWALD'S telephone number at 621 Marsalis Street was WH 2-1985 - Whitehall. The back flyleaf of OSWALD'S address book contained the words "From Mrs. Hail N. White Special."

McCORD told the police that his name was "Martin" when he was arrested at Watergate. [DC PD arrest rec.] The CIA reported: "At approximately 7:45 p.m., Mr. Arnold L. Parham, a Special Agent of the FBI Field Office in Alexandria, Virginia, called to request a name trace on 'James Martin' who had been arrested while demonstrating at Watergate. This call was taken by a security duty officer, and referred to the responsible senior security officer for night calls." [Memo Cary to Helms Message Pref. #480889]

During the Watergate investigation, the FBI questioned two secretaries from Robert R. Mullen and Company, Lynn Jones, and Diana Konowalski. They stated that prior to Watergate, HUNT "frequently traveled to the West Coast and that each time he went, he would tell the secretaries that he was going to San Diego, to check on security of the convention site. Most or all of these trips took place while HUNT was working as a White House consultant. On a majority of these trips HUNT was accompanied by Gordon Liddy. It is known from a review of toll records, credit card charges, and airplane travel tickets that HUNT and Liddy made no such trips to San Diego."

Another FBI document stated "Both advised that HUNT received numerous telephone calls on his private telephone line from person who identified themselves only as 'Bernie' (Possibly BERNARD BARKER): Don (Possibly Donald Segretti) and Tom, who remains unidentified. Both said Tom called from pay phone on the street because they always heard automobile traffic in the background. All three left messages for HUNT to either return the call, or that so and so called. Only Lynn Jones was first instructed to answer the telephone with 'Hello.' She was instructed to accept all messages for Ed Warren. Jones advised HUNT traveled a lot to Miami, Florida, beginning Winter of 1971. Then, toward Spring, he went twice a month. He went on numerous trips to West Coast telling her that he had to go to San Diego to check on security of the convention site and the hotel. Jones never made reservations for HUNT in San Diego, but did make several requests through their Los Angeles client, Howard Hughes, to make reservations for HUNT. HUNT always wanted a suite with two bedrooms. On several occasions, after she would tell HUNT that his reservations were in order, it never failed that within the hour, a man they knew as Gordon Liddy, would appear with his suitcases and depart with HUNT. HUNT told them that Liddy always traveled with him. On several occasions HUNT would be away for three to four days at a time. Sometimes when they didn't know where he was they would contact his office at the White House and would be told by some unidentified secretary that HUNT was probably traveling under his assumed name. They could not explain this, but one time HUNT told them that he did use the name Ed Warren. On a return trip from Los Angeles, one time Liddy came to the office looking for HUNT. Liddy had his hand bandaged. When HUNT was alone the two secretaries asked HUNT what had happened to Liddy and he told them that while in San Diego, checking the building of the new hotel, Liddy accidentally rested his hand on a hot rivet. Later the two girls learned from Robert Wait, that HUNT had told Wait the true story about Liddy trying to prove how powerful his mind was that it could overcome pain." [FBI 139-4089-890, 892]

In 1993 Mrs. William Tackwood was contacted: "Ain't nobody seen that bastard. I have no idea when I last saw him. You'll have to check with someone else. We don't even have anything to do with him, honey. The boy ain't nothing but a con artist, you just wasting you're time. We haven't seen him." When contacted in June 1993 Louis Tackwood was asked if the men he had met with were in fact HUNT and McCORD: "It was HUNT and McCORD and Segretti was there too. I recognized them from their photographs that were in the newspapers after Watergate. They were there because of something to do with the psychiatrist on Wilshire Boulevard. After Watergate I disappeared. They were after me pretty bad. Nobody could ask me if it was them." Louis Tackwood was asked what he had been doing since the early 1970's. He responded: "Trying to keep out of trouble..." He was asked about an arrest for having made bomb threat and having faked a police report. He said, "That had to do with the Pope's visit. I got arrested just before the Pope got here, and was let go the Monday after he left. It was the Fall of 1987. I didn't have anything in for anybody. They was looking for someone else - someone in the Tony Alamo group. They're up on the Ventura highway. Three months later, 150 policeman, at six in the morning, raided the Alamos." At this point Mrs. Tackwood engaged her husband in conversation. He said "Hold on a second" then told his wife, "I ain't been foolin' ...you ain't got the right to say that. I never set those people up. Can I call you back?" The telephone conversation ended.

Louis Tackwood had infiltrated the Alamo group, and his arrest was part of his cover.

G. Gordon Liddy admitted the White House/Special Operations Group planned kidnappings at the Republican Convention:

Q. Did Mr. HUNT ever indicate to you that any of the men with whom he was working, some of the individuals who were Cubans, had any previous experience in assassination or killings or the like or had-

A. (Interposing) He represented to me. Let me back up to give you the circumstances so that my answer will be more understandable.

Q. All right.

A. Prior to receiving authorization to go ahead on what has become known as the Gemstone Plan, Mr. HUNT and I were both engaged in recruiting efforts to man the table of organization that we had drawn up should we receive the go-ahead.

At the time, the Gemstone Plan included abduction of leaders, radical elements which had proclaimed themselves ready to, and intended to, disrupt the Republican National Convention, at the time scheduled for San Diego, in a manner similar to that done by Students for a Democratic Society to the Democratic Party in Chicago the time before.

Mr. HUNT and I both traveled to Miami, Florida, in connection with these recruiting efforts. There, I was introduced to some persons who were Cuban who then introduced me to additional persons who were Cuban, bearing in mind I do not speak Spanish. Mr. HUNT does.

There was a conversation in both English and the Spanish language. And I looked to Mr. HUNT for the gist of what was going on.

And in any event, we had perhaps a dozen men who were willing to come on board in this connection. And Mr. HUNT, to impress upon me the high caliber of these individuals, stated that they had accounted among them for a substantial number of deaths [22], including two who had hanged someone from a beam in a garage.

Q. Did HUNT indicate at any time that any of these individuals were connected in some way with organized crime or whatever?

A. He indicated that these, not he, but these Cuban individuals were connected in some way with organized crime.

Q. Had he ever discussed their connection, or what was the nature of it?

A. No.

Q. Like were these men who were in an enforcement arm of organized crime, so to speak?

A. Well, he certainly did not represent them as law enforcement officers. [Liddy Depo. HUNT v. ajweberman]

John Dean wrote that OPERATION GEMSTONE was to have what Liddy called another "operational arm" consisting of secret operatives who could be used to drug and kidnap anti-NIXON demonstrators and other dissidents. Dean wrote that Liddy referred to kidnapping as "surgical relocation activities." [Dean, Blind Ambition, p81]

Jeb Magruder wrote: "It was, as John Dean said later, mind boggling. It included mugging squads, kidnapping, sabotage, the use of prostitutes, break-ins, electronic surveillance and wiretapping." Jeb Magruder disclosed that G. Gordon Liddy "explained that the proposed kidnap squads would seize radicals, and inject them with some kind of drug that would render them unconscious..." [Magruder, Jeb, An American Life, pgs. 170-180]

HUNT testified: "One of the proposals was to grab a couple of the hippie leaders and take them down to Mexico. Mr. Liddy said he knew all about that, because he had headed operations - intercepted for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and he knew the back alleys across the border." [HUNT test. in HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT 1984 p82]

HEMMING found it hard to believe that someone in the Los Angeles Police Department would introduce Louis Tackwood to two CIA agents who immediately told him their life stories: "HUNT and McCORD are talking to a fuckin' nigger, and they are confessing? What was he doing, sucking on their dicks, or what? Or are they just baring their souls? What does he have, a priest collar on? These are admissions against self-interest. Tackwood had to have heard this information from other sources."

On December 16, 1971, HUNT was in Dallas, Texas, to arrange a magazine interview for retired General Paul D. Harkins. HUNT called his office in the White House from a pay telephone. [FBI 139-4089-1317] HUNT told the Rockefeller Commission that he had never been to Dallas: "May have changed planes in Dallas in 1960 without leaving airport. On way to Mexico City."

HUNT was involved in a plot to kill Jack Anderson from December 1971 to January 1972. In the September 21, 1975, issue of The Washington Post Robert Woodward reported HUNT had told associates that "he was ordered in December 1971, or January 1972, to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, according to reliable sources. According to the sources, HUNT told his former CIA associates that the order was canceled at the last minute - but only after a plan had been devised to make Anderson's death look accidental. His alleged plan involved the use of a poison to be obtained from a former CIA physician, said sources, who added that the poison was a variety that would leave no trace during a routine medical examination or autopsy." HUNT feared an investigation of the break-in would lead to the disclosure of the assassination plan. "The identity of the former CIA doctor, and the reason the assassination was called off, could not be determined."

The poison HUNT was going to use on Jack Anderson could either be ingested or absorbed through the skin. Jack Anderson's steering wheel was to be dusted with this contact poison so it would appear he had a heart attack while driving. The ensuing automobile accident would obscure the circumstances of the journalist's death. (After Lee Bowers died his physician believed that he had had a heart attack.) HUNT: "I have heard from the CIA that there was a physician who apparently was involved in that line of work, that they once attempted it, that if it's put on the steering wheel of a car the drug would have some sort of hallucinatory effect." [HUNT v. ajweberman Depo 6.77 p17] Jack Anderson initially reacted to the story of the assassination plot with disbelief, but filed a multimillion dollar lawsuit against the NIXON Administration. HUNT later identified the CIA Technical Services Division man as Dr. Edward Gunn. Contacted in August 1993, Dr. Edward Gunn refused comment. [Gunn Edward E. telephone 703-680-1826]

HUNT claimed he consulted with Dr. Edward Gunn at the request of Charles Colson "to explore means of drugging Jack Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public appearance," not to discuss ways of poisoning him. [SSCIA Book IV p134; Wash. Post 9.21.73 p1; Wash. Star 9.22.63]

Baron: Did Colson, at any point in the first conversation explicitly mention the possibility that Anderson should be assassinated of that you might --

HUNT: No.

Baron: How about considering assassination.

HUNT: Absolutely not.

Baron: Not even in the sense of contingency planning?

HUNT: No. The only reference I've ever seen to it has been in the Washington Post stories.

Liebengood: In one of Bob Woodward's stories he refers to three separate sources of his as having the impression that you had been inquiring into the prospect of assassinating Jack Anderson. Do you know who those sources might be and where they might have gotten the impression that you were considering assassination?

HUNT: "I have no idea. It is possible that Dr. Gunn may have received that impression or achieved that perception. I thought also that Gordon Liddy may have done some talking when he was a prisoner in the D.C. Jail, but I have no personal recollection of ever discussing the matter outside Colson, Liddy, and myself.

HUNT told the SSCIA: "That there came a time, to the best of my recollection, in late December, or sometime in January, or possibly even February 1972, when Charles Colson, then Special Counsel to the President, called me into his office. Mr. Colson at that juncture was -- appeared rather nervous. He, as you know, had a common wall with President NIXON'S suite in the Old Executive Office Building, and although he did not glance in that direction, my impression was he had been with the President not too long before. He said that in effect, now I'm not making direct quotes, but what he indicated to me was that Mr. Anderson had become a great thorn in the side of the President...He was agitated when he called me in, sort of talking to me and rifling through papers on his desk, which was very much unlike him, and the inference that I drew from that was that he had just had a conversation with the President. So when I accepted this assignment, I assumed, as I usually do with Colson, that he was either reflecting the desires of the Chief Executive, or else that as a prescient staff officer, was attempting to find a solution to a problem that was troubling his chief...I want to say that I don't know what specific incident triggered the White House reaction, whether it was the Pakistan story, or what it was. I can't relate it to any particular thing. So in due course, in the next four days, I got in touch with retired CIA physician whose name is Dr. Edward Gunn. I knew he'd retired, but I also knew that he had been involved in certain unorthodox aspects of medicine, physiological research and, although I can't pinpoint it now, I believe I must have been aware that he had some knowledge of the unorthodox administration of behavior changing of altering substances. But in any event I got in touch with Doctor Gunn, who at that point had just left the White House and moved over to the Committee to Reelect the President. Dr. Gunn met with Liddy and myself in the Old Hay-Adams Grill, and I told Dr. Gunn that -- well I can't recall whether I introduced Mr. Liddy by his true name or by some sort of alias for the moment, but in any event, I indicated to Dr. Gunn that this was a person of confidence and he could feel free to speak freely with me and with Mr. Liddy.

"The crux of what I directed in Dr. Gunn was the following: I said we are interested in altering the normal behavior pattern of a particular targeted individual for a brief period of time to make him appear incoherent and rambling during a public appearance. I am quite sure I didn't indicate radio, much less television. What had his Agency experience been in this matter? Had he ever done anything like this before?

"Dr. Gunn said 'Well, there are a couple of way of doing the thing now.' Oh, I think I specified hallucinogens. I said 'The only kind of which I've heard was L.S.D.' and I said, 'Oh I am sure there are many other kinds,' and he said, 'Well, what we've done in the past, we have administered it a couple of ways. We painted the steering wheel of a car for absorption through the palms of the hand.' He said, 'We put it on a car door handle.' He said, 'We have switched some medicines, we have made a pill to simulate one of the prescription drugs that a particular targeted individual was taking, and of course, there's always the old simple method of dropping a pill in a guy's cocktail.'

"I didn't ask for the names of these substances. I didn't ask him for access to drugs. I did not ask Dr. Edward Gunn to procure any drugs, for this reason, that Gordon Liddy had been a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, just before he joined the White House, and I felt confident, although I didn't confide this in Dr. Gunn, that if the time came when any controlled substances were needed that Mr. Liddy could secure what was necessary through a secure source within the Treasury Department, because I knew that Dr. Gunn was retired from the CIA.

"So in any case, having listened to what Dr. Gunn had to say, and there was no dialogue, it was really a monologue on his part, I asked him certain information and he supplied it, we continued our lunch and broke up. Dr. Gunn departed. Mr. Liddy and I walked back to our respective offices and, on the way back, to the best of my recollection, we discussed the matter and one or the other of us pointing out the impracticality of utilizing administration methods indicated or described by Mr. Gunn.

"It was wintertime then, and neither of us knew whether Jack Anderson drove his car or whether he had a chauffeur. My guess would have been, I suppose, that he had a chauffeur...if he drove his own car chances would be that he would be wearing gloves in the wintertime. If the job were to be done in the summertime, if in fact the job were to be done, the chances are his palms would be sweaty. So that thing went right out the window right away. Secondarily, this business of substituting a pill was highly impractical and we could have certainly determined somehow where Jack Anderson lived, but to perform an entry operation simply to put one or two pills in a bottle seemed highly impractical. It was my understanding that Jack Anderson had a rather large family and how you would go clandestinely into a medicine cabinet with a household full of people and pore over all the drugs and the pharmacopoeia assortments there until you found one that Jack Anderson normally administered to himself a brief period of time before his radio broadcast, of course, was the height of infeasibility.

"We got around to the third, more routine method of administering a drug that is simply dropping a pill into a man's cocktail glass and I had always understood that Mr. Anderson was a Mormon; from my employment at Mullen and Company where I was associated with the Mormons, I understood they were very abstemious, they would even touch Coca-Cola. By the time we left our respective offices, there was nothing left of the kind of concept at all.

"Either that day, or the following day, we reported to Mr. Colson that I had met with a CIA physician. He had described some CIA experiences to me, and in terms of what Mr. Colson was thinking about, it was impractical, and we should just forget about it. It was something that had taken up an hour and a half or two hours of my time and there was nothing to it. That was it.

[HUNT was asked about his fear that some other member of Anderson's family might get the drug].

"Oh yes, certainly. In the medicine cabinet thing, he had a large family and several people were on -- if they were on pills, it would have been of course, ridiculous. To go more deeply into that particular point before we leave it, what I gathered from the talk with Mr. Gunn was that we really needed to have a Subject or a target in a controlled situation. We almost had to have him under clinical conditions to make sure that A. He got a measured amount of the substance, whatever it might be, and that the timing was just right, and that he would be able to sit down or stand up at the lecture platform in apparently good condition, that at least he would be navigable to get there before he began to talk and make a fool of himself. None of these conditions pertained at all, so the whole thing never advance beyond the simply the information gathering phase of it. There was never any proposal or any further reference made to it..."

Baron: Did Dr. Gunn volunteer any information or advice on how Jack Anderson might be killed or seriously disabled, as opposed to rendered incoherent?

HUNT: No. Of course the name Jack Anderson was never mentioned, but you're speaking of the target individual.

Mr. Baron: That right. So there was no discussion of techniques of assassination or physical disablement.

HUNT: Not at all. I might add, this has not been brought up before, I inferred at that time that at least some of the techniques that Dr. Gunn was describing had been tried out in North Africa. Algeria sticks in my mind.

In an interview with the SSCIA Staff, Charles Colson said he did not remember this incident, and he "never discussed drugging or killing Anderson with HUNT, and allowed for the possibility that you might have been confusing discussions that the two of you had, on the effects of L.S.D in the context of considering using L.S.D against Daniel Ellsberg, or re-inducing an L.S.D trip experience with Daniel Ellsberg. To discredit him." HUNT recalled "something generally along those lines with reference to Ellsberg that we were discussing. This was of course prior to the Fielding entry. We were talking generally about -- what is it called where you 'trip out' again?

Baron: Flashback.

HUNT: Whether these spontaneous flashbacks could be induced, and of course one way to do this was to determine what the guy's psychiatric history was, to determine what his experience had been in the past. But that was not relevant to Jack Anderson at all. But that in my mind would set the background for Colson's later request to look into the matter of hallucinogenics with reference to Anderson.

Baron: But you are quite clear in your own mind that you did discuss with Colson Jack Anderson specifically as a target?

HUNT: Well, he discussed it with me. He named the target. I had no reason, certainly, to go into a thing like that with Dr. Gunn. I have no animus against Jack Anderson, certainly nothing compared to what the White House had at the time.

HUNT and G. Gordon Liddy met with Dr. Edward Gunn in the Old Hay- Grill. As stated, HUNT told Dr. Edward Gunn that G. Gordon Liddy was okay. G. Gordon Liddy explained:

Q. Did HUNT ever discuss any assassination plots?

A. Well, there came a time in 1972, I think it was around February, when Mr. HUNT came to me concerning the journalist Jack Anderson.

Now, again, to give you a little background to make my answer understandable, Mr. Anderson had published in a column the fact that as Messrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin and other high officials of the Soviet Union traveled about in their limousines on the streets of Moscow speaking to one another over their car telephones, believing themselves to be speaking privately. The United States was, if fact, listening in.

Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, learned that Mr. Anderson had acquired this knowledge, that he knew this was going on, and took him to lunch and asked him, please, not to publish it. And my understanding is that Mr. Anderson promised not to.

Recently, when I have had occasion to speak to Mr. Anderson on the subject, he has said that he did not publish it until he had seen it published elsewhere first. However, he has never been able to show me, or anyone else, where it was published first. Following that incident in which, while everybody was pretty upset, nobody suggested taking any action against Mr. Anderson, Mr. HUNT came to me, and he said, "Anderson has now gone too far. He has just identified and caused the death or imminent death under torture of one of our human assets abroad." And he, HUNT, had been charged by his principals, meaning his superiors at the White House, with conferring with me and with someone from the CIA who was represented as retired, namely Dr. Gunn, as to - how best to prevent Mr. Anderson from repeating his behavior.

The conference was held in the then existing downstairs luncheon room of the Hay Adams Hotel, now no longer in existence. And Mr. HUNT brought up that L.S.D. business again. Dr. Gunn rejected it on technical grounds. I suggested that the only way to effectively stop Mr. Anderson, was to kill him. Mr. HUNT and Dr. Gunn agreed. The remainder of the conversation consisted of how we ought to do it best.

The conclusion was that the Cuban assets were to stage a mugging in Washington which would be fatal to Anderson.

Q. All right. Now if Mr. HUNT had said he had merely discussed with you and Dr. Gunn nothing more than a discreditation of Mr. Anderson, would that be correct or incorrect?

A. That would be absolutely incorrect.

Q. The story reflecting this situation occurred in The Washington Post under an article by Woodward and Bernstein. Are you aware of that article, and were you surprised to see that that had come to light?

A. I was in prison at the time. The article was made available to me. I read it at the time. And I was surprised to see that it was incorrect in that it did not narrate the incident as I have just narrated it to you, which is what actually happened. [HUNT v. ajweberman Liddy Depo. 9.30.80.]

During the second HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial G. Gordon Liddy stated: "HUNT was talking of putting it [L.S.D.] on the steering wheel, and he said somebody may be wearing gloves, there might be a chauffeur, it just would not work. I said, 'Well, now, wait a minute. If our task is to guarantee,' and that was the operative word, 'that Mr. Anderson will not conduct - behave this was way again, the only way you are going to guarantee somebody is not going to repeat a particular kind of behavior is to kill him...' Both Dr. Gunn and HUNT agreed immediately and the remainder of the conference was how to go about it. We discussed with Mr. Gunn aspirin roulette in which one takes a single tablet of deadly poison, packs it in a Bayer aspirin jar, we place it in the man's medicine chest, and one day he gets the tablet and that's that. HUNT referred to aspirin roulette...We discussed Dr. Gunn's suggestion of the use of an automobile to hit Mr. Anderson's automobile when it was in a turn in the circle, up near Chevy Chase. There is a way that apparently had been known by the CIA that if you hit a car at just the right speed and angle, it will strip and burn and kill the occupant...But what I suggested is we just kill him. And they both agreed that that would be the way to go about it, and the task would be assigned to Cuban assets." During the second HUNT v. SPOTLIGHT trial HUNT was reminded of his testimony on July 11, 1984. HUNT: "About the only other thing we tried [to do to Anderson] is to put a couple of pills in a prescription flask or vial. And he [Gunn] said, eventually, when the patient or the target gets around to taking one of these pills, it will have an effect on him." [HUNT'S testimony July 11, 1984, p76]

The SSCIA mistakenly accepted COLSON and HUNT'S conflicting statements that the action against Jack Anderson was one that would discredit him by slipping him an L.S.D mickey rather than Liddy's contention that it was a murder plot.

In December 1971 HUNT asked Peter Jessup, senior Agency officer with the National Security Council Staff in the Executive Office Building, to run traces on certain figures in Costa Rica and Guatemala. [SDB MFR 6.9.73 CIA FOIA 5899 (Att to Doc #4048)] HUNT was interested in Costa Rican millionaire Jorge Gonzalez Marten, who had formed the Costa Rican National Independent Party that month. Gonzalez was reported to be a millionaire, with various holdings in Costa Rica and an identified connection with IBM. He lived in the U.S. for a number of years. [Broe Memo 6.4.73 FOIA 5850 (Att to Doc #4048)]

The CIA created a file on HUNT'S activities entitled "The Mr. Edward" file. This file was maintained outside the normal CIA filing system. A bigot list (the CIA's term for the treatment of especially sensitive cases, restricting access to a limited number of persons) was created for HUNT'S activities. The CIA admitted to seven contacts with HUNT after August 31, 1971. March to May 1973, HUNT requested a lockpicker from the CIA EEAB Chief; in late 1971 HUNT requested wiretap experts; late 1971 he requested aid in an entry operation; in October 1971, he asked the CIA to locate Vietnam war documents; on December 8, 1971, he asked for a CIA name trace and on October 15, 1971, he met with Richard Helms to discuss an unknown matter. The CIA was aware of the covert activities of the White House /Special Operations Group.

HUNT placed a forged document in the CIA's Bay of Pigs file, which alleged that President John F. Kennedy had made a secret agreement with Fidel Castro to destroy the Bay of Pigs Brigade. On July 1, 1971, Charles Colson telephoned HUNT and asked: "What do you think of the idea of declassifying a lot of these old documents now?" HUNT answered: "I think it's a fine idea. I'm all in favor of it and I would particularly like to see the Bay of Pigs stuff declassified, including the alleged agreement Castro made with JFK." Charles Colson understood that HUNT was referring to a document HUNT had forged, and responded: "Because you were part of it, and knew it was a phony?" HUNT said "Sure." In 1978 HUNT was asked if he had forged this document: "I don't know what Colson was saying when he said, 'Because you were a part of it, and knew it was a phony'. To this day I don't know what he was talking about. I just said 'Sure' and let it go at that." Charles Colson ended his telephone conversation with HUNT by asking him: "Weren't you the guy who told me, maybe the last time we were up to your house for dinner, that if the truth ever came out about Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, that it would just destroy them?" In a memorandum from Charles Colson, to NIXON'S Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, regarding HUNT, Charles Colson suggested that HUNT and H.R. Haldeman should meet: "I had forgotten when I talked to you that he was the CIA mastermind on the Bay of Pigs. He told me a long time ago that if the truth were even [sic] known, Kennedy would be destroyed."

In late 1971 HUNT forged cables that concerned the involvement of President Kennedy in the assassination in 1963 of South Vietnamese strongman, Ngo Dinh Diem. HUNT was asked:

Q. Did you in fact forge, or cause to be forged, cable traffic linking John Kennedy with the Diem assassination?

A. I did.

Q. You did in fact forge documents?

A. I did.

Q. This was at what time period?

A. Yes, because Colson asked me to.

Gordon Liddy was asked:

Q. Do you know whether or not HUNT any skill, training or expertise or has undertaken any study of the art of forgery of documents?

A. I know that he did forge at least one document. That was a cable. And he did so employing the use of a Xerox machine. And that was the summer of 1971.

HUNT consulted with General Edward Landsdale, and with Lucien Conein, in regard to the wording of the cable. A few months later, Lucien Conein granted an interview to NBC-TV news during which he tied President Kennedy to the death of Ngo Dinh Diem. When questioned about this interview after Watergate, Lucien Conein said he had received permission to speak with the media from the CIA's Office of Security. When CIA Office of Security Director Robert Osborne spoke with Lucien Conein on January 31, 1972, he asked him how it came he appeared on the December 22, 1971, NBC television program. Lucien Conein stated he had been contacted by HOWARD HUNT, White House Public Relations and Security Consultant, and had been interviewed by HUNT in his own home extensively as to his role in the entire affair: "Osborne noted: I know this is true since HOWARD HUNT phoned me and asked how he could contact Mr. Conein in late November 1971." Lucien Conein told Osborne that "Mr. HUNT, speaking for his White House superiors, stated that they felt his appearance could be helpful, providing he was properly briefed. Mr. HUNT indicated that he would 'take care of coordinating this with the Agency' and provided Mr. Conein with a file of some 24 cables as a briefing aid to refresh his memory." [CIA OS Memo D/CI] Lucien Conein denied that HUNT had shown him any forged cables, despite HUNT'S testimony to the contrary.

Lucien Emile Conein (born, November 29, 1919), a veteran of the French Foreign Legion, described his military career: "Starting as a recruit I September 1941, was advanced to a Non-Commissioned Officer in 1942, and later chosen for Officer Candidate School February 1943. Graduated and commissioned 2nd Lieutenant February (OSS) on July 26, 1943. Served European Theater of Operations October 1943, to December 1944. Parachuted behind enemy lines in civilian clothes, France, August 1944. Transferred China, Burma, India Theater, February 1945. Assigned German occupation February 1947 to August 1953, as an intelligence officer. 1953 to 1956 served as U.S. Military advisory group, Vietnam, as intelligence and operations officer."

Lucien Conein returned to Indochina as an advisor to the French, who were at war with the Army of National Liberation of General Ho Chi Minh.

"From 1957 to 1959, assigned as battalion commander U.S. Special Forces. Commanded an airborne battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From August 1959 to September 1961 Chief, Foreign Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Mission in Teheran, Iran."

Lucien Conein joined the CIA in December 1961, where he became Chief of Station in Saigon. There, he had liaison with other U.S. officials (up to the Ambassadorial level), and Vietnamese officials including the Prime Minister. Lucien Conein became a leader of an assassination squad under Colonel Edwin Lansdale, and put General Ngo Dinh Diem in power. Diem ruled South Vietnam until 1963, when Lucien Conein helped Vietnamese Generals overthrow him. In 1968 Lucien Conein left Vietnam and retired from the Armed Forces and CIA. He was back in 1969 engaged in a private business venture. The CIA stated: "Lucien Conein was formerly assigned to this Agency in military status from 1943 until 1961, and as a Contract Type A from 1961, until medical retirement in 1968. His file was annotated with the statement that the Domestic Operations Division could not utilize Lucien Conein in any capacity." Lucien Conein reportedly was the liaison between the OSS and the Corsican brotherhood, a mafia-style organization that was involved in heroin trafficking.

In late 1971 Lucien Conein was contacted by the White House, and in early 1972 he was hired by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as a consultant with its intelligence section. At the end of the year, he was given a permanent position with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The Rockefeller Report stated that "Beginning in late 1970, the CIA used one of its proprietary companies to recruit Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs agents...the CIA recruited 19 Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs agents." [RR p39]

When NIXON abolished the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in 1973, and created the Drug Enforcement Administration by Presidential Proclamation, Lucien Conein headed the Special Operations Group of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Lucien Conein began to recruit former CIA agents as Drug Enforcement Administration /Special Operations Group contract employees. He had a staff of 19 individuals, 14 of whom were former CIA employees. Colson stated that the Drug Enforcement Administration / Special Operations Group was responsible for kidnapping and assassination. Wallace Shanley recalled, "I know that Gordon Liddy went down to Miami to recruit talent for the Drug Enforcement Administration's Special Operations Group. STURGIS was one of these potential assassins. I don't have any written documentation on this. I was working with these guys - Lucien Conein was one of them." The Drug Enforcement Administration / Special Operations Group assassination program was headquartered in Mexico. Charles Colson stated that Senator Lowell Weicker "should look into the surroundings of the death an Italian named [Lucien] Sarti, who was a major narcotics trafficker shot in Mexico about two years ago. Sarti bought his way out of jail and got to Mexico where he was shot. Colson said this case will show the other half of Conein's operation." HEMMING told this researcher: "Lucien Conein was organizing an assassination program. It was called Deacon One and Deacon Two. BERNARDO De TORRES was involved. De TORRES was planning to assassinate Juan Balaguer. That was off the record."

Rolando Martinez (born July 8, 1922) was recruited by the CIA in 1961 to engage in maritime activity against the Castro regime. The CIA reported: "Brief data on Members/Contents in PB PRIME (MRR) #125 Rolando Martinez. Resides in Miami Beach, Florida, U.S.A. Works boat for MRR DOJ March 1962. Member of the Naval Section of MRR. DOI May 10, 1962 (60)." Rolando Martinez was in charge of a site in the Florida Keys used for these operations. The CIA: "With a change in operational policy, these missions were no longer required, and in the mid-1960's the project under which Rolando Martinez operated [PB PRIME] was canceled." Rolando Martinez was retained at $100 a month as a part time informant.

Circa December 1971 Rolando Martinez mentioned to his CIA Case Officer that HUNT, who was working for the White House, had been in Miami. The Rockefeller Commission reported: "The Case Officer later told him that he had run a Station name check on HUNT, and that there was no information respecting HUNT'S employment at the White House. Rolando Martinez took the response to mean that HUNT was on a secret mission of which the Miami Station was not to know. On the strength of his past experience maintaining CIA operations, he therefore disclosed none of HUNT'S illegal activities to his Case Officer. The Case Officer's superior, [Jacob Esterline], had been disturbed when he later learned the Case Officer had not promptly reported the HUNT reference, a name that meant nothing to the Case Officer. The Chief of Station felt he should be advised of the presence of any former CIA Officers in his territory." [RR p189]

The Miami Chief of Station, Jacob Esterline, had his Case Officer meet with Rolando Martinez in March 1972, and again the Case Office asked about HUNT. These references to HUNT, in whom Jacob Esterline, "from past experience, had limited confidence," led Jacob Esterline to contact his superior at Headquarters, Cord Meyer. A strongly-worded letter was sent back to Jacob Esterline advising that "HUNT is undoubtedly on domestic White House business, no interest to us, in essence cool it."

The CIA was asked: "Question 5: Prior to June 17, 1972, did Eugenio Martinez advise, hint or suggest to this CIA Case Officer or anyone else in CIA or U.S. Government, of operations or plans to conduct clandestine activities against domestic targets. In this connection did Mr. Martinez mention in any way what has become known as the Watergate break ins, or the break in of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office? Answer: Mr. Martinez in late 1971, and again in March 1972, brought Mr. HUNT'S presence in Miami to the attention of an Agency field representative. The field representative reported this to CIA Headquarters and was advised that he should not concern himself with the travel of Mr. HUNT who was an employee of the White House undoubtedly on White House domestic business of no interest to the CIA. Mr. Martinez made no mention of what has become known as the Watergate and Ellsberg break ins, nor was the Agency aware of his participation in any secret arrangement or relationship that might have involved any domestic clandestine operations. This Agency has no knowledge of any information that Mr. Martinez may have provided to anyone else in the United States Government prior to June 1972 on the subject of clandestine activities against domestic targets."

In August 1993 Jacob Esterline was asked by this researcher what had caused him to have limited confidence in HUNT: "When he was working for me, I was never quite sure what he was up to. What really riled me at that time was here was a guy no longer with us that must have known that the people he was messing with - namely Rolando Martinez who was a nice, dedicated to his cause Cuban, who was obviously confused by someone saying 'I work for the White House' coming in there. It was totally unethical for Mr. HUNT to come in and touch somebody working for another agency, regardless of where he worked. He had no business touching any of our people. I didn't deal directly with Rolando Martinez. I had a case officer dealing with him. But HUNT obviously convinced them that this was so important that they shouldn't tell the case officer or me that they were doing these White House break-ins. Really cheap shot. It set off a very bad relationship between Cord Meyer and me. Cord Meyer was Thomas Karamessines' Deputy. In retrospect, when I wrote that letter to Meyer, it hit him like a bombshell. I'm sure they had no idea what HUNT was mixed-up in." Jacob Esterline did not know why he was not told to terminate Rolando Martinez's CIA employment if Headquarters suspected HUNT was involved in White House political activities. After Jacob Esterline received this letter, he told the Case Officer of Rolando Martinez to have Rolando Martinez summarize his contact with HUNT. Rolando Martinez was told to write something that "he would not be afraid to have shown to him later," rather than to write the truth. [RR p195] The summary failed to disclose any of the illegal activities of the White House/Special Operations Group. [RR p189]

Jacob Esterline explained, "When I got over my annoyance, I told them to go out and check on Rolando Martinez. We were checking on his progress at brokerage school at time. I think I did tell him to put down a pretty good resume of what had been going on. As a matter of fact, I'm pretty damn sure I did. What happened is the summary disappeared from my files. And I didn't get on to the fact that this paper had disappeared, until the case officer handling him, who was a nice little fellow, but he wasn't the brightest man in the world, left. I don't know what happened...I never saw him again. He was long gone someplace else. I think he left the Agency shortly after that. He was long gone before I found out that his, we always kept journals, Memorandum for the Records, contact reports. And the contact report had disappeared from the file. I was never able to get my hands on it. It's gone. It told the fact that Rolando Martinez had been meeting with HUNT on several occasions, and obviously HUNT had gotten to him, or maybe he hadn't even told him at that point what it was, because I was absolutely astounded, dumbfounded, when that whole thing broke and I realized that this poor guy Rolando Martinez had gotten himself into such a mess. He was a real good boat captain."

Rolando Martinez was recruited into White House/Special Operations Group. Rolando Martinez's last meeting with the CIA took place on June 6, 1972. Jacob Esterline: "There's a little bit of a grey thing here, in the sense that I went down there to gently terminate and direct these people into new avenues of life. That was a pretty momentous thing to do. Those who had been rather important leaders, we went to varying lengths with. In some cases I actually got a couple of these very bright fellows into law school. They are now practicing lawyers. In the case of Rolando Martinez, he'd been a Cuban businessman and was a mature man at this point, we put him on a retirement pension which wasn't very much money obviously. It just doesn't happen that way. What you would call a 'brass parachute,' to coin a phrase. I got him into brokers school to direct him into the lifestyle he had in Cuba before he got mixed up in all these crazy kinds of things against Castro." According to Seymour Hersh, Rolando Martinez kept a diary that was found by Federal investigators in the trunk of his car which was parked at Miami International Airport. [NYT 1.14.73]

Rolando Martinez told the SSCIA that in 1972 he conducted an interview "with this Cuban lady in Miami who said she had been a member of the Castro household, and present there at the time of John Kennedy's death. The woman -- I have testified to this before, but I can't recall where." HUNT elaborated: "She had been introduced to me by Rolando Martinez who brought her to my hotel room. He provided the tape recorder for our discussion...The woman's bone fides were established solely by Rolando Martinez, who we determined later was on the CIA payroll at the time, although I did not know of it. I provided a raw report and submitted it to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division." During HUNT v ajweberman, HUNT stated: "I turned over [to the CIA] a tape recording that I made in a Miami hotel room with Martinez and BARKER, of a Cuban refugee lady who claimed to have been present in the Castro home at the time, the day Kennedy was assassinated. I think I had part of that typed up in the White House and eventually sent a summary of it or a transcript over to CIA, and I may have accompanied that with a cassette tape."

The CIA reported: "Quoted below is a letter dated October 29, 1973, Colby received from Fulbright and answer which Colby proposes to send him: 'When Mr. Helms appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee February 7, 1973, (under oath) in connection with his nomination to be Ambassador to Iran, he was questioned in some detail about prior associations with CIA on the part of the Watergate Defendants. The following exchange took place:

The Chairman: And FRANK STURGIS, was he an employee?

Helms: Never.

The Chairman: In any capacity?

Helms: I am sure of that.

"In an affidavit filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, on October 10, 1973, supporting his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. STURGIS says: 'I had also been active in the BAY OF PIGS OPERATION and continued clandestinely working for the liberation of Cuba thereafter.' And again: 'I had known of Mr. Rolando Martinez since the Bay of Pigs invasion, and knew that he had been engaged in clandestine incursions into Cuba for many years following the Bay of Pigs invasion. I was doing similar work, though Mr. Martinez was working for a different sector than I was. It was my belief, based upon my own observations during the years following Bay of Pigs, that Martinez was working for, and being directly financed by, the CIA, as opposed to my own situation which involved the Agency's knowledge and approval of my operations and their indirect financing of them.' With respect to Mr. Martinez, Mr. Helms testified as follows February 7: 'Mr. Martinez was never an employee of the CIA. He was on retained of $100 a month, seen occasionally by a representative of the agency, and his role was simply to identify to us from those legal and illegal immigrants from Cuba those individuals who he thought might be of interest for informational purposes. He simply was to identify them and we took it from there, and it was a very loose kind of arrangement in which he reported in from time to time. And it is indeed true that as soon as it was found out he was involved in the Watergate thing we simply turned him off and have not talked to him since.' Mr. Helms repeated the substance of this testimony of page 58 to 59 of the transcript. I would appreciate you clearing up these discrepancies. Specifically -- was STURGIS active in the Bay of Pigs operation? Did he continue clandestinely working for the liberation of Cuba thereafter, either on behalf of the CIA or with its knowledge, approval or acquiescence? If so, what were his activities?

"Was Martinez involved in clandestine incursions into Cuba for many years following the Bay of Pigs invasion? Were these made on behalf of the CIA, or with its knowledge, approval, or acquiescence? What does STURGIS mean when he says, 'I was doing similar work though Mr. Martinez was working for a different sector than I was?' What does STURGIS mean when he refers to 'My own situation which involved the Agency's knowledge and approval of my operations and their indirect financing of them?' (This completes Fulbright October 29, 1973 memo). Following is Colby's proposed answer:

"This is in response to your letter of October 29, 1973, requesting certain information concerning Mr. FRANK STURGIS and Eugenio R. Martinez. Your questions and the answers thereto follow:

Question: Was STURGIS active in the Bay of Pigs operation?

Answer: We have no evidence that Mr. STURGIS officially participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Any activities concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion in which Mr. STURGIS may have been engaged were not directly connected with or authorized by the CIA, nor was CIA knowledgeable of any such activities. However, he may have been engaged through one of the groups which was supported by the CIA.

Question: Did he continue clandestinely working for the liberation of Cuba thereafter, either on behalf of the CIA, or with its knowledge, approval or acquiescence? If so, what were his activities?

Answer: Any activities in which Mr. STURGIS may have been engaged subsequent to the Bay of Pigs Operation were without the prior knowledge or the approval or acquiescence of this Agency. Our files reflect information from the FBI which indicates that Mr. STURGIS is a soldier of fortune who had participated in Cuban Revolutionary activities for a number of years. However, the Agency did engage in limited activities, and he may have been engaged by one of the groups supported by the CIA in this connection.

Question: Was Martinez engaged in clandestine incursions into Cuba for many years following the Bay of Pigs invasion. Were these made on behalf of the CIA or with its knowledge, approval or acquiescence?

Answer: Mr. Martinez was recruited by the Agency in January 1961, in connection with Cuban operations. The project to which he was assigned was terminated in 1969. I would be glad to brief you on the details if you are interested. Subsequently, he was held on a part-time retainer to report on individuals coming from Cuba to the Miami area whom he thought could provide information on Cuba useful to the United States. The last meeting with Mr. Martinez occurred on June 6, 1972, and the relationship was terminated by the Agency as a result of his involvement in the Watergate break in.

Question: What does STURGIS mean when he says 'I was doing similar work though Mr. Martinez was working for a different sector than I was?'

Answer: We do not now what Mr. STURGIS means by this statement. Our files indicate that Mr. STURGIS was friendly with Mr. Martinez, and he may have been aware that Mr. Martinez was in some way associated with the CIA. However, Mr. STURGIS was not directly engaged in any activity, sponsored, approved or funded by CIA.

Question: What does STURGIS mean when he refers to 'My own situation which involved the Agency's knowledge and approval of my operations and their indirect financing of them?'

Answer: We do not know what Mr. STURGIS means by this statement. Mr. STURGIS was not involved in any operation directly sponsored, approved or funded by the CIA.

"While it is true that Mr. Martinez had an 'agent' relationship with this Agency prior to the time he was put on a part-time retainer, he was never an 'employee' of this Agency, and was never under the type of supervision and control normally associated with a 'staff employee' relationship. Further, prior to Mr. Helms' testimony before your committee on February 7, 1973, there was speculation in the press that Mr. Martinez was an active employee of this Agency at the time of the break in. This, of course, was not true, and in explaining the status of Mr. Martinez at the time of the break in, it is understandable that uppermost in Mr. Helms' mind would be the part-time retainer status which Mr. Martinez held at the time of the break in. Please let me know if there is anything further you desire in the above connection. W.E. Colby, Director." [To Amb. Helms from George L. Cary CIA FOIA 17262 and 17260] On November 16, 1973, Andrew St. George testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee. The CIA reported: "He made certain allegations against the Agency, the gist being (most of it coming from FRANK STURGIS) that the Agency had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in, accomplishing this through the penetration of the break-in group utilizing Eugenio Rolando Martinez, one of the arrested Watergate burglars. At that time St. George alleged he had other Agency sources who he would not identify." [BROWN MFR 7.25.75]

A CIA Index Card read "HOWARD HUNT, Robert Vesco, May 9, 1974, Memo for OPS/RMO from Robert E. Owen, Chief, OPS/OSG (regarding HUNT'S reported activities in Spain, 1972 and Robert Vesco's reported activities in Spain, 1972)." A CIA memo stated that the files of the Chief, OPS/OSG yielded nothing on HUNT and Vesco:

2. I have attempted to recollect any other details which conceivably could be pertinent and which relate to the period of my assignment to (Deleted) in the period of July 1970 to July 1973. The only points which I recall but on which I have no documentation are these:

a. There were occasional joshing inquiries made of me by American residents of (Deleted) about the reported presence in (Deleted) of E. HOWARD HUNT in 1972. My standard reply was I knew only what I had heard rumored. For the record, at no time did HUNT contact me, and I have never known of his having tried to contact any Station personnel in (Deleted) during the period of 1970 to 1973. I made no effort personally to ascertain whether or not HUNT was in Madrid, and I had no effort made by any Station member.

b. A Station officer, possibly (deleted), now assigned to (deleted), was given some information by an informant in 1972 concerning reported activities in Spain by Robert Vesco. I suggested that the information be given informally to the Economic Section chief of the Embassy, John Oliver. That officer was charged with keeping abreast of Vesco-related developments. The Station did not pursue the subject, as I recall, because it was not a topic or reportable interest, according to the requirements of that time period. Robert E. Owen Chief, OPS/OSG.

The military dictator of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, was an early target of the White House/Special Operations Group. In March 1972 a rift between the two countries arose over the involvement of the brothers of Omar Torrijos in narcotics trafficking. Omar Torrijos maintained ties with Fidel Castro and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. Artime told the Miami States Attorney's Office: "Artime reiterated that he had in fact been approached by HOWARD HUNT to recruit a band of Artime's former associates to, to quote HUNT, 'take care of the situation in Panama.' The undersigned informed Artime that a source had told the State's Attorney's Office that one of the duties or functions of the recruited group was to be the assassination of the Panamanian President. Artime denied that HUNT used the word, or ever made reference to assassination, but again repeated that HUNT had used a 'key phrase,' that he, Artime, had related to the Watergate Grand Jury, and also to the Ervin Committee investigators." [Dardis interview with Artime] Manuel Artime stated that BARKER assembled the usual crew, including STURGIS. John Dean revealed that members of the White House/Special Operations Group traveled to Mexico and arranged the details of the plot. STURGIS had obtained a Mexican Tourist Card valid from January 7, 1972, to April 6, 1972. The plot allegedly entailed shooting Omar Torrijos at a race track that he frequented. BARKER'S associate, Miguel Suarez, had set up a Panamanian company that would serve as a command center. [All State Investment Fund cited by Ewing] When HUNT was paroled from prison in 1977, he confirmed that members of the White House/Special Operations Group planned to assassinate Omar Torrijos: "I did not know any of the people asked to take part other than people in the White House/Special Operations Group. They had that as part of their brief."

A few months later HUNT was questioned about this statement:

Q. Did you ever make a statement to the press in the recent past that the White House plumbers had in fact plotted to assassinate General Omar Torrijos of Panama?

A. No.

Mr. ajweberman (Sighs)

The Deponent: May I request -

Mr. Rubin: Wait a minute. I'll do it. Any more remarks by this man, any more sighs of exasperation, anymore snickering and laughing and I am going to walk out of here with Mr. HUNT and I am going to bring this to the attention of the Court. Now Alan, please behave yourself This is a serious business.

During a deposition one year later, HUNT was asked: "Did you indicate to the press that you had knowledge of a plot to kill Omar Torrijos?" HUNT answered: "Well, I probably did."

In February 1972, HUNT traveled to Nicaragua on an undisclosed mission. In March 1972, he visited International Telephone and Telegraph lobbyist Dita Beard. Before he spoke with her, he disguised himself in a red wig. He also used a voice modulator.

On March 3, 1972, Dorothy Hunt's psychiatrist, Dr. Gary O. Morris, vanished while vacationing on Caribbean island of St. Lucia. The newspaper account of Dr. Morris' death stated:

PSYCHIATRIST,

WIFE MISSING ON

BOAT TRIP

"A psychiatrist and his wife have been reported missing of the island of St. Lucia, in the Caribbean. Dr. and Mrs. Gary O. Morris set out Friday in a 15 foot motorboat from the Halcyon Beach Club hotel for a picnic on Pigeon Island, about three miles away. With them was a local captain Mervin Augustin. When the three failed to return by Friday night, the hotel manager flew out to look for them, according to the Associated Press. U.S Coast Guard, British and private aircraft searched the seas off the British protectorate over the weekend. The group had two quarts of water, a picnic lunch and a box of ice on board. The Halcyon Management said the Morrises had checked in on Wednesday for four days. Morris practices psychiatry at 4501 Connecticut Ave in Washington. He and his wife have three children."

No trace was ever found of the 15-foot motorboat or of its three occupants. Dorothy Hunt had been a patient of Dr. Gary Morris under a pseudonym, and their connection was revealed only after Mrs. HUNT died in the crash of United 533 nine months later, when the name and telephone number of Gary Morris were found on her person. The records of Dr. Gary Morris' patients were not checked to determine if one of them was really Dorothy Hunt. Stuart Knudsen of Ellicott City, Maryland, had the records of Dr. Morris. Stuart Knudsen: "The only records I have left is a book which he kept of his patients of how much he charged them, and how much they owed him. If I don't know the pseudonym I wouldn't know, of course. Maxine Cheshire did a story. Dr. Morris specialized in hypnosis. He may have put her under hypnosis for a back ailment. And while she was under hypnosis she told him about the Ellsberg break-in. That was one scenario, but not what Maxine Cheshire published. Morris only had about 15 patients."

Circa April 1972 HUNT approached Robert Bennett with a proposal to obtain the assistance of the Hughes organization for a burglary in Las Vegas which was to secure information on Senator Edwin Muskie. Frank O'Malley recalled a request "from Mr. HUNT for an individual having skills in the areas of locks and surreptitious entry. A resume of (Deleted) was provided to Mr. HUNT at that time. It is Mr. O'Malley's recollection that Mr. HUNT specifically stated that a person with (Deleted) qualifications was needed in connection with a requirement of the Howard Hughes organization in Las Vegas, Nevada." HUNT sought to recruit a spy to infiltrate the headquarters of Senator Muskie. HUNT may have run covert operations against Senator Edwin Muskie in early 1972.

On Saturday, February 26, 1972, Senator Muskie was giving a speech outside of the offices of the Manchester Union Leader from the top of a flatbed truck. The New York Times reported: "The Senator broke into tears minutes later, his speech halting, as he protested the newspapers republication yesterday of an item from Newsweek magazine. The Newsweek item was itself an abridgement of a report in Woman's Wear Daily, quoting the candidates wife, Jane, as using early language while campaigning in December in New Hampshire." The possibility existed that Senator Edwin Muskie's crying episode in Maine was the result of his having unwittingly ingested a threshold dose of L.S.D. G. Gordon Liddy explained:

"HUNT was under a misapprehension as to the uses of lysergic acid diethylamide-25. He seemed to believe initially that it was a reliable substance for disorienting an individual. And he took considerable dissuasion on the part of one Dr. Gunn, retired or un-retired, I don't know, the CIA physician who was represented to me as being an expert in the unorthodox application of chemical and medical knowledge. And it was he who instructed Mr. HUNT that the effects of L.S.D. 25 are unpredictable from individual to individual. And it was not, in fact, something one ought to entertain using for that purpose. There was a conversation that was had between Mr. HUNT and me in the Summer of 1971, at which time he came to me and said that Mr. Colson had suggested the application of L.S.D. 25 to Dr. Daniel Ellsberg at the prospective dinner function at which he would be a speaker, and the purpose was to disorient and to discredit Dr. Ellsberg at Mr. Colson's suggestion.

"And plans were laid to accomplish that and were then submitted through Mr. HUNT to Mr. Colson. And there was no response forthcoming for a while. When it came, it was in the affirmative: do it.

"But by that time, there was insufficient lead time to follow the plan, which called for the infiltration of our Cuban asset persons as waiters at this function up here in Washington, and to introduce the chemical in the soup course of Dr. Ellsberg. In other words, it was --- there was insufficient time to get the Cubans up and into the place to do that. And so the mission had to be canceled, the idea being that we would do it some later time should the opportunity arise." [HUNT v. ajweberman Liddy Depo. 9.30.80]

In 1985 G. Gordon Liddy stated: "We knew of the weakness of Senator Muskie in that he had difficulty in controlling his emotions, could break down. We believed that it would be a disaster for the United States for Muskie to break down before Brezhnev, better he break down on the snows of New Hampshire, and we conducted our activities to bring something like that about. Eventually we were successful." G. Gordon Liddy claimed he and HUNT planted an anti-Mrs. Muskie article in the press and that was what upset him.

On April 5, 1972, a paper entitled "Activities of HOWARD HUNT and Dr. Manuel Artime in Miami and Nicaragua [English translation of Martinez report] BARKER, Mrs. Hunt, Varona, Tino Fuentes, Prio IG FILE #18 Tab #1 Internal Review]" was generated.

In the Spring of 1972, the Governor of Alabama, George C. Wallace, posed a threat to NIXON'S reelection by having declared himself an independent Presidential candidate. George Wallace could have siphoned away enough NIXON votes to have thrown the election to Senator George McGovern (Dem.- N. DAKOTA). On Monday, May 15, 1972, Arthur Bremer attempted to assassinate George Wallace at a campaign rally in Laurel, Maryland.

Arthur Bremer had no connections to the White House/Special Operations Group, although his brother, William Bremer, was represented by Ellis Rubin in March 1972, when a Federal Grand Jury indicted him for fraud. William Bremer was charged with swindling $36,000 from the public in a bogus "Figure Form Reducing Outlets" operation. William Bremer was convicted. Ellis Rubin said that he took the case of William Bremer for its publicity value. When Ellis Rubin was asked if he had ever been questioned by the authorities about himself or any of his clients, he stated: "Well you would be surprised to know that I have been questioned in all these cases." Ellis Rubin was asked if he was questioned specifically about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: "All of these things that have been mentioned, because I have represented the principals involved..." The link through Ellis Rubin was too thin a thread to associate Arthur Bremer with the White House/Special Operations Group.

Another possible Arthur Bremer - White House/Special Operations Group link involved Donald Segretti. According to The Milwaukee Journal: "The former Wisconsin College Republican State Chairman said Donald Segretti, confessed political spy and Republican saboteur in the 1972 presidential campaign, urged him to recruit persons in Wisconsin to do dirty tricks to embarrass the Democrats." [Milwaukee Journal 10.4.73] Arthur Bremer was from Milwaukee. During Watergate, no evidence surfaced that linked Donald Segretti to Arthur Bremer.

The apparent fact that Arthur Bremer had acted independently did not prevent NIXON from trying to exploit the attempted assassination. Arthur Bremer shot Wallace on Monday, May 15, 1972, at 4:00 p.m. (EDT). On Monday, May 15, 1972, at 4:05 p.m. (EDT), NIXON held an emergency meeting with Charles Colson. The tapes of this meeting were classified, although Seymour Hersh heard them, or spoke with someone who did. Seymour Hersh: "By Monday evening, it is known that Wallace's assailant is a deranged youth named Arthur Bremer. W. Mark Felt, an Assistant Director of the FBI, reports to Charles Colson that Secret Service agents have entered Arthur Bremer's Milwaukee apartment, apparently without a search warrant, and found it littered with political tracts...Felt also reports that the FBI agents on the scene will not enter until they obtain a search warrant...NIXON and Colson agree that HOWARD HUNT is to fly to Milwaukee, secretly enter Arthur Bremer's apartment, and replace the political tracts and other materials with McGovern campaign literature. Colson paves the way by telling Felt that he and the President have heard rumors that Arthur Bremer 'had ties with [Ted] Kennedy or McGovern political operatives, that obviously there could be a conspiracy...' HUNT packs his bags, including special CIA equipment for disguising his facial features, and makes a plane reservation." [The New Yorker 12.14.92]

On Monday, May 15, 1972, between 4:05 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Charles Colson called HUNT and asked him to fly to Milwaukee and enter the apartment of Arthur Bremer. The HUNT/Colson telephone call lasted only about five minutes. Charles Colson and HUNT had greatly differing versions of the time and nature of that conversation, and HUNT'S recollection of the day's events changed several times.

On June 11, 1973, HUNT was assaulted in his jail cell and badly injured. On June 12, 1973, during an Executive Session of the Senate Select Committee on Illegal Campaign Activities, HUNT testified that within one hour of the Wallace assassination attempt on Monday, May 15, 1972, Charles Colson telephoned him and told him to "Go to Bremer's apartment and see if there is Left or radical reading material around." HUNT did not say he was asked to plant McGovern literature, instead he said he was asked to determine if any was present in Arthur Bremer's apartment. HUNT went on to testify that, following Charles Colson's call, he went to his home in Potomac, Maryland, telephoned Charles Colson and told him the plan was ridiculous.

When HUNT testified before the Senate Select Committee on Illegal Campaign Activities in July 1973, he said that Charles Colson called him into his office on the morning of Tuesday, May 16, 1972. HUNT'S version: "In the past, when Mr. Kennedy was assassinated and when Martin Luther King was killed, it was all immediately blazoned as a right-wing plot of some sort. We would like to know what kind of kook this guy is. Is he a neo-Nazi?" HUNT claimed Charles Colson wanted him to find out what brand of political extremism Bremer subscribed to, in order that the media could not erroneously accuse Bremer of having been a right-winger.

HUNT referred to President Kennedy as "Mr. Kennedy." This was because HUNT believed John F. Kennedy was never a legitimately elected President because of massive vote fraud in Chicago.

In early 1974 HUNT wrote about the proposed Arthur Bremer operation in Undercover. He maintained Charles Colson called on the morning of Tuesday, May 16, 1972, and expressed fear that the right was going to be blamed for a left-wing assassination. HUNT wrote that Charles Colson told him: "HOWIE, every time there's an assassination in the country the press blames the political right. Weeks later the truth seeps out, like OSWALD, a lefty. Just once I'd like to see the truth come out, if Arthur Bremer's a Marxist himself."

According to HUNT, OSWALD was portrayed by the liberal media as a rightist, until weeks later, when the truth "seeped out," that he was a leftist. This was untrue.

In an interview by the FBI on September 9, 1974, at the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor, HUNT reverted to his original story, although he was less specific:

"During the late afternoon of May 15, 1972, Mr. HUNT was in his office at 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue when he received a telephone call from Mr. Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President, asking that Mr. HUNT immediately come to his office. Mr. Colson's office was in the Executive Office Building, and Mr. HUNT'S best recollection of the time of this telephone call was approximately 5:00 p.m. There was a television set in Mr. HUNT'S office and he recalls having heard a news report that Governor Wallace had been shot that afternoon in Laurel, Maryland. This was prior to the telephone call from Mr. Colson.

"Upon visiting Mr. Colson he was first asked if he had any friends in Milwaukee, or if he had ever been to Milwaukee. Mr. HUNT replied that he had not been to Milwaukee in over 30 years, but nevertheless he had a few friends there. At this point Mr. Colson mentioned that the individual who had attempted to assassinate Governor Wallace had an apartment in Milwaukee. Mr. Colson remarked further that 'We don't know the motive' of the individual who had shot Governor Wallace and that he wanted to know what was lying around this individuals apartment. Mr. HUNT was not sure the identity of the assassin was given by Mr. Colson during the conversation, and does not recall whether he was aware of the identity of Arthur Bremer at the particular time.

"Mr. HUNT believes Mr. Colson mentioned LEE HARVEY OSWALD, Sirhan Sirhan and the assassinations of former President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. Mr. Colson made some remark indicating that each time there is an assassination some people claim the right-wing is responsible. Mr. HUNT recalls a comment by Mr. Colson that LEE HARVEY OSWALD had married a Russian citizen. It was apparent to Mr. HUNT that Mr. Colson desired to know background information regarding Arthur Bremer.

"Mr. HUNT also recalls a comment by Mr. Colson during this initial conversation as to the availability of Mr. HUNT to travel that evening and was informed that Mr. HUNT was available. Mr. HUNT recalls making airline inquiries and found out there were no flights available to Milwaukee until at least 9:00 p.m. that evening.

"Mr. HUNT believes he was at home during that evening when he received a second telephone call from Mr. Colson. Mr. HUNT does not recall having made airline reservations by the time of this second call and does not believe airline reservations were made by him at any time. He does recall Mr. Colson informing him during the second call that it was terribly important that he go to Milwaukee to find out information regarding Arthur Bremer, specifically what was in his apartment. Mr. HUNT recalls having heard news reports by that time indicating that newspaper reporters had been in the apartment of Arthur Bremer and also received some indication from these reports that the FBI had been to Bremer's apartment. He received the impression that the apartment had been sealed by the FBI. He recalled asking Mr. Colson how he was to get into Bremer's apartment. Mr. Colson replied, 'Bribe the janitor or pick the lock' indicating that he did not care how HUNT got into the apartment, so long as the job was done. Because of the news reports, Mr. HUNT objected to going to Milwaukee, and Mr. Colson insisted that he go.

"Mr. HUNT thereafter discussed this with his wife, who was present at the time he received the second telephone call from Mr. Colson. Mrs. HUNT objected to Mr. HUNT going to Milwaukee, explaining that this was another of Colson's stories or something similar. A brief time later Mr. HUNT received a telephone call from Mr. Colson's secretary, Joan Hall, at his home, advising that Mr. Colson no longer desired that Mr. HUNT go to Milwaukee. Mr. HUNT recalls no other conversation with Mr. Colson regarding Arthur Bremer.

"Arthur Bremer's address was never mentioned during the conversations with Mr. Colson. Mr. HUNT assumes the address was known by Mr. Colson, as he explained he would not have left for Milwaukee not knowing the address, and does not believe Mr. Colson would have asked him to go to Milwaukee without eventually informing him of the address.

"It was mentioned to HUNT that it appeared from what he had said that Mr. Colson had meant for him to go to Milwaukee immediately following the second conversation and the address had not been mentioned. Mr. HUNT replied this was the best of his recollection, and that it was unthinkable that he would have left Washington without Mr. Bremer's address.

"HUNT stated Arthur Bremer has never associated with him; that he does not know Arthur Bremer; does not believe Charles Colson or anyone else he worked with at the White House knew Arthur Bremer. HUNT had no discussion with G. Gordon Liddy regarding Arthur Bremer and had no basis to believe Liddy was involved in the attempted assassination of Governor George C. Wallace." [FBI interview 9.9.74 S.A. Lane Bonner Jr. and Hugh M. Barnhardt]

The FBI investigated the allegation that G. Gordon Liddy had been photographed on the scene of the Wallace assassination. It determined that he was not there. [FBI 139-4089-NR 7.20.73]

Charles Colson told the FBI on September 11, 1974, that he first heard about the attempted assassination of Governor Wallace at 4:00 p.m. while attending a staff meeting in the Roosevelt Room of the White House:

"This room is located across from the President's office, and he believes the meeting was interrupted shortly after 4:00 p.m. by someone informing those present of a wire service story that Governor Wallace had been shot a Laurel, Maryland. Mr. Colson suggested to the other present that the President be notified. He believes this was done by Mr. Butterfield who was present at the staff meeting.

"The staff meeting attended by Mr. Colson continued, and Mr. Colson recalls having received a request from the President to come into the President's office while he (Colson) was still in the Roosevelt Room. He explained this recollection was not consistent with the White House logs, which reflected that he had met with the President from 6:45 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. and again from 7:59 p.m. to 8:10 p.m. Mr. Colson recalls having met with the President in the President's office located in the Executive Office Building. He does not believe the logs are correct because he has some recollection of spending more time with the President, and has no recollection of leaving for a period of two minutes. The log keeping system after hours in the Executive Office was not as accurate at that maintained during the regular hours by these employees working the day shift.

"At the outset, the President expressed grave concern that a national mystery could result if something happened to Arthur Bremer. The President mentioned the Kennedy assassination, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, and JACK RUBY. He wanted everything done to make sure that nothing happened to Arthur Bremer, and that all evidence was secure. Mr. Colson believes he knew the identity of Arthur Bremer when he first met with the President during the early evening of May 15, 1972. The events of May 15, 1972, were researched by him during June 1973, and this included an interview with former FBI official Mark Felt. A memorandum prepared by Mr. Colson at that time reflects he first learned that a man was in custody at approximately 4:35 p.m. May 15, 1972, and received a description, including the identity of the assailant at approximately 5:00 p.m. This was from wire service reports.

"Mr. Colson talked to Mark Felt by telephone on at least six different occasions during the evening of May 15, 1972, and believes the President talked to Mr. Felt on two occasions. He believes that first conversation with Mr. Felt took place between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. He was informed of the identity of the assailant during the first conversation with Mr. Felt. Even so, it is his recollection he heard of Bremer's identity earlier from wire service reports. Mr. Felt also informed Mr. Colson there was some jurisdictional problem, including the fact that Bremer had been arrested by Maryland authorities and was in custody of Maryland authorities. He recalls some conversation with Mr. Felt that a local prosecutor in Maryland was extremely interested in this case, and would not relinquish jurisdiction to Federal authorities or some similar remark. President NIXON was 'frantic,' commenting that it appeared to him that no one in the Federal Government wanted to be taking charge of this matter, including custody of Bremer and making sure all evident was secured. Mr. Colson recalls that Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Grey was not available that evening, as he was driving to Washington for his Connecticut home. The President was furious because of Mr. Grey's unavailability.

"At the President's instruction, Mr. Colson informed Mr. Felt that the President instructed the FBI to take complete charge of the investigation of Bremer. Mr. Colson believes the President was so upset that he asked for the telephone a personally gave these instructions to Mr. Felt. He expressed some concern to Mr. Felt that the FBI was not moving swiftly enough in the custody of Bremer and securing Bremer's apartment. The President informed Mr. Felt that he wanted the FBI's custody of Arthur Bremer to include an Agent to be physically present with Bremer around the clock.

"The White house motor logs reflected that Charles Colson was driven home by a White House car the evening of May 15, 1972, departing the White House at 9:01 p.m. Mr. Colson expressed belief that the evening logs of the White House motor pool were more accurate than those reflecting visitors to the President, and it is his recollection that he left at approximately 9:00 p.m. He believes he was with the President until the time of his departure.

"Mr. Colson arrived at his McLean, Virginia, home prior to 10:00 p.m. May 15, 1972, and recalls thinking a great deal about the motivation of Arthur Bremer in shooting Governor Wallace. This had been discussed at some length with President Nixon earlier that evening, and the President was likewise concerned. It had been discussed that possibly Bremer could be a NIXON fanatic, and some would say that he was involved with the Administration. Mr. Colson expressed positive belief Arthur Bremer was not known by anyone in the White House...

"Mr. Colson was aware that E. HOWARD HUNT'S background included psychological evaluation in some manner. Because of this he thought of talking to Mr. HUNT to gain an evaluation of Arthur Bremer. He recalls having trouble reaching Mr. HUNT as he attempted to do so through the White House switchboard and his present recollection is the problem arose from the fact HOWARD HUNT uses the initial E in place of his first name, and this was not given to the operator. He reached Mr. HUNT after 10:00 p.m. At the time Mr. Colson talked to Mr. HUNT he had certain background information regarding Bremer, including the fact that a wide range of items had been found in Bremer's apartment. Mr. Colson believes this material mostly came from Mr. Felt, although some of it might have been discovered through review of Wire Service reports. He recalls little specifics at the moment, except that he believes there were some Black Panther Party publications found in Bremer's apartment. Mr. Colson recalls having wanted very much at the time to find out if Bremer was associated with the 'left-wing.' He wanted to find out the spectrum of the political picture Bremer came from.

"Mr. Colson was unable to recall HUNT'S specific reply to his inquiry the evening of May 15, 1972. He said he has since read testimony by Mr. HUNT that HUNT was told by him (Colson) to go to Milwaukee in an effort to get background information regarding Bremer. Mr. Colson said this simply never happened, and he never informed Mr. HUNT to visit Milwaukee in regard to Bremer. He believes it is possible that Mr. HUNT might have mentioned after the inquiry by him the evening of May 15, 1972, that he (HUNT) would go to Milwaukee and find out information regarding Bremer. This is the only way Mr. Colson can conceive of at trip to Milwaukee coming up.

"This was the only conversation between Mr. Colson and Mr. HUNT regarding Arthur Bremer. Mr. Colson mentioned something that happened the following morning in an effort to solidify his contention that no other conversation took place. He recalls arriving at work somewhat late the following morning and in a somewhat irritable mood, as a result of having worked the previous night. Upon arriving at the office Colson was informed by his secretary that HOWARD HUNT had called and wondered why he had not heard again from Mr. Colson. This was totally puzzling to Colson, as he had no intention of further contacting HUNT and did not further contact him...

"Mr. Colson received a telephone call at his home after 10:00 p.m. May 15, 1972, from Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Grey, informing him that the entire situation regarding Arthur Bremer was under control by the Bureau. Mr. Grey was informed to immediately call the President and so advise him. Mr. Grey replied this would be done." [NARA FBI 124-10238-10316 9.9.74 Bonner & Barnhardt]

In an interview with Seymour Hersh, Charles Colson stated: "It began with NIXON saying to me, 'Whose side is he on - right - or left-winger?'" Charles Colson then left the Oval Office to track down HUNT, and HUNT volunteered, Colson said, to fly to Milwaukee and try to break into the apartment. Charles Colson: "I went back and told the President that HUNT can find out about Arthur Bremer. NIXON said, 'It'd be great to get him out there and put some things in.' But I don't know which of us actually said, 'Too bad we can't plant McGovern literature.'" After this conversation was overheard on the White House tapes, the FBI interviewed Charles Colson about it.

In his deposition in the course of HUNT v. ajweberman, G. Gordon Liddy supported Seymour Hersh's account:

Q. Do you recall HUNT ever having a discussion with you of burglary of Artie Bremer's apartment?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he suggest that that would be a feasible idea and a good idea, or what was the nature of that?

A. Well, what happened was that HUNT came to me, and actually, I think he was kind of upset. And he said that Mr. Charles Colson wanted him to enter Mr. Bremer's apartment. This is following Mr. Bremer's, by the way, having shot former Governor George Wallace. And it was very, very close after the fact of that shooting, to place this in time. And Mr. Charles Colson wanted him to go in there and to deposit therein and leave to be found by law enforcement authorities spurious literature that connected Mr. Bremer with some other persons. At the moment it escapes me who.

And Mr. HUNT said he didn't think that was a good idea. And he was, in effect, looking for additional argument from me with which to persuade Mr. Charles Colson that this was not a good idea. And I told him, I said, "You know that place is probably under seal right now. And it's impractical because the FBI or the Secret Service or whatever, they know where it is. They have been in there and they know it's there. And you go put something else in there, and they are going to know somebody else put something in there. And it's just not a good idea."

Q. What was it that was being suggested be implanted in there?

A. Literature connecting Mr. Bremer with others whom Mr. Colson wanted Mr. Bremer connected with for reasons of his own. And I don't remember who they were.[HUNT v. ajweberman Liddy Depo. 9.30.80]

Hersh wrote: "Felt reports that the FBI agents on the scene will not enter until they obtain a search warrant." The FBI, like the United States Secret Service, did not wait until they obtained a search warrant before entering Arthur Bremer's apartment. The United States Secret Service arrived at Arthur Bremer's apartment at 5:00 p.m. CDT. The FBI arrived there at 5:10 p.m. CDT. At 6:20 p.m. CDT, the FBI and United States Secret Service were ordered to leave Arthur Bremer's apartment. Without the FBI and United States Secret Service, the press gained entrance to the apartment and virtually ransacked it. At 7:05 p.m. CDT the FBI was back, under Presidential orders: "FBI S.A. (deleted) advised the apartment manager that newsmen in Arthur Bremer's apartment would be asked to leave; and, in view of the Presidential Directive, the FBI would seize pertinent property in Arthur Bremer's apartment. The [apartment manager] advised he was somewhat confused by the whole situation but said, in as much as a United States President wanted Arthur Bremer's personal effects, the FBI could take anything they deemed necessary." [FBI 5.15.72 - Milwaukee]

Why did NIXON order the United States Secret Service and the FBI withdrawn in the midst of the investigation? Was it to give HOWARD HUNT time to go there and plant McGovern literature? Why did NIXON then order the FBI and United States Secret Service back? Was it because the plan had been canceled? Would the plan have failed anyway because the media ransacked Arthur Bremer's apartment during the period HUNT was supposed to have been there?

Governor George Wallace wondered: "How did anyone know where he [Arthur Bremer] lived within an hour after I was shot?" George Wallace believed the White House/Special Operations Group was behind his shooting. He knew that NIXON had funneled about $400,000 to his political rivals, had initiated an Internal Revenue Service investigation of himself and his brother, and had helped the American Nazi Party recruit members of George Wallace's American Independent Party, so that the Nazis could not vote for George Wallace in the primaries. How did Charles Colson get Arthur Bremer's address so quickly? NIXON obtained it from the United States Secret Service and gave it to Charles Colson. The United States Secret Service reported that Arthur Bremer was carrying "the identification of Arthur Bremer, 2443 West Michigan Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin" on his person. The FBI agent in charge of the investigation "indicated presently there was a need to determine if such an individual resided at the above address," but didn't call the Milwaukee FBI until 5:45 EDT (4:45 CDT).

Who was Artie Bremer? Was Arthur Bremer a Nazi willing to spend his life in prison to insure Senator George McGovern did not get elected President? On November 18, 1971, Arthur Bremer was arrested while he sat in his automobile outside a Milwaukee synagogue. He had parked in a no-parking zone, and when an officer approached him about this, he noticed a box of .38 caliber shells on the seat. Concealed on Arthur Bremer's person was a .38 Charter Arms revolver. He refused to say what he was doing there. Found among Arthur Bremer's possessions was a Black Panther Party newspaper and a Confederate flag. The FBI found "close-up snapshots of broken glass." Was Arthur Bremer documenting his anti-Semitic vandalism? When they interviewed Arthur Bremer's landlady, she told them Arthur Bremer had shaved his head approximately four months ago. Was Arthur Bremer an early skinhead?

On "April 5, 1972, (?)" the Office of the Inspector General of the CIA generated an Index Card titled "Internal Review Rolando Martinez, HUNT, BARKER, Mrs. Hunt, Tony Varona, Macco, Manuel Artime, Tino Fuentes, Carlos Prio Paper entitled 'Activities of HUNT and Dr. Manuel Artime in Miami and Nicaragua [English translation of Rolando Martinez' report].'" [CIA IG File #18 Tab #1]

On June 17, 1972, at 2:00 a.m., a White House/Special Operations Group unit was arrested inside the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. A check bearing the name of HOWARD HUNT was discovered in the Watergate rooms used by the people apprehended. A few days after the aborted Watergate Operation, Roy Sheppard - a staff member of NIXON'S 1972 campaign who ran a pickup and delivery service - was directed by Dorothy Hunt to go to the Executive Office Building and remove several cartons of documents. Roy Sheppard used a Department of Transportation pass to enter the White House grounds. The documents he removed concerned HUNT'S White House/Special Operations Group activities and allegedly also contained information on Nelson Rockefeller. The fate of this material was unknown. It was either destroyed, or shipped somewhere by Railway Express. HUNT traveled to Los Angeles where he stayed with his attorney, Morton Jackson. HUNT called Manuel Artime from the home of Morton Jackson. [FBI 139-4089-1129] The CIA released this index card: "HUNT, E. HOWARD OR 72 M34544 /Y M /D MEM JUNE 28, 1972 PHILBY, HAROLD V3 /R PHILBY WAS A KGB AGENT 1930 63 BRITISH /Z 2572667." On June 28, 1972, the CIA generated a highly deleted Official Routing Slip To Director, Ex. Dir. D/Security "I suppose this is deleted at work." [CIA 41736]

The FBI reported: "S.A. Mahan displayed a series of two black and white photographs of unknown white males and series of letters which were signed 'Bob' and Juan Carlos. Mrs. HUNT identified the photographs as photographs of Ernesto Herrera Iena, also known as 'Chango,' a citizen of Argentina who she met in Tokyo, Japan, and the other a photograph of Juan Carlos Quagliotti, a Uruguayan national. (Deleted) S.A. Mahan then displayed to Mrs. HUNT a .25 caliber colt automatic pistol, and asked if she was familiar with the weapon. Mrs. HUNT stated that this is her personal weapon, and stated that she is surprised that it is in the hands of the FBI, as she thought that the weapon was in a closet at her residence. Mrs. HUNT stated that she was given this weapon prior to 1946 when she traveled to China to work on behalf of the U.S. Treasury Department. She stated that she had nearly forgotten about the gun but stated that she does not know how of when this gun was removed from her residence as she observed it during the evening hours of June 24, 1972." Dorothy HUNT was shown photos of STURGIS, BARKER, McCORD. The results of this were deleted. She told the FBI she had no idea of her husband's whereabouts. "Mrs. HUNT stated that the items that were displayed to her earlier in the interview may have been kept by her husband in a safety deposit box they maintained at the Riggs National Bank at Wisconsin and M Street. Mrs. HUNT stated that she would be willing to meet with S.A.'s Mahan and Stukey at that bank to review the contents of that safety deposit box for any further information that might be of value to the investigation being conducted by the FBI.

By November 1972 HUNT was blackmailing the White House for $100,000. White House aide Fred LaRue gave Manuel Artime at least $21,000 to distribute to the families of the Watergate burglars. The CIA informed the FBI it had been reliably informed Manuel Artime had given cash to Miami area individuals, who in turn wrote checks to the Watergate Prisoners Fund. [CIA FOIA #2002 (21) EYES ONLY Memo E.O. 11652 - D/OS Howard J. Osborn] The CIA reported: "Mr. Silbert asked whether HUNT continued his ties with Manuel Artime, referring to the fact that he is mentioned as Manuel Artime's supervisor. Manuel Artime left the Agency in 1966. Were there any contacts between 1961 and the present?" The CIA responded: "Our records fail to reflect any information indicating that HUNT maintained any official ties with Manuel Artime since 1961. It is understood that Manuel Artime acted as godfather to one of HUNT'S children, but we have no data as to any personal association which developed subsequent to 1961." [CIA FOIA #2146-18]

HUNT could have implicated NIXON in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. But did HUNT have any evidence? Had HUNT entrusted it to his wife while he was in prison? NIXON may have believed DOROTHY HUNT possessed evidence that linked him to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

As stated, DOROTHY HUNT was killed in the airplane crash of United Airlines Flight 533 on December 8, 1972, at Chicago's Midway Airport. UAL 533 was on its way from Washington, D.C., to Omaha, Nebraska, with an intermediate stop at Midway Airport. There were 55 people aboard, including five children and two infants. After Charles Colson became a born-again Christian, he stated: "I don't say this to many people because they think I am nuts. I think they killed DOROTHY HUNT. I really do..." HOWARD HUNT: "When I see these repetitive allusions to my wife's death as having somehow been caused by the CIA, I think that is really enough...if my wife had been the only one killed that would have been one thing...but 40 people..."

A detailed analysis of the Aircraft Accident Report prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board on the crash indicated that the Boeing 737 crashed because of instrument sabotage that engendered pilot error. In its report, however, the NTSB attributed the cause of the crash only to pilot error. The report was unofficial. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman John Reed, "was not present and did not participate in the adoption of this report." The report went unsigned.

The National Transportation Safety Board Report blamed "the Captain's failure to exercise positive flight management during the execution of a non-precision approach, which culminated in a critical deterioration of airspeed in the stall regime..."

At 2:26 p.m. the Captain ordered the crew of United Airlines Flight 533 to do a final descent check. At 2:27 p.m., United Air Lines Flight 533 was issued a missed-approach clearance by Midway Airport control tower: "United Flight 533, execute a missed approach..." Just as the sound of word "execute" began, the sound of the stickshaker, which was a device that sent vibrations through the cockpit several seconds before an aircraft was about to go into a stall, was heard on the tapes recovered from the cockpit voice recorder. Captain Whitehouse, the pilot of United Air Lines 533, age 44, had been employed by United Airlines for almost 20 years. He had accumulated a total of 18,000 hours flying time, of which 2,435 were in a Boeing 737.

Every pilot was taught that when a stall occurs, he should point the aircraft's nose slightly downward by extending his flaps, then immediately accelerate the engines to increase thrust. HEMMING told this researcher: "When you get a stall you drop the nose. The last thing you do is add power because that will tend to raise your nose. Put you nose down first then add power, which lessens your rate of descent. Change the angle of attack of your wings which get more airflow going across the wings creating more lift. Then add power to kill the rate of descent. Your rate of descent has slackened off, but your nose is still pointing down." Most survivors reported that, just before the crash, contrary to being nose-down, the aircraft went into a very high angle of attack. HEMMING told this researcher: "Whitehouse realized he was going to crash and tried to drag his tail to cut down his speed." Some survivors believed that there was a rapid application of power before impact. An analysis of the cockpit voice recorder tapes found by the General Electric Research Corporation did not conclusively show this power increase.

The cockpit voice recorder revealed that when the stickshaker went off at what was thought to be 1000 feet because of altimeter readings, Captain Whitehouse ordered the Second Officer to release the flaps to point the airplane's nose downward and get out of the stall. The Second Officer acknowledged the Captain's last command by saying: "Flaps 15." The Second Officer then said "I'm sorry." The National Transportation Safety Board stated that when faced with a stall, the Captain had decided to reconfigure the aircraft by extending the flight flaps because, within two seconds of the onset of the stickshaker, he asked for "more flaps." The National Transportation Safety Board stated that following this order, there was a sound indicative of flap lever movement. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that it was Captain Whitehouse's error - failing to realize the flaps were already extended to 30 degrees and ordering the additional 15-degree extension while making a non-precision landing - that caused the crash. The National Transportation Safety Board: "The 15 degrees was added to the 30 degrees of extension that was accidentally there, so the aircraft continued to stall."

Eight seconds after the Second Officer said: "I'm sorry," United Air Lines Flight 533 crashed into several houses located near Midway Airport. Forty passengers and three crew members were killed. Two persons on the ground received fatal injuries. The aircraft itself was largely destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. Ground damage "precluded any determination of the pre-impact integrity of the control system." If this was so, how did the National Transportation Safety Board arrive at it's figure of the 30 degrees of extension that was "accidentally" there.

HEMMING told this researcher: "For the pilot to say 'flaps' then '15 degrees' - they ain't supposed to be at 15 degrees that quickly. It's deadly for those flaps to come up in a hurry when you are executing a missed approach. You'll sink. You got a stickshaker and ask for more flaps - that's the last thing you do. You're gonna start milking them flaps up. You're at that altitude and you have a stall, you've got to execute a missed approach. Nose down, full power. He's telling you what it says on the instrument. You run that fucker to 15 degrees below 500 feet you're going to die. He said he was sorry."

There was confusion in the cockpit during crash. The cause of this confusion would have become apparent had the flight recorder functioned properly.

Eighty-two minutes after takeoff (approximately 14 minutes before the accident), the Fairchild Flight Data Recorder stopped functioning: "Flight recorder examination showed that a mitre gear (part of the drive gear assembly) had slipped on its shaft, causing the recorder to stop functioning." The cockpit voice recorder, which was recovered from the wreckage, revealed that when the flight recorder went off, a light went on in the cockpit and Captain Whitehouse asked: "Recorder go off?" The second officer: "Yeah." Captain Whitehouse: "See what's wrong, will ya...sounds to me like a circuit breaker...yeah, I just meant, I thought you'd better check everything..." The cockpit voice recorder revealed the Second Officer activated the circuit breaker that fused the power going to the flight recorder and reported: "It tests...I think its okay. I think its working...it says 'Off' but the signal, the encode light comes on and it shows, indicating taping. Christ, I can't even find the circuit breaker for this (deleted) flight recorder...I don't know, I get a reaction when I pull the AC, no reaction when you pull the DC though, you want me to call maintenance?" Captain Whitehead ordered the Second Officer to immediately call it in. Double click here to see a photograph of the flight recorder. [FlightRecorder.JPEG] The recorder was installed on the day of the accident, and had last been overhauled on November 11, 1972, only two months before it malfunctioned. The Flight Recorder Group of the National Transportation Safety Board found: "No evidence of recorder malfunction in any of the parameters as determined by examining previous flights contained on this foil medium."

The mitre gear slipped because a saboteur had loosened its set screw. (The Kollsman Instrument Report asked: "if the questionable calibration arm set screws were loose...") HEMMING told this researcher: "That was very unusual. The thing is wired into the aircraft's electrical system and has its own backup battery. A power failure doesn't shut it down. I doubt if it was coincidental. How many wrecks do you have in the history of the NTSB where you could recover the flight recorder but it didn't work?"

Q. Will you state your full name.

A. James W. Angus.

Q. And what is your address?

A. 57 Westervelt Avenue, Baldwin, New York.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am staff engineer with Kollsman Instruments Company.

Q. Will you tell us how long you have been employed by Kollsman Instruments?

A. I have been employed with Kollsman since 1942 with the exception of a short period of a year and a half.

Q. Would you briefly describe your background and training and experience with Kollsman leading to your current position?

A. I have a bachelor of Mechanical Engineering Degree from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. At Kollsman I have held assorted positions, starting as a tool inspector, becoming an experimental machinist and experimental technician, a designer, and finally an engineer.

Q. Would you describe your duties and responsibilities in your present position?

A. My primary duties are to develop pressure sensitive equipment. I also assist in giving technical assistance in areas where it is requested under special occasion.

SENIOR HEARING OFFICER HENDRICKS

Exhibit 9-G is identified as a report of an examination of altimeters and air data computers recovered from the Boeing 737, United Airlines Flight 553. Exhibit 9-C-1 is photographs altimeters and air data computers recovered from flight 553. Exhibit 9E, excerpts from Boeing 737 instruction manual regarding the pilot static system.

Q. Mr. Angus, I would like for you to start by describing the altimetry system that is install in Boeing 737, and you may use Exhibit 9E for referral. I would like you to point out those components furnished by Kollsman.

A. Our involvement with the 757 air data computer and the servo-automatic computers for this particular aircraft. The central air data computer is a device which accepts inputs of static pressure, total pressure, temperature and electrical power. We sense the pressure functions and by means of servo systems, compute associated outputs that are used in various positions around the airplane. The sensors, sender portion of the air data computer ,consist essentially of mechanisms somewhat similar to what is contained in altimeters and airspeed indicators. That is, capsules which are responsive to the particular air pressures being supplied. And this particular information is converted into angular motion which ultimately becomes part of a synchotel system and combined with a servo, it positions all of the necessary output devices in accordance with program established by the specification for the air data computer, the output devices are in the forms of syncros, potentiometers, decoders, and reliability signals.

Included with the air data computer is a monitor system for each loop. This monitor determines that the servo system is properly following up each of the sensed values. If, as in the case of the altimeter, the servo system were to get out of track by as much as 100 feet, it would automatically disconnect the system. The way it does this, it cuts off the reliability signals that are sent to each of the using devices. So that any device in the airplane receives not only data from the air data computer, but it receives a validity signal which indicates whether or not the information should be used. The functions that are sent out are sent to indicators on the panel, auto-pilot, the flight recorder, the cabin pressurization system, and the transponder for reporting altitude. The altimeters are what are sometimes referred to as servo pneumatic altimeters. These altimeters have two modes of operation which are selectable by the pilot. In the standby mode of operation, the instrument will operate as a normal pressure sensitive device in accordance with the requirements of FAA/T on C10 Beacon. If it is elected, the indicator my also operate as a servo-repeater from the altitude data transmitted by the central air data computer. In order to operate in this mode, the pilot must actuate a switch knob on the face of the altimeter, which puts it in corrected mode of operation. In this mode of operation, the overall accuracy is improved from approximately ˝ a percent system to about 2/10 of a percent accuracy.

Q. The corrected mode would be the normal side of the operation?

A. I believe the way the airline uses the term, the corrected mode is the normal side of operation.

Q. And I am sorry if I missed it, but there are two such systems in the aircraft?

A. Yes, there are two completely different independent systems. There is a central air data computer for the captain's side with his own indicator, and there s a central air data computer for the first officers side that he has his own independent altimeter. As I understand it there are independent static systems supplying each of these units.

Q. Where does Kollsman interface with Boeing in this system?

A. In each case there is a Boeing specification which determines what the inputs are that you receive and what specification level these inputs would be provided to. In the case of pressure, they give us certain -- we have to provide certain cords on the devices that will tie up the lines in the aircraft, electrical connectors -- it is pretty much standardized, what pins are used for each function.

Q. I believed you mentioned the monitor tripout. Can you describe the monitor tripout as it effects the altimeter. Does this go into the standby mode when the CADAC trips out?

A. The air data computer will supply precise altitude information to the altimeter. If, for some reason, the altitude module in the air data computer determines that the information is unreliable, it will automatically cut off the reliability signal going to the altimeter.

Q. Is there any other protection in the event of a legitimate signal which is erroneous coming from the central air data computer?

A. The altimeter also contains its servo-monitor. There are two basic modes of servo detection in the altimeter. First would be if the servo system in the altimeter does not track that output of the air data computer. If there is a 50 foot disagreement between the altimeter and the air data computer, the altimeter will automatically revert to standby operation. That will be operating as a straight TSO altimeter. At the time this occurs, there is a flag on the dial which indicates it goes from the corrected mode to the standby mode.

Q. You said this occurs with a 50 foot --

A. Fifty foot separation, that is correct.

Now, in addition to this, we have what is known as a limiting device. People are always concerned and rightly so, for some reason that the servo might run away. If, for example, servo in the air data computer were to run away, we would provide a limited device in the altimeter and at certain pre-selected levels after the altimeter has responded to the corrected mode. It will then be limited in total correction capabilities at the point the monitor will cut the altimeter off, even though the air data computer might want to drive further.

Q. What kind of error would this generate maximum?

A. The error is a variable error with altitude, so that you can take care of increased tolerances at high altitude. At sea level this error would amount to approximately 350 feet.

Q. At what phase of the investigation into the accident of United 533 did your participation start?

A. We started when the instruments had been recovered and they were returned to United at San Francisco. We joined the committee at the United overhaul base and participated with them.

Q. You participated in the examination of both altimeters and the central air data computer, is that correct?

A. That is right, two data computers and two altimeters.

Q. And you prepared Exhibit 9-C to describe the extent of your participation and findings, is that correct.

A. That is correct.

Q. I would like you to refer to refer to Exhibit 9-C-1, answering the following, if you would please. Could you use the photographs and describe the general condition of the Captain's altimeter when it was first received by you?

A. I might mention before we go ahead that is all of these findings, the committee was present, and in general, I don't know of an area that doesn't exist, the committee in general agreed with the findings. These are not single person findings.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. The altimeter suffered primarily what appeared to be fire damage. There was some small indication of impact damage, but the primary source of the difficulty here was that the exterior of the case of the altimeter, which has an enamel paint which is baked on at the time of manufacture, this paint was actually burned off in many areas. With this burning off of the paint, all of the pressure seals in the instrument were no longer active.

The covered glass was cracked and it appeared to be intact, which gave us the impression that this was a thermostress problem, rather than breakage due to impact shock. The rear connector on the instrument was contaminated with a fire material which more than likely was the mating connector on the electrical harness supplied in the airplane. This material had to actually be dug out. It was quite solid. Then the electrical connector was cleaned off. We observed the instrument. We shook it lightly; it didn't have any particular noisiness inside which might indicate broken parts rolling around. We felt the instrument was capable of further testing.

Q. May I refer you to photograph 1-1 in your exhibit, please.

A. Yes, I am looking at that.

Q. The indicated dial is set 30.035 thereabout. Have you any reason to believe this setting had been changed since impact?

A. Yes. It is my understanding after the instruments had been recovered at the accident site, and as I understand it, notes were taken and photographs were taken of the instrument as mounted on the panel, that subsequently the barrel knob was rotated to see if the pointers were still operable and the particular setting that you see there is the setting that happened to be left on the instrument at the time that it was received in the United Shop.

Q. Could you briefly describe for me the functional test unit was subjected to?

A. This altimeter was placed in a ball jar. The reason for that was that we could not pipe pressure into the altimeter and maintain a reading due to the leakage from the various seals.

Without making any further adjustments to the altimeter, we connected this bell jar, which is a sealed chamber that you can look through and observe the altimeter inside of it, connected this chamber to a barometer and programmed pressure into the chamber, and each specific instance we brought the altimeter to an indicated value in 200 foot stops, going from 0 to 2000 feet.

At each time that we reached stabilization, we measured the pressure within the chamber by means of the barometer that was attached to it. We then computed, based upon the indicated values, pressure values, and the setting, we computed that the indicator had, in its present state, had an average error of approximately 150 feet in the minus direction.

Q. In which?

A. In the minus direction. We then took the same altimeter and just rotated the barrel knob to the 29-92 position, which is the standard position for performing tests on an instrument of this type, and then programmed corrected pressures into the instrument. And putting corrected pressures into the instrument, we then read the instrument error. Now, the instrument error in this case averages out to approximately minus 120 foot value. The reason for the disagreement in this particular case between the first test and the second test -- excuse me. Am I getting ahead? Do you want the reason now?

Q. Yes, go right ahead.

A. The reason we felt the disagreement existed was because due to the high temperature exposure of the unit, the operation of the fundamental mechanism was not as smooth as it would be in normal conditions. And operating somewhat erratically, you would not be perfectly sure exactly where the first level was when we were setting the pointer on the instrument. The second case, you program in a very specific pressure, vibrate the instrument, and then take a reading when it settled out. So using a control standard that is much more precise in the second case, the results tend to be more meaningful.

Q. And the error was still in the same direction?

A. Same direction, but much more repeatable all the way up. Used the same 2000 foot altitude test span and 200 foot increment.

Q. Okay, do you have any explanation as to how the low effect offset may have occurred?

A. Yes. The subsequent examination of the instrument after taking the case off revealed that the instrument internally, where the mechanism is located, had reached temperatures approaching 360 degrees Fahrenheit.

We have since taken an equivalent instrument of the servo pneumatic variety and subject that instrument to a basic calibration. The instrument was seasoned overnight in the normal operation that you season these instruments to, which is to expose it to plus 70 degrees. The next morning it was rechecked again and the instrument was a stable instrument. We had to ascertain this fact first.

Then we placed the instrument in an oven. Now I am saying in an oven because you are essentially placing it in air which is heated to a specific temperature level, but it is no a high circulation factor. It is something -- there is a gentle fan in there that just keeps the air moving at a slow pace. This particular instrument was placed there, kept there for one hour at 360 degrees -- excuse me, let me go back.

In the test condition, we did not expose it to 360 degrees because that happens to be coincident with the melting temperatures of the solders used in the instrument, so for the purpose of the second instrument, to keep the data valid, we operated this at 300 degrees Fahrenheit. No, under these conditions, after aligning the instrument to return to room temperature, we the retested it and we have an average minimum error of 85 to 90 feet. Now that does not appear in the report because we just finished the test Monday. I received the data by phone on Tuesday. We will give you a supplement on that.

Q. Do the results of the pressure testing this particular altimeter in this manner, reflect operation in the servo mode as well as the stand-by?

A. No. When we were finished testing the instrument as noted previously, using control pressure inputs, that was as far as we went on the testing in San Francisco. At that point we concentrated our testing on some of the central air data computer testing. We subsequently resumed testing on this back at Elmhurst in our plant with the team present.

After verifying our initial data, we took the instrument out of the case, we found that all of the electrical components had been exposed to very high temperatures, capacitors had exploded, solder had melted. But the basic pressure mechanism was intact. So we could not operate the instrument in servo mode. We tried in California but we just blew fuses. At that point we just stopped, we didn't want to damage it.

Q. Can you describe the condition of the first officer's altimeter one as described by you?

A. The first officers altimeter was in very poor condition as received. This instrument was subjected to extensive fire and impact damage. The fire damage present was at a level that actually melted the aluminum away, which means it was in the temperature band of 1100 degrees Fahrenheit. The base of the instrument was split open, and a goodly portion of it was missing. The rear mechanism in the instrument, which is the pressure sensing section, was also missing. The front end, the cover glass, and flange assembly, was missing. The display elements were still on the face of the instrument. Essentially all that we could say was present was a mechanism body with associated burned-out electrical components and the display portion of the instrument.

Q. Would you refer, please, to photograph 2-1 in Exhibit 9-C-1. Is this a photograph of the first officers altimeter?

A. Yes, that is a photograph taken at United as it was received.

Q. Can you explain the significance of the dial reading or apparent pointer positions and also the reading on the baro set on the altimeter as found?

A. The pointer positions are what are referred to in the trade as uncoordinated. The relative position of the pointers cannot exist based upon the normal reading that is present in the instrument. The baro set was approximately 30,685.

Q. Was there any indication on the dial of the instrument such as impact markings?

A. No.

Q. Anything to give you a clue as to what the altimeter may have been reading on impact.

A. No. We have very carefully examined the dial components under a binocular type microscope using lights and we could not find any signs that could be attributed to an impact mark.

Q. Would you briefly describe the significance of the photos that you have labeled 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8 in establishing the uncoordinated positions of the pointers?

A. Yes. While we were at United, United made available to the team a recently serviced altimeter in their possession of the same type. We very carefully measured reference points on each pointer of the first officers unit and then positioned the corresponding point on the sample altimeter to that value, and then photographed, the purpose being when you look at the photograph of the good instrument and the photograph of this instrument which had been damaged in the accident, it become readily apparent the pointers are discoordinated.

Q. The primary central air data computer, can you describe the coefficient of that component when you received it?

A. The air data computer received what we would consider a moderate amount of impact damage. By that I mean the cases were dented in several areas on each unit. The front face of the computer was also damaged rather significantly, and there was fire damage around various areas. Let me just check which ones -- the captain's, first the captains computer unit was not severely damaged, but the first officers unit was very badly burned to the point where even the knobs could not be rotated.

Q. Were the units, the internal portions, in operable condition?

A. Yes, they were operable.

Q. Could you describe for us, please, the tests to which these units were subjected?

A. Testing accomplished on the air data computers consisted, first, of isolating all of the output devices to obtain position data at the point of power cutoff to the computer. This was followed by a check of the altitude sensor by disconnecting it electrically from the computer, and running it strictly on a pressure function to determine the operability of the sensor, and again, there are means in there to determine the point at which power was cut off.

At this point we got both computers - we had the sensors and everything reconnected. We programmed standard pressures into the computer and measured the output of the --- find the sink rows. This was to determine if the signals going to the altimeter were within specification requirements.

In the case of the first officer's air data computer, it read approximately 3 ˝ degrees low. This is roughly 45 to 50 feet. The captain's altimeter was well within spec, in general it was within approximately 7 feet. We then checked the correlation of the encoder, which is used by the transponder. This is checked by comparing the point at which you transition from one code value to the next as compared to the altitude data being transmitted to the indicator in the panel. This was in general less than one degree on both units, which is within 14 feet.

And individually we tried --- we worked the servo unit up to air data computer and ran them through the same range, 2,000 feet. The altimeter connected to the captain's air data computer generally responded to less than 10 feet. First officer's was between minus 30 feet and 50 feet. Following this, we ran what we call a coast test of the servo. This test was to determine if the computer was being driven as it would be in the case of a descent and power was cut off, would the computer continue to move, thereby destroying the validity of the original set of data we took off the output devices. This test was run at top rates of descent, 1,000 feet per minute and 2,500 feet per minute. In the case of the captain's altimeter, so-called coast effect was less than 7/10. The first officers altimeter approximately two feet. We considered this gave the original output devices reasonable values that we could accept.

Subsequent to this we performed a monitor check. This took special test equipment and this was done back in New York. What we did in this case was we isolated the modules for the air data computer and used jump cables, so that electrically they were connected even though they were set aside on some special test boxes. This allows us to, with the computer and the particular modules concerned, tied together, we can inactivate the servo, but still have power applied, and determine whether then monitors were still operating. The monitors on the both the first officer's and the captain's operated properly. This and some subsequent testing also verified not only did the monitors operate, but at the time that the monitor operates, the encoder output was cutoff automatically.

At one point in time the subject came up, were the sensors capable of performing when submitted to assorted acceleration factors, as you might have when the aircraft might pull some G's if you made a sharp pull up.

We made some special test pictures and adapted the altitude modules to a centrifuge. Units were tested individually for this. We subjected them from zero to one, back to zero; from zero to four G's, back to zero; then up to ten G's and back to zero. This was done at an altitude level of approximately 500 feet. The first officer's altitude module from the air data computer at 10 G's, the output varied 3 ˝ degrees, which would be equivalent to 100 feet. The captain's module was within two degrees at 10 G's, which would put it at approximately 50 to 60 feet. There is no requirement for the 10 G's. The test was performed in any case. In further testing of the units, we became aware that when the overall air date computers were fired up for a short period of time, the reliability signal coming from the airspeed modules was in the unreliable state and then after approximately 30 seconds to a minute, reliability signal would come back on, indicating a valid state. This was an unusual condition so we decided to pull the airspeed sensor modules off and check them. This was the captain's incidentally, in case I didn't mention that. When we opened the airspeed sensor, we found there was a gear disengagement at the output stage on this particular sensor. The sensor has subsequently --- gear has been reengaged and everything operated normally.

We were concerned because when we looked at his particular sensor, the gearing is protected with stops, what we call stops in terms of functions, high and low; and also side stops so that the gears can't disengage by moving axis. All stops were in place. That particular sensor, we checked all the records, dates back to 1967.

We subsequently, as I mentioned, re-engaged the gears properly and then we took the sensor to our test laboratory and performed a shock test in the direction that was indicated as if this disengagement occurred due to shock. We felt that it would probably come in the fore and aft direction of the airplane so we checked it in that direction and levelwise what we did, we said we were not going to try to break it, the normal shock test for a unit of this type would be to expose it to 15 G's for approximately 11 millisecond pulse. In this case we first tested it at 20 G's, then we tested it at 25 G's. The instrument stayed in the sink and there was no disengagement. We stopped at this point because we felt that there may be further testing required for some other functions and it would not be conducive to break the instrument to prove one point.

The air data computers were made ready again and at the request of United, we ran what we called some computer step function tests. These tests consisted of programming pressure changes into the sensor and measuring the time that it would take the output of the air data computer to become stable at the secondary pressure. This was done for values of a thousand foot step function, 500 foot stop function, 200 feet and 100 feet. In the case of the captain's 1,000 foot function, the response of the overall system, -- this is, the air data computer, it was 5 seconds. When you get down to 100 feet, you are talking 3 or 2 ˝ seconds. Subsequently we took the computers back up and in order to determine the operation of the monitors, we ran the air data computers at high velocity, and velocity chosen was that value at which point the servo would just indicate at the edge of the monitor trip. We're talking roughly 100 feet. The captain's air data computer would run at 21,400 feet per minute and the first officer's approximately 18,000 feet per minute. Now, that essentially completed the testing that was done on the air data computers.

Q. Thank you Mr. Angus. I may have misunderstood something, but I would like to refer you to page 10 in Exhibit 9-C. This test concerns the position evaluation of the sink rows with relation to the output of the central air data computer. I think I heard testimony, but you spoke of figures of 45 to 50 feet for the first officer's and 7 feet for the captain's primary unit. I would like clarification of what the 45 to 50 feet and the 7 feet are in reference to.

A. Those values don't appear on page 18. The values you are referring to come about on page 21, which is the programming correct pressure into the unit and measuring the output finding sink roll. The data on page 18 is the reading in the "as received" stats of each output module.

Q. Could you explain the page 18 figures for me again sir? I am specifically interested in trying to correlate the position of the sink rows in the "as received" condition to the known pressure altitude.

A. The sink rows that is used to drive the altimeter on the flight panel were read out, using an angle position indicator. Captain's read out, converted to feet, read out 652 feet; first officer's read out 558 feet. Now this difference here corresponds to 54 feet, but there would be some small difference depending upon the time sequence of power off, small differences in calibration, things of this nature.

Q. What barometric pressure would these figures refer to, sir?

A. These just refer to the "as received" state. They don't refer to any barometric pressure. They are measured against what we all call standard altitude. Standard altitude sometimes referred to by pilots at times as QNH altitude. This would be in the case of the altimeter, altimeter set for 29.92 power setting. If you wanted to convert these QNH values, it would be necessary to add the appropriate offset that would correspond to the local baro setting.

Q. How does the pilot produce the QNH baro set into the system?

A. He introduces it to the air data computer. He uses this in terms of his altimeter. When he program the baro setting into the altimeter it automatically puts the baro setting in whether he be using it in standby or servo mode of operation. It puts in an additive factor, adds so many feet to the display.

Q. So in order to correlate the "as received" position of the sink rows in the central air data computer to a given elevation on a given day, we would have to apply the QNH correction, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Have you done that for these figures?

A. The difference between the standard altitude and the pressure setting, as we were notified, 30.035 comes out to 120 feet. At 120 feet, each of these values, that would be the indicated value being presented to the crew at the time of power cut off.

Q. And knowing the elevation of the impact site is about 620 feet above mean sea level, that represents an error of about 150 feet, 100 feet. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Thank you. The encoders verified were correlated with the sink positions?

A. That is correct. The photo transmission point is always at the 50 feet point. The captain had a 652 foot value so that was into the next code bit, which was 700 feet.

Q. Now I would like to refer you to page 27 in this. Again it may be misunderstanding on my part, but I thought that I heard you say that the acceleration test showed an error of approximately 100 feet. And on page 27 I see a statement that all three positions maximum deviation of model sensored was one degree or 27 feet, for acceleration from zero to 10 G's.

A. When we do a test that is not a standard test for that particular equipment, we always try, particularly in the case of an accident, equipment, we always try to get an equivalent item. So in this particular case we took a sensor that was in stock and first ran the test through on the sensor. That particular sensor was within one degree on all the tests. The data for the two sensors involved is contained on the next page, and that data contains the difference values that I quoted previously.

Q. Were there any other significant findings in the evaluation of the units other than those already discussed?

A. On point we did, on the air data computers we did check the friction level of this and the friction level was down on the order of 2 feet. I think it was two feet on one and seven feet on the other one. We have checked the captain's altimeter for lead effect on the captain's, and he is coming out very close to what we consider nominal.

Q. And Mr. Angus, I can't find it right now, but in the report there is a reference to white flaking material in the static report of one of the central air data computers. Could you amplify that a little for me?

A. Angus: Yes. After we had resumed testing this equipment in Elmhurst, when we were running the monitor test, as I previously mentioned, we had to remove the altitude modules from the Central Air Data Computer so we could run a jumper cable. So it would be possible to interrupt the servo motor pilot. When we separated the module, I am not sure which one it is, that was the first officers unit. When we took the first officer's altitude module off the computer chassis. There was a white, flaky, material over the connecting port as used to connect the module into the plumbing with the central air data computer that goes to the connection tubes. There was a small deposit, probably two or three cubic millimeters, of very flaky material. We had noted back at United in San Francisco that one of the static lines had some water in it which looked to be like it might be water that had accumulated because of fire. The water wasn't clean.

Q. Was there any analysis of the white, flaky, material?

A. We, that white flaky material was placed in a sealed box and it is available to the Board if they want to spectrograph it. Now the general assumption on the flaky material is this is contained on a stainless steel pressure port which fits into an anodized aluminum. It was just felt his loose -- all the people called in with reasonable chemical background indicated it was more likely an aluminum oxide.

CHAIRMAN BURGESS: What?

THE WITNESS: An aluminum oxide.

MR. STREET: I have no questions.

MR. LAYNOR: I wasn't through.

CHAIRMAN BURGESS: I am sorry, Mr. Laynor is still continuing.

MR. STREET: I am sorry.

(Discussion off the record)

BY MR. LAYNOR

Q. Mr. Angus, I believe in your testimony you commented to the fact that to your knowledge of these systems are connected to two completely independent static systems. It is true then that both static systems will have to be effected in a similar manner to cause essentially the same error in the system?

A. It would appear that way due to the fact they have this more than tolerance difference in the particular outputs of the computers.

Q. Are the static systems, again to your knowledge, you could refer to exhibit 9-E, were the static systems which feed the central air data computer common in any way to the captain to the captain or first officers air speed indicators?

A. First of all, you are talking, "as received" correct?

Q. Yes, sir. First of all, as I understand it, the central air data computer themselves transmit no information to the air speed indicators in the cockpit. It this true?

A. This is correct.

Q. And the airspeed indicators?

A. The pitot input -- the panel requirements for pilot pressure come off separate pitot tubes according to this diagram. In other words, there is a pilot tube that supplies the captain's panel, a pilot supply for the first officer's panel, pilot for each air data computer independently.

Q. How about static systems, sir?

A. It would appear to be the same way for the static except in the case of static there, they cross over -- in other words, there is a right and a left pitot static tube tied together to provide what is called a balanced pitot static. I think in this case there were dual statics for each side, thus providing a line for the indicator separate.

Q. Okay. I realize that the static system installation is not in your area of responsibility, but can you discuss possible reasons why the static system errors -- although of a magnitude reflected in the sink row telepositions in the central or data computers, could have occurred? Can you offer any rational explanation as to why the central air data computers could have been reading in the direction they were?

A. I am afraid I will have to pass that at the moment.

James Angus testified that he found contaminant: "The rear connector on the instrument was contaminated with a fire material which more than likely was the mating connector on the electrical harness supplied in the airplane. This material had to actually be dug out." He found flaky material: "There was a white, flaky, material over the connecting port as used to connect the module into the plumbing with the central air data computer that goes to the connection tubes. There was a small deposit, probably two or three cubic millimeters, of very flaky material." No spectrograph was run on the flaky material and there was no scientific evidence indicating that it was aluminum oxide.

HEMMING told this researcher: "When you land a big bird, you have got to know your precise altitude." At the time of the missed approach, the altitude of United Air Lines Flight 533 was thought by the First Officer to be approximately 1,000 feet above sea level. When the National Transportation Safety Board interviewed witnesses to the crash, however, it discovered that the aircraft descended from the cloud base at an estimated altitude of only 400 feet, heading in a northwesterly direction. Shortly thereafter it veered to the right, as the pilot began to execute the missed approach, and was on a northerly heading when the crash occurred. By this time, more altitude had been lost.

No meaningful altitude indications were obtained from either of the altimeters. Captain Whitehouse's altimeter was virtually intact, but "because of heat damage to the internal components, no assessment could be made of the pre-impact accuracy..." When Captain Whitehouse's altimeter was disassembled at the Kollsman Instrument Corporation, technicians observed and photographed foreign matter in its gears. Double click here to see the photograph, titled "Captain's Altimeter - Gear with contaminant in teeth." [Gear.JPEG] Angus never mentioned this.

The Captain's airspeed indicator had also been tampered with. When it was tested, it remained at the high end of the airspeed system. The technicians from Kollsman Instruments reported: "The condition was isolated to a gear and a sector (non-linear) which had become disengaged. This allowed the output shaft to assume a high airspeed position regardless of the input airspeed value."When the technicians from Kollsman Instruments discovered this problem, they were, according to Angus, "concerned because when we looked at this particular sensor, the gearing is protected with stops, what we call end stops in terms of functions, high and low; and also side stops so the gears can't disengage by moving axle. All stops were in place. That particular sensor, we checked the records back to 1967."

The National Transportation Safety Board also discovered common errors in two independent systems that "could have been transmitted from the Central Air Data Computer units to the altimeter of the First Officer." This static error may have been caused by the contaminant that was found in the altitude modules of the Central Air Data Computer. HEMMING told this researcher: "The Central Air Data Computer tells you if you've sprung a leak somewhere, or if something is contaminating your system etc. A little computer tells you right away, 'turn on your de-icer' various procedures. It's a warning system that tells you not to believe your gauges."

The Central Air Data Computers were recovered and both units were capable of normal operation, but their fine altitude synchros showed an altitude higher than crash site's. Electronic measurement of the #1 fine altitude synchro in Captain's Central Air Data Computer altitude module showed a phase angle that corresponded to 772 feet above sea level. A similar measurement of the First Officer's #1 fine altitude synchro corresponded to 718 feet. The technicians at Kollsman Instruments checked the fine altitude synchro #2, and got similar readings. They checked the Coarse Synchro #2, the Cabin Pressure Potentiometer, and the TAT/EPRIL and obtained identical readings. This was odd, since when electrical power was removed for any reason, the altitude synchros did not move, but remained in their position at the moment of power removal. This indicated that the power going to the Central Air Data Computer was cut off at an altitude higher than that of the crash site, before the plane crashed, instead of on impact with the ground. Nonetheless, the NTSB concluded: "The static system errors reflected in the Central Air Data Computer readings at impact do not have a bearing on the events at Midway."

Even if we accepted the statement of the National Transportation Safety Board that pilot error was responsible for the crash, all the aforementioned malfunctions could have contributed to pilot error. The strongest evidence of sabotage was that the flight recorder had gone off 14 minutes before the accident, so the National Transportation Safety Board claimed it had very little to work with when it conducted its investigation. To compensate for this, it extrapolated flight path data from the traces registered by the flight in the Automated Radar Terminal Service (ART-III) at O'Hare International Airport, which had been tracking Flight 533. The National Transportation Safety Board, however, admitted that data obtained in this manner was far from precise, precluding an accurate determination of the nature and tempo of the events during the 61 seconds before impact.

Researcher Sherman Skolnick was the first to point out that Flight 533 was sabotaged. Skolnick, however, added charges that Captain Whitehouse had been poisoned, and that Midway Control Tower, the Serrelli Mob and El Paso Natural Gas were in some way involved. Skolnick, who is Jewish, is an advisor to the crypto-Nazi organization, Liberty Lobby, which published Spotlight. Andrew St. George and Mark Lane were also connected with Liberty Lobby. HEMMING told this researcher: "A.J. just because they don't like Jews you're prejudiced against them. Just because they gassed a few million, you're getting all upset."

The technology involved in loosening the set screw on the flight recorder, just enough so that the instrument would stop functioning 15 minutes or so before landing, indicated that this was a professional job. Someone had also manually disengaged the gears on Captain Whitehouse's airspeed indicator, and had rewired the plane's electrical system so that it would stop functioning prior to landing. In 1993 the final report of the National Transportation Safety Board on United Air Lines Flight 533's crash was still available to researchers, but the National Transportation Safety Board had routinely destroyed documents it was based on, since they were over 15 years old. The report mentioned the Central Air Data Computer readings, and the disabled flight recorder was noted in the cockpit voice recordings transcription; no mention, however, was made of the contaminant or the premature power cutoff.

Minutes after the crash, 50 FBI agents rushed to the scene, conducting interviews and seizing evidence. John Reed, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, protested the actions of the FBI after the House Government Activities Subcommittee had pressured him to do so. In a letter to Acting FBI Director William D. Ruckelshaus, John Reed wrote that "for the first time in the memory of our staff" the FBI had interviewed witnesses and listened to control tower tapes before investigators for the National Transportation Safety Board did. William Ruckelshaus responded that the agents were investigating a Crime Aboard Aircraft, and were within the law, although he did admit that more than 50 agents were on the scene. [FBI 149-10024-12]

NIXON contemplated using the FBI to obtain documents he desired. White House/Special Operations Group member Jack Caufield said Charles Colson told him the Brookings Institution possessed papers needed by the Administration, and that the FBI had adopted a policy of coming to the scene of any suspicious fires in Washington, D.C. Jack Caufield believed Charles Colson had hinted that he should start a fire at the Brookings Institute enabling the FBI to make its appearance and steal the desired documents. [Wash. Post 11.22.74; Jack Anderson 8.9.74] G. Gordon Liddy reported: "The operation that we planned was to purchase several used fire engines from the market where they are available, have them painted and declared in the colors of the Washington, D.C., Fire Department, to have our Cuban assets dressed in the fireman's uniforms and attending the engines, to have a penetration which would then, during the period of time there would be no one there - so no one would be hurt - start a fire in the Brookings Institution. The first engines to respond would be ours. It would be our people who would enter, and in the guise of putting out the fire, they would take whatever it was that Mr. Colson wanted out of the Brookings Institution. [HUNT] came to me with this task from his principal, who was Mr. Colson."

One day after the crash of United Air Lines Flight 533, NIXON appointed Egil Krogh Under Secretary of Transportation. Egil Krogh controlled the parent agency of the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aeronautics Administration. Ten days later, NIXON appointed Alexander P. Butterfield as the head of the Federal Aeronautics Administration.

BARKER stated that the death of Dorothy Hunt caused HUNT to give up blackmailing the White House and plead guilty. This benefited NIXON. John Dean discussed Mrs. HUNT'S death with NIXON:

Dean: Mrs. HUNT was the savviest woman in the world. She had the whole picture together before her death.

NIXON: Great sadness.

NIXON considered granting HUNT clemency if he were convicted in the Watergate affair: "I, uh, question of clemency...HUNT is a simple case. I mean, uh, after all, the man's wife is dead, was killed." When the FBI examined Dorothy Hunt's remains, it found $10,000. HUNT denied this was hush money, and he claimed it was going to be used to purchase a franchise for a Holiday Inn. The FBI investigated HUNT'S claim, and discovered that it was not normal for such a fee to be paid in cash and that such a fee would have had to be paid at the main office in Memphis, Tennessee.

HUNT'S Watergate break-in trial began on January 10, 1973. He was charged with Burglary and Eavesdropping. On January 14, 1973, HUNT offered to plead guilty to three of the six charges of an indictment handed down by a Federal grand-jury. This offer was made one month after the United 533 crash. The New York Times reported: "HUNT, a CIA agent for 20 years, had found the public interest in him to be extremely disagreeable...He wore dark glasses and a hat low on his forehead..." [NYT 1.14.73] HUNT pleaded guilty to Wiretapping, Burglary and Conspiracy. HUNT was given a long prison sentence by Federal Judge John J. Sirica, who wanted to pressure him into incriminating his superiors in the NIXON White House. On January 18, 1973, BARKER and STURGIS entered guilty pleas. They were both released on bail pending sentencing.

NIXON continued to distribute hush money to the Watergate burglars. In late January 1973 Manuel Artime gave $45,000 to STURGIS. On February 2, 1973, Judge John J. Sirica said he doubted if the Watergate trial got to the bottom of the case. On March 29, 1973, HUNT was granted immunity.

The CIA's Office of the Inspector General generated this index card on September 21, 1973:

M/R by Fredrick N. Evans with routing sheet and attachment. Subject: Watergate - William F. Buckley. Jack Anderson, FRANK STURGIS, William F. Buckley, HOWARD HUNT, Fred Evans, Fred Silva, Thomas Garrity, Curtis McSherry, DAVID PHILLIPS.

Frederick K. Silva was in Guatemala from 1969 to 1971, in Ecuador 1971 to 1973, Colombia 1975 to 1978 and Chile 1978 to 1980.

William Buckley maintained a close friendship with HUNT. By 1964 William Buckley was a syndicated columnist. William Buckley suggested OSWALD was a KGB agent, and in an article written in 1975 entitled: "Who Killed Everybody?" he ridiculed assassination research. On December 28, 1973, the U.S. Appeals Court released HUNT, pending his appeal. A week after his conviction, HUNT and Mario Lazo appeared on William Buckley's television program, Firing Line. Mario Lazo stated: "You know when we left Cuba, my wife and I, we left with $2. To lose everything that you've made your entire life at the end of a long life is very bad. To lose a friend the way BARKER lost his friend [to Castro's firing squad], the way this gentleman recently lost his wife [DOROTHY HUNT] is much worse...politics is a very dirty business, you know that. The Americans all know that. McGovern and his campaign compared NIXON to Hitler on three occasions publicly, and the NIXON Government to the Hitler henchman. This is the Communist line."

In 1965 PHILLIPS was promoted by the CIA from agent to officer, and sent to the Dominican Republic after the April 1965 invasion of that country by the U.S. military. Clark Anderson became the FBI Legal Attache in the American Embassy, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, a few weeks later. PHILLIPS explained on September 30, 1980:

A. I happened to be in Washington, D.C., when he and a large number of other FBI agents who spoke Spanish were told to get on the next plane and report to the Dominican Republic. And when I arrived there to take over that station, Clark Anderson was in charge of the FBI contingent.

Q. You got a promotion around that time, made head of station around that time, somewhere around this time.

A. Shortly before all of this happened in the Dominican Republic.

Q. After the assassination and before the Dominican Republic situation.

A. Um-hum.

Q. You were head of the Cuban operations group of the Western Hemisphere Division somewhere around that period of time?

A. 1968, 1969.

Q. Did you ever have occasion of meeting FBI S.A. WARREN DeBRUEYS?

A. Yes. I remember having been in touch with him either...that name is very familiar. I knew a lot of FBI people. [PHILLIPS Depo. HUNT v. ajweberman]

DeBRUEYS told this reseacher: "I knew DAVID PHILLIPS when I was undercover, and assigned to the Dominican Republic revolution for about six months in Santo Domingo and DAVE was the CIA Station Chief. I don't recall that I contacted him subsequent to that time. I think, maybe when I was in Brazil, he may have been there a short period of time. I never thought of this before."

In Santo Domingo in 1965 PHILLIPS called the Dominican strongman General Elias Wessin y Wessin - "a completely patriotic, anti-communist, atrocious man" - and told him to get out of his own country. [Washington Times 3.30.88]

HEMMING told this researcher: "We had a new Cuba being born in the Dominican Republic. Everybody went there. MARCELLO went there. They were there to clean them people out - and they did. That was Murder Incorporated. They went down there, and they took out everybody." When STURGIS was asked if he knew DeBRUEYS he responded: "Possibly, you know we're going over years." [Depo. HUNT V. ajweberman p99]

Q. I am sure you have heard of Mitch Werbell. He is a rather notorious character in the news from time to time. Did you ever actually know him during this period of time in the 1950's when you were in the Agency.

A. In the 1950's?

Q. 1954?

A. Not in the 1950's. I certainly have seen him since and heard a great deal about him.

Q. All right. Did you have any occasion to meet him prior to 1968.

A. I don't think I ever met Mitch Werbell, III, in the sense of shaking hands and being introduced. I was Chief of Station in the Dominican Republic in 1965, during the crisis. Werbell was presently living at the Hotel Embajador along with all the newspapermen. And he was around Santo Domingo with all sorts of contraptions strapped to his body, large cases, cameras, tape recorders and so forth, wearing a pith helmet and looking just like the character of a CIA agent, which he was not.

Q. During the Cuban activities with the Agency, did you ever know a public relations firm run by Werbell in Cuba prior to Castro?

A. A public relations firm? I don't recall...I had a Public Relations firm in Cuba...My responsibility laid with my Chief of Station in the U.S. Embassy. I was what was known as a deep cover. I did not have an office at the Embassy. Paul Bethel was the Press Attache or Assistant Press Attache in Havana when I was there. I knew him.

Q. Jay Mallin?

A. Newspaperman? Yes, I knew Jay Mallin. [Phillips Depo. HUNT v. ajweberman]

Circa 1968, PHILLIPS became Chief of the Cuban Operations Group of the Western Hemisphere Division, a job that involved "keeping tabs on Cuban preoccupations in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean." He later became Second Consul (CIA Chief of Station) in Brazil and Venezuela.

In September 1970 PHILLIPS became the Deputy Chief of the Task Force on Chile of the Directorate for Plans. At this time he was assigned to the Foreign Service as First Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. PHILLIPS told F.A.O. Schwarz Jr. of the SSCIA that he plotted to destablize the Chilean military by kidnapping General Schneider, the leading constitutionalist in the Chilean Army.

Schwarz: What did you actually do in order to insure, if I may use your words correctly, that General Schneider would not remain in office, what were the things besides contacting people that the Agency did?

PHILLIPS: Well, to make it an absolutely accurate description, certainly we are not at any one time zeroing in on General Schneider as the only thing.

Schwarz: But that was not the problem, was it?

PHILLIPS: It was a problem.

Schwarz: It was the main problem, wasn't it? You needed a coup, and you knew the political solution wouldn't work. You knew the greatest problem. You needed the Army. You knew the problem in having the coup was that there was a constitutional mentality, crazy constitutional mentality in the Chilean military, right?

PHILLIPS: I didn't say that sir.

Schwartz: Okay. I am sorry. You knew there was a constitutional mentality, and that that was the problem?

PHILLIPS: That is true. And consequently, I suppose, was probably the number one problem.

Schwarz: He was the number one problem?

The Chairman: And he was the commander in chief of the army.

PHILLIPS: That is true.

Schwarz: And the leading constitutionalist?

PHILLIPS: That is true.

Schwarz: What did you do?

PHILLIPS: Entertained all possibilities, talked to people, and said what can you do, and looked to people to support, and looked for General Viaux with his ideas, and turned those off. And looked toward the Valenzuela group, I think it was. And they seemed to have much more capability and to be much more serious and so forth. I suppose if someone said, try to bribe General Schneider, and someone said, alright, let's do it, then someone else said General Schneider can't be bribed. And those men went so far as the kidnapping of General Schneider. And we were aware of that.

Schwarz: You were aware of and approved, didn't you, the kidnapping of General Schneider?

PHILLIPS: Not in the case of General Viaux, because we turned him off. But in the other case we were aware that part of their plan was the possibility of a kidnapping, yes.

Schwarz: And you offered through (Deleted) whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could accomplish it, didn't you?

PHILLIPS: I think that was the correct sum, yes.

Schwarz: And you gave them prior to their attempt on October 19 some tear gas masks to help accomplish the kidnapping.

PHILLIPS: That is true.

Schwarz: And subsequently you provided to the Valenzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?

And those were going to be used in a kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that, didn't you?

PHILLIPS: I recall that they were going to be used by the group, and that kidnapping was part of their plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them specifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was -- the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin America.

And they said something about, their own arms could be identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified. I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was just for that. It was certainly understood that they might very well be used.

Schwarz: But draw the line again. You thought assassination was a bad thing?

PHILLIPS: I did.

Schwarz: On the other hand, you believed, at least in your capacity in performing your duties, whether you personally believed it, you believed that kidnapping of General Schneider was a good thing?

PHILLIPS: Absolutely not, since I said in my personal capacity I thought the whole idea was a bum idea.

Schwarz: I tried to put you in your official capacity.

PHILLIPS: In my official capacity I realized that the removal from office of General Schneider was an important element of any successful military coup. I make that statement in the context of what I have said previously that I didn't really think it was going to work all along.

Schwarz: In your official capacity you thought the kidnapping was a good thing?

PHILLIPS: I thought it was a necessary thing if there was going to be a coup.

Schwarz: And the submachine guns were made by the Agency with the knowledge that they might be used in the in the kidnapping.

PHILLIPS: Yes.

Schwarz: Now put together, if you can, and explain how you fit, how you make them consistent, the attitude against assassination and the supply of very deadly weapons. You will agree that machine guns are very deadly weapons?

PHILLIPS: I do sir.

Schwarz: Put together the attitude against assassinations and the supply of very deadly weapons to be used in a very dangerous activity, which is kidnapping -- and remember, of course, that the man did die. Although not through those submachine guns.

PHILLIPS: Yes, I do. May I ask you to rephrase that question. I am not quite sure of it.

Schwarz: It is not seeking a fact, Mr. PHILLIPS, it is seeking an explanation of how you can make consistent on the one hand your testimony of opposition to assassinations, which is given with great credibility from its appearance, how can you put that together on the one hand with your testimony as to what was actually done as far as supplying deadly weapons for a purpose which was highly dangerous, in a context when in fact the man died when he was kidnapped.

PHILLIPS: Well, of course, this is a very complex, and complicated, question you are asking. I think that the answer is that if you are going to involve yourself in foreign endeavors, that you very seldom find a situation in which you are capable of placing stop and go buttons on the machinery that you have set in motion.

In the Dominican Republic the involvement of the Agency of the U.S. Government in the death of -- I like to think of that not as an assassination, but tyrannicide -- I just don't see how in the world anyone could have pushed a stop button for the General Tony Imbert type of thing. [Church Comm. Test. 7.31.75 pgs. 28-33 NARA SSCIA 157-10002-10165]

PHILLIPS admitted that he ran an operation in 1970 to prevent Salvador Allende from taking office.

On October 15, 1970, Thomas Karamesssines met with General Alexander Haig and Henry Kissinger to formulate a plan to stop socialist Salvador Allende Gossens from assuming power.

The CIA:

SECRET 181408Z OCT 1970 CITE SANTIAGO 562

IMMEDIATE (Deleted)

REFS: Santiago 551, Santiago 558

1. Station co-optee met clandestinely evening October 17, 1970, with two Chilean Armed Forces Officers who told him their plans were moving along better than thought possible. They asked that by evening October 10, co-optee arrange furnish them with eight to ten tear gas grenades. Within 48 hours they need three 45 caliber machine with 500 rounds ammo each. One officer commented he has three machine guns himself, but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him, therefore unable to use them.

2. Officers said they have to move because they believe they are now under suspicion and are being watched by Allende supporters. One officer was late to meeting having taken evasive action to shake possible surveillance by one or two taxi cabs with dual antennas which he believed being used by opposition against him.

3. Co-optee asked if officer had Air Force contacts. They answered they did not, but would welcome one. Co-optee separately has since been trying to contact a (Deleted) a Chilean Air Force General and will keep trying until established. Will urge Air Force General to meet with Officers ASAP. Co-optee commented to Station that Air Force General has not tried to contact him since referenced talk.

4. Co-optee comment: Cannot tell who leader of this movement is, but strongly suspects it is Admiral Roberto Viaux. It would appear from his contacts, actions and alleged Allende suspicions about them that unless they act now they are lost. Trying to get more information from them on the evening of October 18, 1970, about support they believe they have.

5. Station plans give six tear gas grenades (Arriving on October 8, 1970, by special courier) to co-optee for delivery to Armed Forces Officers instead of having false flag officer [Henry J. Sloman - an American who carried a false passport who could pass for a Latino] deliver them to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that co-optee dealing with active duty officers. Also false flag officer leaving on evening of October 18, 1970, and will not be replaced. Hence, important that co-optee with Armed Forces Officers be strengthened by prompt delivery what they requesting. Request Headquarters agreement by 1500 hours local time October 18, 1970, on decision delivery of tear gas to co-optee Vice False Flag Officer.

6. Request prompt shipment three sterile 45 caliber machine guns and ammo per para 1 above by Special Courier if necessary. Please confirm by 2000 hours local time October 18, 1970, that this can be done so co-optee may inform his contacts accordingly.

The CIA was puzzled about the request for sterile weapons because the co-optee planned to lead the coup: "Why should it bother him if the machine guns are sent to him? What is special purpose of these guns." A CIA cable stated:

RESTRICTED HANDLING

OCTOBER 18, 1970.

IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, EYES ONLY (Deleted).

REF: SANTIAGO 562

Submachine guns and ammo being sent by regular (deleted)[diplomatic] courier leaving Washington 0700 hours October 19, 1970, due to arrive Santiago late evening October, 20, 1970. Preferred use regular (deleted) courier to avoid bring undue attention to OP. C/WHD (Deleted) Authenticating Officer (Deleted). [CIA FOIA 5851 Att to Doc 4048]

Roberto Viaux had left the Chilean Army in 1969. Viaux's plan was to kidnap the head of the Chilean armed forces, General Rene Schneider, and blame his abduction on the left. His attempted kidnapping culminated in the murder of General Schneider, who was a strict constitutionalist. General Schneider was succeeded by General Rene Prats, who also upheld Allende's right to assume power. After Allende was overthrown, General Viaux's prison sentence for the murder of General Schneider was reduced to lesser charges and he was freed from prison.

PHILLIPS worked closely with Thomas Karamessines and Richard Helms in the overthrow of the Allende Government of Chile. In 1972 PHILLIPS was under Foreign Service cover as First Secretary, U.S. Embassy, in Caracas, Venezuela. In 1973 PHILLIPS rose to Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, a position second only to Deputy Director. PHILLIPS claimed that in 1973 he sent a cable to the Santiago CIA Station instructing it not to work with the military men who were plotting the demise of the Allende regime. Salvador Allende was finally overthrown on September 11, 1973. Antonio Veciana told Gaeton Fonzi: "Bishop was involved with the plan to dispose of Allende in Chile. That was one of his jobs." Allegations were made concerning the involvement of PHILLIPS in the car bombing of former Allende Cabinet Minister Orlando Letelier.

On March 16, 1976, Veciana told Gaeton Fonzi: "Although all of BISHOPS plans against Castro failed, there were other plans against other people that did not fail. He knows - he says there is no doubt - that BISHOP was involved in the plan to dispose of Allende in Chile. He knows that by the contacts in Chile BISHOP had. All the connections I had in Chile were given to me by BISHOP."

PHILLIPS denied these allegations, and claimed he was a McGovern-type liberal Democrat who would not have engaged in any anti-democratic operations. [NYT 9.3.75] The Washington Times commented on PHILLIPS book, Nightwatch: "He made it a tale of moral conflict, emphasizing his inner turmoil over some of what he was told to, and did, in Guatemala, in Chile. He played up his politics: his 'dismay' at the election of RICHARD NIXON, whom he paints as a man of shadow; his disdain for E. HOWARD HUNT." PHILLIPS stated: "I wouldn't have treated HOWARD HUNT as roughly as I did if I didn't know I was going out on a college tour" he says. "I didn't have to say 'Gina [PHILLIP'S second wife] and I cast our vote for George McGovern.'" PHILLIPS told the United Press that Castro had nothing to do with the Kennedy assassination: "For the first time I agree with Castro. OSWALD was undoubtedly the sole killer." [UPI Dispatch 05-12 09:58 AED]

On March 21, 1975, PHILLIPS resigned from the CIA. He had been Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division for two years. PHILLIPS formed "The Association of Retired Intelligence Officers," whose goal was to defend ex-CIA men like HUNT against charges stemming from the Watergate break-in, as well as to counter the efforts of CIA defectors like Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee. A legal fund was established to sue authors who accused CIA agents of committing crimes. First to be sued was Gaeton Fonzi. [Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, PHILLIPS vs. Washington Magazine et. al. Law No. 57691] Eventually all of PHILLIPS' charges against Gaeton Fonzi were dismissed, but Fonzi incurred high legal bills. Member of this organization included Sam Halpern.

On May 2, 1973, the FBI contacted DAVID PHILLIPS and asked him about the source of the information contained in a CIA memorandum dated April 13, 1973, to the FBI regarding payments made by Manuel Artime. PHILLIPS refused to divulge his source. When the FBI met with the CIA/OS Director, the agents were told that PHILLIPS' information came from the Chief of Station, Miami. [FBI WFO 139-166 4.24.73 McLean Virginia MJK:pag p208, 4.24.73 MJK:mml 207 poss. serial 2393] On July 26, 1973, Manuel Artime was the Subject of an FBI investigation. Character: Interception of Communications. Most of this document was deleted. [Miami Field Office File 139-328]

In December 1976 PHILLIPS was called to testify before a Federal Grand Jury investigating possible perjury in Congressional testimony about American efforts to oust Salvadore Allende. Other called before that same Grand Jury included John A. McCone and Hal V. Hendrix, former director of public relations of ITT in Latin America. By 1988 PHILLIPS was suffering from cancer. [Who's Who 1972; Wash. Times 3.30.88; NYT 5.10.75, 12.21.76] He died of cancer on July 10, 1988. A document transfer and cross reference sheet indicated "There is a restricted (deleted) folder on the Subject of his 201 held under (deleted)." [CIA 201-88764]

The CIA described BARKER'S post coup activities:

"BARKER frequently conducted investigations which resulted in valuable operational information for the CIA. To assist BARKER in his activities, he was given a five week full-time trade craft training course in 1964. [BARKER'S citizenship was restored in 1964.]" On January 21, 1964, the Chief of the Special Affairs Section, Desmond FitzGerald asked JMWAVE if it had any interest in BARKER. On March 4, 1965, the Chief of Station JM WAVE reported on BARKER'S Operational Progress for February 1965: "During the period under review BARKER was transferred from the PW Branch to the CI Branch for future handling. Subject's files were turned over to CI on January 27, 1965, and he was informed by his PW case officer of his proposed transfer at a meeting on February 2, 1965. A subsequent meeting was scheduled for February 8, 1965, with BARKER and the PW case officer at which time the latter introduced him to the CI Case Officer. Subject appeared to be pleased with this turn of events expressing the wish that he could be put to more frequent use and be given a heavier work load. He said that he had enjoyed his 2 ˝ year association with his previous case officer but looked forward into getting into a new line of activity, preferably some type of PM activity or investigative work, which he claims to enjoy as a result of his previous police experience in Cuba. Subject was told by CI case officer that his duties would remain essentially the same as they had been and that he should continue his coverage of exile activities with emphasis on any rumors of impending raids on Cuba.

"On February 18, 1965, Subject was introduced to (Deleted) and was told that (Deleted) would keep in daily touch with him either by telephone or by personal meeting. Subject and (Deleted) know one another from the time when they were working in Cuba and both seem pleased with the current arrangement whereby they will be in contact with one another. In addition to this daily contact meetings are held with Subject and (Deleted) about once a week by the CI case officer to discuss Subject's reporting as well as any difficulties he may have encountered, or any guidance he may need. For all practical purposes, however, (Deleted) is being handled by (Deleted). Subject knows nothing of about (Deleted's) other operational duties and contacts, and the latter has been instructed to limit his discussions with (Deleted) to any mutual business at hand. (Deleted) knows (Deleted) by true name (which he knew in Cuba) and his home telephone number. During the absence of (Deleted) from the area the CI case officer will meet directly with Subject.

PRODUCTION:

Subject provided a number of useful reports during the period under review mainly concerned with MIRR bombing missions over Cuba and details concerning the ransacking of Artime's house. The following disseminations were made as a result of the Subject production:

A. (Deleted) (WAVE 7900; February 3, 1965) from FRANK FIORINI: Alleged Abortive Air Raid over Cuba by the MIRR.

B. WAVE 8261 (Rybat February 13, 1965): Ransacking of Artime's house.

C. (Deleted)6710 (WAVE 8326; February 16, 1965) from FRANK FIORINI: Planned Air Strike Against Havana by the MIRR.

D. WAVE 8419 (Rybatt February 17, 1965): Additional information on the ransacking of Artime's house.

E. (Deleted)6727 (WAVE 8394; February 17, 1965) from FRANK FIORINI: Decision of Orlando Bosch Avilla to Use Cuban Pilot on MIRR's Air Strike of Havana.

F. WAVE 8521 (Rybat February 20, 1965). Additional information on the ransacking of Artime's house.

G. (Deleted)6747 (WAVE 8618 February 23, 1965) from FRANK FIORINI and Bill Johnson: Insistence of Orlando Bosch Avila that the MIRR Bomb Havana.

FINANCES

"Subject was paid his February salary in the amount of $433.77 (This amount is arrived at after withholding his income tax from $500.)

FUTURE PLANS

"(Deleted) will continue to contact Subject on a daily basis either by telephone or by personal meetings and will see that Subject's reports are promptly relayed to the CI case officer. Subject has been instructed to continue his coverage of exile activities with emphasis on prompt reporting of any impending exile raid on Cuba. Subject will also continue to report in writing any conversations that he has had with Cuban exiles who appear of operational interest and will explore his wide array of contacts for any information that may lead to the identification of Cuban intelligence assets operating in the area. In this connection Subject is currently exploring a lead involving two Cuban mulatto women who allegedly have hit the bolita numbers frequently (six or seven times) and for large sums of money. Subject, who has a theory that Fidel Castro may be using the bolita racket to fund agents in the U.S. is trying to learn the identities of the two mulattos. He has been cautioned not to delve too deeply in this matter however, since he may become involved with local underworld elements who may take drastic action against him in the belief that he is working for the local FBI or the police. Subject said that he is well aware of this possibility and is making very discreet inquiries with the assistance of certain friends (Cuban ex-policemen) who are bolita runners and who know that he has no interest in their bolita activities per se except to learn the identities of the two Cuban mullato women. Subject said that his friends, in addition to possibly helping him, would like to know the identities of the two women since they would then play the same number as the two women and make some money on their own. (Deleted). Ted Shackley." [CIA FOIA D002232]

Handwritten notes indicated: "WAVE 8521 dated February 20, 1965. Mentions BARKER reporting on FIORINI re a robbery of Artime's house and FIORINI'S meetings with Miami Police concerning the robbery. File (Deleted) WAVE 8419 February 18, 1965. More information on robbery of Artime's residence. (Deleted) and FIORINI (File (Deleted) Also mentions Frank Campbell or Kappel. WAVE 8261 February 13, 1965. More of same."

In 1966, when BARKER was monitoring the Bay of Pigs Brigade elections for the CIA, he attempted to influence its outcome: "Instead of monitoring the activities of his contacts, however, he began hammering away at them, instructing them to work against certain candidates. This gave the impression that BARKER was attempting to rig the elections through (deleted)...BARKER'S strong points have been his dedication and enthusiasm for his work. He has, however, been somewhat of a problem in that he is a 'heavy-handed' operator who tries to impress his contacts with his importance, thereby committing a number of indiscretions...His home address did appear on a Cuban intelligence service censorship list which possibly contained the names and addresses of alleged Cuban intelligence agents in the U.S., but the validity of the list was never confirmed and he was SRWIRLED on this matter in April 1964 with overall favorable results." [CIA 201-251689 8.26.66] The CIA: "BARKER'S contract at $500 a month was renewed yearly until his termination July 31, 1966, which was amicable and resulted from the change in times and the resulting change in CIA activities in which BARKER did not fit because of his previously widely-known association with the Agency. [No Agency contact has been maintained with him since that date.]" BARKER was given a job in Chicago. Richard Helms told the Ervin Committee: "We found out he was involved with certain gambling and criminal elements, and we didn't like the cut of his jib, and we cut him off." Richard Helms subsequently retracted this statement.

BARKER recalled one of the early meetings of the White House/Special Operations Group during his Ervin Committee testimony: "We did go to this meeting, we did speak in Spanish to two or three persons that were in the old Cuban Revolutionary Council."

Miami architect Leonard Glasser reported that in October 1971, BARKER told him he needed building blueprints that included the details of the air-conditioning system and the air intake ducts of the Miami Beach Convention Center in which the Republican and Democratic conventions were to be held. Leonard Glasser: "He came to me and said he had a client in Puerto Rico who wanted to build a convention hall. It was a logical story. We were in the same building and threw business each other's way. But the city doesn't release things without authorization and they didn't have any of the plans around. Then he said 'Could you get the air conditioning plans?' This was unreal because what the hell would anyone want them for?" G. Gordon Liddy: "We had planned to sabotage the air conditioners in the convention center in Miami at the time the Democrats were in convention there." [Miami Herald 6.25.72]

The CIA reported:

1. According to press reports of August 25, 1972, Mr. Dwayne Orville Andreas is Chairman of the First Oceanic Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota. It was his $25,000 check which was given to Mr. Kenneth Dahlberg, Midwest Regional Chairman of the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, and which eventually made its way to the Miami, Florida, bank account of Watergate participant BERNARD L. BARKER.

2. Mr. Dwayne Andreas was born March 4, 1918, at Worthington, Minnesota. He is a recognized agricultural expert and from April 1952 to present has (deleted).

3. Beginning in 1962, Mr. Andreas served as Principal Officer of the Andreas Foundation (deleted).

4. Mr. Andreas' firm, the Archer Daniels Midland Company, Decatur, Illinois (deleted)

END OF NODULE.